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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I empirically assess the dynamics of political behavior. More specifi-
cally, I analyze what creates—or does not create—change in political participation,
such as voting in elections and contributing to campaigns. Through this, I intend to
show that paying close attention to dynamics can help answer fundamental questions
of political behavior and offer important insights for real-life policies.
In Chapter 1, I focus on how non-political life events and election administration
policy impact voter turnout. I analyze (1) the effect of moving on turnout over time
and (2) how an election administration policy helps with the recovery of lowered
turnout by lowering the re-registration burden of movers.
Moving depresses turnout by imposing various costs on voters. However, movers
eventually settle down, and such detrimental effects can disappear over time. I
analyze these dynamics usingUnited States Postal Services (USPS) data and detailed
voter panel data from Orange County, California. Using a generalized additive
model, I show that previously registered voters who move close to the election are
significantly less likely to vote (at most -16.2 percentage points), and it takes at least
six months on average for turnout to recover. This dip-and-recovery is not observed
for within-precinct moves, suggesting that costs of moving matter only when the
voter’s environment has changed much. I then evaluate an election administration
policy that resolves their re-registration burden. This policy proactively tracks
movers, updates their registration records for them, and notifies them by mailings.
Using a natural experiment, I find that this policy is effective in boosting turnout
(+5.9 percentage points). This success of a simple, pre-existing, and non-partisan
safety net is promising, and I conclude by discussing policy implications.
Chapter 2 (published at Election Law Journal, doi: 10.1089/elj.2019.0593, coau-
thored with R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan N. Katz) shows how the participation
dynamics of political participation differ between two distinct classes of donors—
hidden and visible (from data), based on their amount contributed. In campaign
finance we find that there is something about the data generating process that is
often overlooked, but which affects the interpretation of data greatly. This precedes
Chapter 3 as it provides some important intuitions as to how the data should be
filtered, wrangled, and interpreted for usage.
More specifically, inferences about individual campaign contributors are limited by
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how the Federal Election Commission (FEC) collects and reports data. Only trans-
actions that exceed a cycle-to-date total of $200 are individually disclosed, so that
contribution histories of many donors are unobserved. We contrast visible donors
and “hidden donors,” or small donors who are invisible due to censoring and rou-
tinely ignored in existing research. I use the Sanders presidential campaign in 2016,
whose unique campaign structure received money only through an intermediary (or
conduit) committee. These are governed by stricter disclosure statutes, allowing us
to study donors who are normally hidden. For the Sanders campaign, there were
seven hidden donors for every visible donor, and altogether, hidden donors were
responsible for 33.8% of Sanders’ campaign funds. We show that hidden donors
start giving relatively later, with contributions concentrated around early primaries.
We suggest that as presidential campaign strategies change towards wooing smaller
donors, more research on what motivates them is necessary.
In Chapter 3, I focus on how events in the election cycle affect political behavior—
this time, campaign contributions. I show how the aggregate behavior of campaign
contributors is not affected as a function of election cycle dynamics and events.
Using the 2016 campaign finance data from the FEC as a daily time-series, I test the
hypothesis that if presidential donors are either instrumental or momentum-driven,
they will be responsive to events that reveal new information about candidate vi-
ability, such as early victories or unexpected upsets in primaries. I employ the
sequential segmentation spline method to detect structural breaks while providing
smooth estimates between the jumps. I find that on the national level, daily aggre-
gates for any candidate is a slow-moving, smooth process, without any particular
critical events. Even when data is disaggregated by state, events expected to create
shocks hardly ever do, such as the Iowa caucus or the New Hampshire primary. This
is also observed for a preliminary analysis of the 2020 contribution data. I conclude
that campaign contributing is, in aggregate, a smooth process, and that donors are
neither uniformly instrumental nor momentum-driven.
In all these chapters, my methodological contribution is in taking advantage of ex-
tremely large administrative datasets and harnessing the power of the large sample
size with nonparametric and semiparametric methods. The rich world of nonpara-
metric and semiparametric methods remains largely untapped by political science
studies. I hope to show through this thesis that they can answer new questions, an-
swer old questions in new ways, and provide strong insight that the default linearity
model cannot provide.
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INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, I empirically assess the dynamics of political behavior. More specifi-
cally, I analyze what creates—or does not create—change in political participation,
such as voting in elections and contributing to campaigns. Through this, I intend to
show that paying close attention to dynamics can help answer fundamental questions
of political behavior and offer important insights for real-life policies.
Dynamics of individual-level political behavior span across many subjects and
intellectual traditions since the so-called “behavioral revolution.” In the political
psychology tradition, they can speak about the dynamic effects of the media, with
negative information or events perceived to be important potentially changing over
time. In the political sociology tradition, they can speak to the effects of changing
social contexts. In the political economy tradition, they can speak to how the tangible
benefits and costs of participation changes over time, as perceived by the individual
citizen.
Despite these important connections, the dynamics of individual-level, micro-
political behavior have not received the interest they deserve within the field. This
is perplexing, because analyzing dynamics is particularly important in political par-
ticipation, a subtopic of political behavior. Analysis of dynamics complements the
scholarship about a mechanism more frequently highlighted: habit formation. The
literature has shown that many prominent political behaviors such as turnout are
formed by habit—that is, that once a behavior is acted upon, it increases the prob-
ability of that behavior in the future. Some examples include Green and Shachar
(2000), Gerber et al. (2003), Aldrich et al. (2011), and Coppock and Green (2016).
But it is awkward to answer the why-question in political participation only with
the habit theory, because (1) it cannot explain the origin of the behavior, and (2)
empirically, behavior often changes. First, habit theory as a standalone answer to
participation would be the equivalent of answering the question of “Why are we
acting this way?” with “Because we have always done so.” There is no doubt
that there are evidences showing the observed “habit” is not simply a residue of
unexplained variance. But it still does not answer how the initial act came to be.
Moreover, empirically observed political participation is never completely static.
This is unsurprising, as the environment in which these behaviors are shaped are
constantly shifting. The ebb and flow of media/public interest in politics, changes
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in institutions or policies, information revelation from events such as elections—all
contribute to creating a dynamics that guarantees that there is no fixed behavior at
the micro-level that can be fully replicated in the next cycle of interest. For example,
in every election cycle, there are strong election-specific characteristics that affect
participation in all areas and levels differently.
The evidence for habit formation naturally calls for two separate but related ques-
tions: (1) how does the behavior form in the first place, and (2) if the behavior
changes, what causes that change? This dissertation is comprised of three essays
with independent research questions that come under the umbrella of the second
question: I take advantage of aforementioned changes in the environment to empir-
ically assess the dynamics in political behavior—especially participation—and to
determine what changes them, if anything.
Again, although political behavior itself is a broad theme, dynamics have been of less
interest, relative tomore traditional research questions. For example, the role of indi-
vidual determinants of participation such as education, race, gender, demographics,
and economic constraints such as income have been much explored (Wolfinger and
Rosenstone, 1980; Verba and Nie, 1987; Verba et al., 1995; Leighley and Vedlitz,
1999; Schlozman et al., 2012; Leighley and Nagler, 2013). Systematic, long-term
determinants such as legal and institutional constraints have also been lengthily
explored (Rosenstone and Wolfinger, 1978; Powell, 1986; Rosenstone and Hansen,
1993;Wolfinger et al., 2005; Geys, 2006; Burden et al., 2014). But determinants that
are more short-term, local, contextual, and therefore less predictable have received
less limelight. These include changes to the individual and systematic environment,
such as a sudden change in an individual voter’s life, a chance decision by local
or state-level election administrators, a political candidate’s unexpected victory in
caucuses and primaries, and so on. This dissertation is meant to be an endeavor to
fill some of this gap in the literature.
In Chapter 1, I focus on how non-political life events and election administration
policy impact political behavior—specifically, voter turnout. I analyze (1) the effect
of moving on turnout over time and (2) how an election administration policy
helps with the recovery of lowered turnout by reducing the re-registration burden of
movers.
Moving depresses turnout by imposing various costs on voters. However, movers
eventually settle down, and such detrimental effects can disappear over time. I
analyze these dynamics using USPS data and detailed voter panel data from Orange
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County, California. Using a generalized additive model, I show that previously
registered voters who move close to the election are significantly less likely to
vote (at most -16.2 percentage points), and it takes at least six months on average
for turnout to recover. This dip-and-recovery is not observed for within-precinct
moves, suggesting that costs of moving matter only when the voter’s environment
has sufficiently changed. I then evaluate an election administration policy that
resolves their re-registration burden. This policy proactively tracks movers, updates
their registration records for them, and notifies them by mailings. Using a natural
experiment, I find that it is extremely effective in boosting turnout (+5.9 percentage
points). This success of a simple, pre-existing, and non-partisan safety net is
promising, and I conclude by discussing policy implications.
Chapter 2 (published at Election Law Journal, doi: 10.1089/elj.2019.0593, coau-
thored with R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan N. Katz) shows how the dynamics
of political participation differ between two distinct classes of donors—hidden and
visible (from data), based on their amount contributed. In campaign finance we find
that an often-overlooked part of the data generating process has great implications
about the interpretation of data. This precedes Chapter 3 as it provides some impor-
tant intuitions as to how the data should be filtered, wrangled, and interpreted for
usage.
More specifically, inferences about individual campaign contributors are limited
by how the FEC collects and reports data. Only transactions that exceed a cycle-
to-date total of $200 are individually disclosed, so that contribution histories of
many donors are unobserved. We contrast visible donors and “hidden donors,” or
small donors who are invisible due to censoring and routinely ignored in existing
research. I use the Sanders presidential campaign in 2016, whose unique campaign
structure received money only through an intermediary (or conduit) committee.
These are governed by stricter disclosure statutes, allowing us to study donors who
are normally hidden. For the Sanders campaign, there were seven hidden donors
for every visible donor, and altogether, hidden donors were responsible for 33.8%
of Sanders’ campaign funds. We show that hidden donors start giving relatively
later, with contributions concentrated around early primaries. We suggest that
as presidential campaign strategies change towards wooing smaller donors, more
research on what motivates them is necessary.
In Chapter 3, I focus on how events in the election cycle affect political behavior—
this time, campaign contributions. I show how the aggregate behavior of campaign
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contributors is not affected as a function of election cycle dynamics and events.
Using the 2016 campaign finance data from the FEC as a daily time-series, I
test the hypothesis that if presidential donors are either instrumental or momentum-
driven, they will be responsive to events that reveal new information about candidate
viability, such as early victories or unexpected upsets in primaries. In addition, I
provide a smooth, de-noised estimate of the underlying campaign dynamics by
candidate. For this purpose, I employ the sequential segmentation spline method
to detect structural breaks while providing smooth estimates between the jumps.
I find that on the national level, daily aggregates for any candidate is a slow-
moving, smooth process, without any particular critical events. Even when data is
disaggregated by state, events expected to create shocks hardly ever do, such as the
Iowa caucus or the New Hampshire primary. This is also observed for a preliminary
analysis of the 2020 contribution data. I conclude that campaign contributing is, in
aggregate, a smooth process, and that donors are neither uniformly instrumental nor
momentum-driven.
In all these chapters, my methodological contribution is in taking advantage of ex-
tremely large administrative datasets and harnessing the power of the large sample
size with nonparametric and semiparametric methods. The rich world of nonpara-
metric and semiparametric methods remains largely untapped by political science
studies, often because much of the literature has relied on surveys, which can fall
short in the number of observations necessary to run more flexible regressions. I
hope to show through this thesis that they can answer new questions, answer old
questions in new ways, and provide strong insight that the default linearity model
cannot provide.
5
C h a p t e r 1
GETTING SETTLED IN YOUR NEW HOME: THE COSTS OF
MOVING ON VOTER TURNOUT
1.1 Introduction
Americans are very mobile—every year, at least 10% of the total population moves
(United States Census Bureau, 2018a,c). This is an internal migration rate that is
almost twice as high as other developed countries’ rates. In 2018, with 10.1% of
‘mover’ rate, more than 30 million people changed residences in the United States.
Andwhile moving in itself many not necessarily be a political life event, it has a large
impact on people’s political participation, particularly by reducing their turnout rate
(Squire et al., 1987; Highton, 2000).
Many different types of costs obstruct movers’ turnout. A voter whose residence
changed has to re-register to vote with her new address and figure out where her new
polling place is, which poses an administrative burden. She has to learn the names
and the issue positions of her new political representatives if she crosses political
district lines. In addition, she may no longer have friends and neighbors in her new
community, which can break the social and contextual cues that motivate her to turn
out.
On the other hand, a voter is rarely a mover for a long time. She eventually settles
into her new home, transitions into a ‘stayer,’ and overcomes the detrimental shock of
moving on political participation. Eventually, she will have more time to re-register,
to learn about the new political districts, and to build social ties. Given this, what is
the dynamic impact of moving on turnout? If there is a significantly negative effect
of moving, can we offset the reduced turnout of movers by a policy intervention?
I answer these questions using detailed voter panel data from California’s Orange
County between the 2016 and 2018 elections, appended with data from the United
States Postal Services (USPS).
The existing studies have been somewhat limited, by either relying on settings where
some types of costs are entirely alleviated by the institutional setting, or by using
surveys with a small sample size and rough, self-reported measurements related
to moving. This unique administrative dataset on the American electorate—large,
accurate, and comprehensive—helps fill the gap in the literature by overcoming
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measurement constraints present in survey-based research.
Using a generalized additive model, I show that previously registered voters who
move close to the election are significantly less likely to vote. Compared to a voter
who has lived for a full two years at her new residence, the propensity to vote is at
most 16.2 percentage points lower. The detrimental effect is largely transitory, but I
find that it takes at least six months on average for turnout to recover. The nonlinear
dip-and-recovery pattern is not seen for moves where information costs of voting
are nonexistent or very low. This suggests that costs of moving matter only when
the voter’s environment has sufficiently changed.
Time does help a voter recover frommoving. Yet, is there a way to quickly offset the
lowered turnout other than simply waiting—that is, speed the convergence? I evalu-
ate an election administration policy designed to retainmovers by lifting their burden
of having to re-register to vote. I exploit a natural experiment in which because of a
policy implemented in California, which I call NCOA automatic voter registration,
only some movers were proactively tracked, had their voter registration updated for
them, and were notified of the automated change by an official mailing. I find those
who received this mailing turned out 5.9 percentage points more. This is a highly
effective get out the vote (GOTV)measure. Moreover, this is a simple, non-partisan,
and pre-existing policy based on the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, which
is very promising for a scale-up. I discuss the policy implications and suggest that
restrictions placed on this policy should be lifted if election administrators want to
increase turnout of voters who move close to the Election Day.
1.2 Literature
Who Are the Movers?
Annually, at least 10% of Americans move.1 This is a decreased proportion
compared to when Squire et al. (1987) performed their survey (30%), but still a
formidable percentage. Table 1.1 shows geographic mobility for the last five years,
estimated from the Current Population Survey (CPS), 2013-2018. It also provides
more details into where movers are headed to. Two-thirds of internal migration
within the United States is same-county moves. One-fifth of moves are same-state,
cross-county moves, and about 15% of Americans cross state borders.
It should first be recognized that movers are nonrandom, self-selected group. What
1This estimate of 10% is, of course, pre-COVID-19 statistics, and the number is likely to decrease.
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2017-2018 2016-2017 2015-2016 2014-2015 2013-2014
As proportion of population,
— Movers 10.1 11.0 11.2 11.6 11.5
— Non-movers 89.9 89.0 88.8 88.4 88.5
As proportion of within-country movers,
— Same-county movers 63.7 64.2 63.8 66.1 67.8
— Same-state, different-county movers 20.8 19.8 22.2 19.2 18.7
— Different state movers 15.5 15.9 14.1 14.7 13.5
Table 1.1: Annual Geographical Mobility Rates, By Type of Movement: 2013-2018
does it mean for a voter to have changed residences?2 They are likely to be younger
and renters (Squire et al., 1987; McDonald, 2008). Some also document that they
are more likely to be non-white (McDonald, 2008) and higher educated (Squire
et al., 1987). But what makes them move?
Reason for Moving 2017-2018 2016-2017 2015-2016 2014-2015 2013-2014
1 Wanted new or better home/apartment 16.4 16.0 17.4 15.3 15.8
2 To establish own household 12.6 11.5 12.2 11.0 11.1
3 Other family reason 11.1 11.3 10.5 14.3 13.4
4 New job or job transfer 10.3 9.9 10.8 10.6 9.7
5 Wanted cheaper housing 7.9 8.3 8.2 7.5 9.4
6 Wanted to own home, not rent 7.3 7.3 5.9 5.3 5.6
7 Other housing reason 6.7 7.6 6.7 14.4 12.8
8 To be closer to work/easier commute 5.6 5.5 6.0 4.9 6.2
9 Other reasons 5.0 5.0 4.4 1.5 1.0
10 Change in marital status 4.4 5.1 4.8 5.8 4.9
11 To attend or leave college 2.8 3.0 3.2 0.3 0.5
12 Wanted better neighborhood/less crime 2.6 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.0
13 Health reasons 1.8 1.9 1.8 0.3 0.4
14 To look for work or lost job 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.1
15 Retired 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.7
16 Other job-related reason 1.1 0.9 1.2 2.3 2.0
17 Foreclosure/eviction 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.7 1.3
18 Change of climate 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.1
19 Natural disaster 0.5 0.3 0.1 — 0.0
Table 1.2: Reasons for Moving, 2013-2018, The Census Bureau, Aligned in De-
scending Order Using 2017-2018 Responses
Table 1.2 displays the reasons cited for moving in percentages from the Annual
Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (United
States Census Bureau, 2018b), 2013-2018. In 2017 to 2018, 40.9% of moves were
2I use residential mobility instead of geographic mobility to refer to any changes in residence,
regardless of distance. According to Gillespie (2016), geographic mobility refers to “long-distance
household migration across some administrative or geopolitical boundary,” whereas residential mo-
bility refers to “short-distance household mobility.” Highton (2000) uses residential mobility vs.
community mobility similarly to distinguish changes in residences from changes in communities.
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housing-related,3 28.1%were family-related,4 and 18.5% job-related.5 The first and
foremost reason seems to be that the mover wanted a new or better home (16.4%).
As can be seen, factors behind moving are diverse and not dominated by one
particular reason. Age is clearly a key higher-level variable, as many events in
a person’s life cycle such as marriage or job seem to trigger residential mobility.
Indeed, the Census Bureau has consistently reported that people in their mid to late
twenties have the highest mobility rate, at 65.5% during a five-year interval (Ihrke
and Faber, 2012).6 While I recognize that movers are a self-selected group, the
interest of this paper is analyzing the changes to turnout only within the group of
movers. Hence, the upcoming analysis is entirely conditional on being a mover
within the last two years.
The Costs of Turnout
The analysis of turnout for movers is part of the larger literature of what influences
individual turnout, a key indicator and foundation of legitimate democracy. Previous
research has shown that there are a variety of reasonswhymovers will face additional
burdens when turning out to vote. Residential mobility can activate one or more of
these barriers, as can other factors. While many different costs of voting exist, three
types of costs are relevant: convenience costs, information costs, and social costs.
The key idea behind convenience costs is that turnout can deteriorate due to barriers
between the voter and the polling place (or a vote-by-mail ballot). Because voter
registration was not fully automatic anywhere in the U.S. until recently,7 the major
3These are, per exact quote from the data, “wanted own home,” “not rent,” “wanted new
or better home/apartment,” “wanted better neighborhood/less crime,” “wanted cheaper housing,”
“foreclosure/eviction,” and “other housing reason.”
4These are change in marital status, to establish own household, and other family reason. Other
family reason is the third-largest factor in moving, but an ambiguous category. To supplement this
loss in information, the Census Bureau has conducted an analysis of a write-in expansion (Ihrke,
2016). They determined that the common write-in responses for this particular category were such as
movedwith familymember(s), pregnant/had a baby/adoption, assist or take care of familymember(s),
death of a family member, and move closer to family.
5These are new job or job transfer, to look for work or lost job, to be closer to work/easier
commute, retired, and other job-related reason.
6In sociology, the life-cycle theory of householdmobility argues that individuals relocate because
they are dissatisfied with their current housing when there is a change in family size and household
composition (Rossi, 1980; Gillespie, 2016). Highton and Wolfinger (2001) on the other hand
concluded that early adult roles have inconsistent and sometimes negative association with turnout,
while age significantly boosts turnout, independent of assuming social roles.
7The only exception is the state of Oregon, which first implemented automatic voter regis-
tration (AVR) in 2015. Of course, limited forms of AVR exist such as through the DMV or
state-level benefits agencies. For a full list of states participating in various levels of AVR, see
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration.aspx.
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discussion has been focused on institutional barriers to registration (Rosenstone
and Wolfinger, 1978; Wolfinger et al., 2005; Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2006;
Nickerson, 2014; Street et al., 2015). For movers, convenience costs equate to the
burden of re-registering to vote to reflect their recent-most address. Squire et al.
(1987) show that the longer people live in their homes, the more likely that they
will turn out, attributing it to having more time to newly register. Highton (2000)
shows that changing residences accounts more for a drop in turnout than changing
communities, suggesting that re-registration costs are high.
Information costs constitute the cost of (1) having to learn about the choices available
on the ballot for the new political jurisdiction, and (2) having to learn where, if
changed, a new polling place is. By the same vein, voters roll off for unfamiliar
choices (Wattenberg et al., 2000) or when they are redistricted/reprecincted (Hayes
and McKee, 2009; Brady and McNulty, 2011; Amos et al., 2017). Hansen (2016)
finds that crossing municipality borders did not lower turnout, but along with Squire
et al. (1987), finds that educated voters are less affected by moving.
Social costs usually indicates a decrease in social rewards from voting, or a de-
creasing  term. Because turnout is perceived as a desirable behavior, it results in
intrinsic satisfaction from social networks (Rosenstone andHansen, 1993). A higher
degree of social “embeddedness” will give higher turnout, while its disruption result
in a lower turnout, such as recent loss of a spouse (Hobbs et al., 2014). Moving can
also cut social ties and lower turnout: Aldrich et al. (2011) discuss the disruption
of voter’s habit formation by moving; Gay (2012) shows that mobility experiments
had a negative impact on poor voters’ turnout whose social relations were severed;
Hansen (2016) argues that when there are no convenience costs, absence of evidence
for information costs translates into evidence of social costs on turnout.
All in all, moving hampers turnout in a variety of ways. But how does the voter
adapt to the damage incurred by moving over time? This can depend on residential
stability, or how long she has lived in her new residence. Previous literature has
been mostly built on surveys, which have many covariates, but often lack power to
answer these questions, as the number of survey respondents is limited. Movers are
but a small part of the already strained survey sample, and it is plausible that movers
are less likely to be contacted for or answer surveys. Highton and Wolfinger (2001)
pooled six presidential elections’ worth respondents for a sufficiently large sample
size within the National Election Studies (NES) for a total of 9,435 respondents. The
CPS’s sample size is much larger, but it faces the same problem, and its technical
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documentation briefly touches upon the bias and sample variation from the exclusion
of movers.8 Moreover, the CPS breaks down residential stability into five uneven
categories.9 The only paper that uses administrative data is Hansen (2016), but here
residential stability is again presented in uneven, arbitrary categories of 0-30 days,
31-90 days, and 90 days and beyond.
The detailed voter data that I use improves upon these measurement constraints. I
have sufficient sample size to fully use the residential stability information without
discretizing them into coarser categories. What is more, it is accurate and not reliant
upon self-reported moving and turnout information, the latter of which especially
can be subject to social desirability bias. To cap it all, the data contains granular
information on their old and new residences and political districts, which I can
geocode and use to identify different environments in which adaptations can occur
heterogeneously.
In particular, I build upon the less-studied aspect of information costs of moving
and show that turnout depends on not only how long you have lived there, but also
how much your environment changed by moving. I show that dynamic adaptation
occurs differently by what information barriers the movers is facing.
Finally, this paper provides a first-ever evaluation of an election administration
policy aimed to retain movers, rooted in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993
(NVRA). The policy idea is in fact first suggested in Squire et al. (1987) in discussing
how to increase turnout and also briefly discussed in Wolfinger and Highton (1995)
and Highton and Wolfinger (1998). However, again due the low power of surveys,
the authors were not able to estimate the partial effect of the policy.
1.3 Data and Context
This Section describes the data acquisition and the sample in detail. The data is
provided by official election administrators, and it is a combination of official voter
registration records and the change-of-address requests filed at the USPS, a rare
chance to look in-depth at movers’ political participation. In my final sample, out of
8In 16-4, Quality Indicators of Nonsample Errors, the authors write as follows:
Panel nonresponse. (M)overs are not followed, but the new household members are
interviewed ... Out-movers were more likely to be unemployed but more likely to
respond compared with in-movers.
9CPS distinguishes the length by (1) less than 1 month, (2) 1-6 months, (3) 7-11 months, (4) 1-2
years, (4) 3-4 years, (5) 5 years or longer.
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roughly 1.5 million registered voters, I have 102,425 movers in the data. For details
on data wrangling and descriptive statistics, see Appendix A.2 and A.3.
Official Voter Database from Orange County, California
Data Acquisition. The voter database is provided by the Orange County Registrar
of Voters (OCROV) in California. The acquisition is part of a long-term, larger
project built on strong cooperation and trust with election administrators of Orange
County, who are the leading public servants in terms of innovative administration
practices. Including the 2016 general election snapshot, I have received 156 daily
“snapshots” of the data for more than 1.5 million unique voters from April 26, 2018
to December 31, 2018, which cover 89% of business days within the period. This
enables me to observe exactly when the voter data changes, and as I will illustrate
in Section 1.3, can be used to find movers with details about when and where they
moved. This is an unprecedented level of granular details provided for academic
studies and provides high accuracy in capturing the dynamic aspect of the voter file.
Given the daily snapshots, I apply entity resolution between them to reverse-engineer
transaction logs to the data. More simply, this allows me to look into what records
are added, dropped, or changed, on a daily level. By closely observing how the data
changes day to day, I am able to extract not onlywhomoves, but when they re-register
and through what means. These details contain insight into what the voter is doing,
and what policies are affecting the re-registration or voting decisions. No other
existing compilation of voter data provides such information, and none certainly
have been augmented with the National Change of Address (NCOA) dataset. For
more details on the data, refer to Kim et al. (2019).
Asides from being able to determine mover status, the voter data carries many useful
covariates. It carries full street-level addresses of old and new residences which can
be geocoded into specific latitude/longitudes and accompanying political districts. It
also has date of birth, original place of birth, partisan affiliation, precinct assignment,
political district assignments such as Congressional districts, first and most recent
voter registration date, and the reasons for the last update of the registration. Most of
all, it has accurate records of voting history that is not inflated by social desirability
bias as in surveys. I also augment the data with imputed gender and race.10
10While there is a ‘gender’ entry in the Orange County dataset, most of the entries are missing,
as it is not an official field in the voter registration document. R package gender (Mullen, 2018;
Blevins and Mullen, 2015) of rOpenSci project helps infer gender by first names and the Social
Security Administration’s yearly dataset. If there is an entered gender or a prefix (e.g. ‘Mr.’), it
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Differentiating Movers. Movers are defined as those who have moved after the
2016 general Election Day and before the 2018 general Election Day, up to October
31, 2018—that is, those who have moved within two years of Election Day, as in
Squire et al. (1987).11 My sample is limited to in-county movers, which enables
full visibility of their voting history for the dependent variable, which is the 2018
general election turnout. Note that in-county movers form the lion’s share of movers
at more than 63% as seen in Table 1.1, giving sufficient number of cases to analyze
movers’ political behavior.
I differentiate movers from stayers by closely monitoring the changes in the resi-
dential addresses of voters. This may seem initially odd because not all movers will
voluntarily report their new address to the Registrar, who maintains the countywide
voter database. Indeed, while a voter can voluntarily re-register to vote with their
new address or visit the Department of Motor Vehicles and update their registration
information there, not all voters will do either of these things. The OCROV writes
in its website as follows:
Unfortunately most people that move notify their banks, car lenders,
family and friends - even magazine subscriptions before they change
their voter registration. You can help us to keep our voter lists up-to-
date by taking a few minutes to notify us of changes in your life.
In Orange County, it is possible to detect movers just by observing the Registrar’s
changing data due to a particular election administration practice called NCOA pro-
cessing. While originally designed as voter list maintenance activity, the processing
allows the Registrar to detect movers in advance, even when they do not voluntarily
inform the election administrators. Section 1.3 illustrates this.
National Change-of-Address (NCOA) Data
The NVRA, while mainly about offering more opportunities to register to vote, also
requires the states to maintain accurate, up-to-date database. To achieve this goal,
states can use the permanent change-of-address requests submitted to the USPS.
Individuals submit such requests to the USPS because then the agency will forward
overrides the inferred gender. For race/ethnicity, R package wru uses surname and geolocation to
infer race (Khanna et al., 2017; Imai and Khanna, 2016) using Bayesian updating. The inference is
primarily performed on the census block level.
11While ideally I would like to observe movers for a longer period, this is restricted because the
data collection began in 2018.
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mail from their old residence to the new one. USPS maintains the last 48 months’
requests, called NCOA data, which approximates 160 million change-of-address
(COA) records with accurate old and new residences, as well as when the individual
moved and requested the data.
While not strictly required to use the NCOA dataset, California’s Election Code
requires the Secretary of State to match the statewide voter file to NCOA data
(called NCOA processing). If existing voters have changed addresses, the Secretary
will then transfer the data to relevant counties. For protection of voters’ privacy, the
change-of-address request dates are coarsened to the month of the move instead of
the exact date, and the data is disseminated on a monthly basis. Within the Orange
County data in question, there were two major NCOA processing, respectively, on
July 26, 2018, and December 20, 2018, to monitor which voters moved each month.
Again, note that while this is coarsened, this is still an unprecedented level of detailed
data compared to the previous literature.
If the address change is within the same county, the voter file is automatically
updated with a forwardable address confirmation mailing sent to the voter. If this
update was a mistake because there was an error or the move is temporary, the voter
can inform the Registrar using a prepaid postage or a phone call. For the full wording
of the various legal statutes and California’s NVRA guidelines, see Appendix A.1.
In sum, by examining the changing data, it is possible to detect between the 2016-
2018 elections (1) all voters who have voluntarily reported their change of address to
the Registrar before any NCOA processing, and (2) all voters who did not voluntarily
report, but filed a change of address with the USPS, thereby being detected through
NCOA processing, and ultimately had their address updated within the Registrar’s
database.12 I classify them altogether as movers between the 2016-2018 elections.
Again, this is a valuable addition by the NCOA dataset.
Validated Movers. The NCOA data enables the classification of movers, as the
Registrar performed NCOA processing up to movers of November 2018. The only
undetected movers would be those who did not voluntarily inform the Registrar,
the DMV, nor the USPS, and did not vote in either the primary or general election
with the updated address. While this is theoretically possible, I limit my sample of
12In Orange County, another source of third party address changes are consumer credit reporting
agencies, which a county can use to verify a voter’s residence per CA Elec Code § 2227 (2017).
However, as we detail above, we do not use this class of movers, which form a very small percentage.
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movers to those who requested a change of address with the USPS, independent of
informing the Registrar.
This is a validation measure which ensures that the measured mobility is not a
correction of incorrect data entries/typos. Suppose that a voter has lived at 110 N.
California Boulevard, and the address changes to 1100 N. California Boulevard in
the voter data. Or suppose that I see a voter’s record change from 200 S. Main
Street to 200 N. Main Street. Is this a real change in physical residences, or a
modification in data with no entailing real-world change? By itself it is difficult to
discern. However, even if the old and new addresses look similar, if I see that in the
USPS data that the voter has requested a change of address, I can be assured that
there is a true change in residences.
In addition, I am able to get an accurate measure of when a voter has moved, which
is something not available in the voter database. For instance, if a voter voluntarily
reports a new address to the Registrar in October 2018 but does not have any record
in the NCOA database, it is incorrect to impute her moving date to October 2018
because it would be confounded by the fact that closer to the election, voters will
remember to re-register more. As this paper’s interest is in the dynamic effect of
moving, ascertaining the timing of the move is vital.
While these two points are strong pros in limiting the sample of movers to those
who officially requested the change of address, one point should be noted. There
is no study to my knowledge about who chooses to request the change of address
as opposed to those who do not. Therefore, it is unclear whether and if so, how
inference will be affected by the decision to limit the analysis to validated movers.
The data itself is certainly popular—for example, the Census Bureau has usedNCOA
data to supplement the tracking ofmigrations (Hogan, 2008). The younger electorate
such as teenagers may be underrepresented, as they are likely to have little mail in
their name. Not many more educated guesses are possible.13
The OCROV used a USPS-licensed vendor to provide me with the augmented data.
Some 2 out of 3 movers that I had classified could be matched to the NCOA dataset,
with the same set of old and new addresses as can be found in the voter file. In the
end I have around 100,000 voters.
13Comparison within the available voter file is not a valid comparison, since the baseline popula-
tion will be then those who voluntarily reports to the Registrar or those who vote without the change
of address requests.
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1.4 Dynamic Impact of Moving
In this Section, I describe how I estimate how voters adapt to moving—the impact
of moving over time. In particular, I show how the impact varies by different hurdles
of moving, defined by different informational environments.
Methods
The dependent variable used in this paper is turnout for 2018 general election.
Residential stability, or months lived at the new residence, is the key explanatory
variable. This is a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 24 months lived in the
new residence before the 2018 General Election. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution
of number of movers by each value. For example, those who have lived four months
at their new home by November Election Day are essentially movers in July 2018.
There is a seasonality as summer is the most popular time for moving, and January
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Months at the New Residence
Ideally within a controlled environment, a researcher could randomize (1) the timing
of voter’smoves given a particular election date and (2) the various costs that shemay
potentially face. As this is not possible, the data is observational. An experimental
research design is also difficult, since ignorability of treatment assignment is likely
to be violated with voters who have moved in various points in time. However,
the cross-sectional analyses presented in this Section, which show the conditional
prediction of turnout given the values of the independent variables, still provide
insight into a problem that practically does not have an experimental design. In
addition, it is likely that voters do not self-select into choosing their timing of
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residential move based on the decision of whether to turn out to vote in a future
election. Hence in this paper, I assume that the cross-sectional variation between
the 24 months is conditional on the observables. For example, the seasonality of
moving is age-dependent, hence I control for age.
In the following Subsections, I show how turnout is depressed by moving by
semiparametric regressions. More specifically, I use generalized additive models
(GAMs) which can flexibly fit continuous variables. The functional form associated
with costs that change over time is not known, and there is no reason a priori to
assume that the relationship will be linear. Using GAMs can expand the analysis
beyond the default linearity assumption while keeping the interpretability of an ad-
ditive model. In addition, while parametric handling of nonlinearity such as log
transformations or polynomial regressions will impose a global function, GAMs are
local and more flexible (Beck and Jackman, 1998). The results indeed show that the
relationship between residential stability and turnout is strongly nonlinear and need
a local specification.
GAMs are fitted by the R package mgcv using thin plate regression splines (TPRS)
and fitted by restricted maximum likelihood (REML) method. The smoothness
is automatically selected using a penalized spline approach and are checked with
standard diagnostics to see if the basis dimensions for smooth functions are adequate
(Wood, 2017). TPRS have one basis function per data point, but the basis functions
are reduced by eigendecomposition, hence fitting on a reduced problem (Wood,
2003).
Because I show how costs of moving depends on different environments, I fur-
ther use factor-by-curves, which is an extension of simple GAMs, by allowing the
smoothed continuous variable to ‘interact’ with a specified factor. In other words,
the smoothing curves are fitted separately for each level of the factor, subject to a
centering constraint. For more reference on GAMs, see Hastie (1992), Beck and
Jackman (1998), Keele (2008), Wood (2011), and Wood (2017). All continuous
variables are smoothed. The main independent variable is the months lived at the
new residence, which is an interval variable, taking discrete values from 1 to 24.
Given this, the usage of GAM provides a unique specification into the relationship




Not all moves are created equal—amove across the street is not equal to amove thirty
miles away from your original home. As explored in the literature, these situations
pose different costs on turnout. While it is impossible to fully net out convenience
and social costs, it is possible to differentiate the information environments that
voters are facing. For factor-by-curves, I use the following categorical proxies for
information costs:
1. The voter moved but stayed at the same street address (e.g. only changed units
within the same apartment complex), labeled Same Address (3.3%);
2. The voter moved within the same precinct and with the same polling place,
labeled Same Precinct (5.7%);
3. The voter crossed precinct boundaries but within the same state-level or local
political districts,14 andwith the same polling place, labeled Same Subdistricts
(8.3%);
4. The voter crossed some local or state-level districts or her polling place
changed, but within the same Congressional district, labeled Same Congres-
sional District (46.3%);
5. The voter crossed Congressional district lines: Different Congressional Dis-
trict (36.5%).
The variable captures five different situations a mover can face, with progressively
larger burdens. Note that convenience cost should theoretically apply to all movers,
and the social costs are not independent with information costs. For example, if
social costs are roughly proxied by distance moved, if a voter moves within the same
apartment, there are certainly no information or social costs involved, because the
distance moved is zero. If a voter moves a mile or more, it is highly likely that she
crosses precinct boundaries. If she moves sufficiently far away, she is also likely to
cross local, state, and federal district boundaries. Therefore, I simply term this the
difference in ‘environment,’ or (generic) costs of moving.
The logistic GAM with factor-by-curves used in this paper is as follows, for 8 =
1, · · · , =:
14These include state Senate districts, state Assembly districts, supervisorial districts, and ward
divisions.
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H8 is turnout in the 2018 general election, G is residential stability (months lived at the
new residence), and I is the information cost category. X1 is the set of variables that
are linearly added without smoothing, such as dummies for race/ethnicity or gender.
X2 is the set of variables that are additive but smoothed, such as age, and 6: for
: = 1, · · · ,  are nonparametric smooth functions fitted for each of these variables.
W is separately includedwith the indicator variables I8 for information cost categories
I = 1, · · · , 5, subject to ∑5I=1 I8 = 0, because the estimation of smooth functions is
subject to a centered constraint. Note that the model is essentially specifying that
the residential stability information should not be pooled for different environments,
while for other variables such as age, voters are exchangeable across environments.
The following covariates are controlled for: number of times moved in a 24-month
period, straight Euclidean distance from voter’s home to the designated polling place
(Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003; Dyck and Gimpel, 2005; McNulty et al., 2009),
permanent absentee voting status (Gronke et al., 2007), age, inferred gender15 and
race, partisan affiliation, 2016 general turnout, census block group-level median
household income of both their old and new residences, whether the voter was
born abroad (e.g. a naturalized citizen), and the Congressional district of the new
residence. The Congressional district was added to address the fact that there were
some hotly contested House races in the 2018 general election, as opposed to other
districts where landslides were predicted.
Results
Heterogeneity by Costs of Moving
Figure 1.2 shows the relationship between residential stability and turnout by each
information cost category, holding other covariates fixed.16 What is immediately
153.8% of voters have an ambiguous gender that cannot be inferred from the first name. In these
cases, these are treated as unknown and as a baseline group, instead of dropping them from the
sample.
16The dependent variable’s values displayed in conditional plots usually use the median value
for continuous variables and mode values for categorical variables, as each covariate has to have
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Figure 1.2: Fitted Smooth Functions for Residential Stability by Information Cost
striking is that there is a clear nonlinear trend for movers with medium to high
information costs (? < 0.001). There is a severe dip in turnout for movers close to
the election if they at least crossed precinct lines. By the projected propensity to
vote, an average voter (regardless of information environment) who has lived fully
two years at her new residence will vote 67.6% of the time. An average voter who
has lived only two months will vote 51.4%, resulting in maximum difference of 16.2
percentage points. Turnout steadily climbs before it reaches a plateau with slight
variance, displaying similar patterns for the last three panels.
For movers with sufficient change in their informational environment, it takes at
least six months or more for their turnout to climb to the level of stayers (about
70%). The slight uptick of turnout for movers of October 2018 is puzzling, but it
is likely because some of them were eligible to vote in their original precinct and
polling place. By California election statutes, movers within 14 days of the Election
Day can choose to vote either at their old or new residence’s polling place.17
On the other hand, movers who havemoved but stayed at the same street address (? =
0.0924) or within the same precinct (? = 0.3004) do not show strong associations
between their time at the new residence and turnout. Given that the sample size for
a fixed value. The predictions are not necessarily aligned with the average predicted value of the
dependent variable. For more on visualizing the relationship between a single independent variable
and the dependent variable, see (Breheny and Burchett, 2013). For the full set of values used for the
displayed figures, see Appendix ??.
17I do not interpret the bumps after turnout reaches a plateau—these are less likely to be ‘inter-
esting local features’ (Beck and Jackman, 1998).
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same-address movers is 3,000 or more voters, and the sample size for same-precinct
movers at least 5,000, it seems to be the case that for those with low to no information
cost, there is no strong evidence for turnout change over time. Crossing precinct
lines or more seem to be a necessary condition to observe the dip and recovery.















A. Smooth terms (effective degrees of freedom / residual degrees of freedom)
Res. Stability × Same Address 3.353 1.148∗ 2.698 2.655 1.030 1.003 1.002
4.153 1.145 3.358 3.305 1.059 1.006 1.004
Res. Stability × Same Precinct 2.684 1.145 3.391 1.931 1.004 1.003 1.933
3.341 1.276 4.206 2.418 1.007 1.007 2.421
Res. Stability × Same Subdist. 7.205∗∗∗ 1.034 2.305 1.015 2.007 3.971 3.473∗∗
8.232 1.067 2.878 1.030 1.792 4.899 4.305
Res. Stability × Same Cong. 8.446∗∗∗ 3.810∗∗∗ 3.910∗ 1.013 1.792∗ 2.296 1.002
8.913 4.709 4.830 1.027 2.241 2.868 1.004
Res. Stability × Diff. Cong. 8.428∗∗∗ 3.177∗∗∗ 1.235 2.552 1.015 1.003∗ 1.002
8.908 3.945 1.433 3.183 1.029 1.007 1.003
Distance Moved 1.139∗ 1.009∗ 2.828 2.270 1.006 1.005 1.002
1.139 1.017 3.580 2.887 1.011 1.011 1.006
Age 7.991∗∗∗ 7.378∗∗∗ 7.314∗∗∗ 7.035∗∗∗ 7.603∗∗∗ 7.655∗∗∗ 8.115∗∗∗
8.655 8.227 8.200 7.998 8.473 8.365 8.752
Distance to Poll 4.947∗ 1.037 2.287 1.021 2.102∗ 1.011 1.814
6.035 1.074 2.910 1.041 2.676 1.021 2.303
Old Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
8.623∗∗∗ 8.140∗∗∗ 5.252∗∗ 8.377∗∗∗ 8.060∗∗∗ 3.017∗∗∗ 7.732∗∗∗
8.955 8.786 6.318 8.882 8.754 3.808 8.573
New Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
8.357∗∗∗ 7.866∗∗∗ 1.009∗ 6.994∗∗ 3.103∗∗ 2.371∗ 1.003
8.881 8.655 1.019 8.037 3.891 3.029 1.006
B. Parametric coefficients (estimate / standard error)
Same Precinct 0.053 0.043 0.003 0.303∗∗∗ 0.163 0.134 0.094
(0.050) (0.058) (0.053) (0.064) (0.084) (0.069) (0.080)
Same Subdist. 0.113∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.063 0.395∗∗∗ 0.170∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.064
(0.048) (0.054) (0.050) (0.060) (0.079) (0.064) (0.075)
Same Cong. −0.004 0.133∗∗ 0.019 0.312∗∗∗ 0.152∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.042) (0.047) (0.046) (0.056) (0.071) (0.056) (0.068)
Diff. Cong. −0.026 0.104∗ −0.018 0.325∗∗∗ 0.158∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.031
(0.045) (0.050) (0.050) (0.059) (0.074) (0.060) (0.071)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 100,389 96,195 83,977 71,411 69,104 65,388 59,914
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.052 0.090 0.134 0.165 0.067 0.164
Log Likelihood −57,722.160 −45,323.170 −53,401.650 −41,960.780 −26,208.670 −34,083.580 −27,761.590
UBRE 57,859.880 45,412.880 53,480.550 42,045.840 26,277.130 34,150.990 27,832.550
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 1.3: Generalized Additive Model Results, Full Sample
Placebo Tests
For a robustness check, I perform placebo tests—that is, the same analysis on data
where there was no ‘intervention,’ which should theoretically yield null results. An
intuitive placebo test to check for sample self-selection is to not use turnout of 2018
general election but use turnout of previous elections. Because residential changes
took place after the 2016 general election, theoretically, the imposed costs should
not affect turnout for previous elections. Table 1.3 shows the results of the main
regression and its placebo checks using primary and general elections of 2016, 2014,
and 2012. The table contains both the parametric coefficients and the smooth terms,
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and covariates are excluded for brevity—the full table can be found in Appendix
A.4.
The first noticeable results from placebo tests are the sample-selection issue of
information cost categories. From Figure 1.2, comparative to movers within the
same subdistricts, it appears that the mean of predicted turnout is lower for those
with higher information costs. However, the placebo tests show that voters seem to
be self-selecting into these different environments. A voter who moves within the
same apartment complex can be a different voter than those who cross Congressional
district lines, although what this means substantively is uncertain.
But having partialed out the difference in means by a centering constraint, do fitted
smooth functions also pass placebo tests? Although not perfectly for every cost
and past election combination, the results seem reasonable for elections before the
2016 general election. For the 2016 general, there is a strong nonlinear relationship
documented for movers with high information costs, on a smaller scale (effective
degrees of freedom ≈ 3) and in the opposite direction, if linearly fitted.
Why is this the case? The likely answer is that the 2016 general election is not a
great placebo for this model, because costs may also incur right before the voter
moves. Note that a voter who has lived in her new residence for twenty-four months
before the 2018 election is essentially a voter who has moved in the thicket of the
2016 general election month. Take distraction costs. A voter may be more distracted
before she moves, rather than after, because it would take at least a few months to
search make a housing decision and to search for appropriate housing. In addition,
a voter who will soon move has no objective benefit to reap from a community
that she will soon leave. In that case, the information costs of learning about local
issues can outweigh the benefits of voting (Dowding et al., 2012). Figure 1.3 shows
the descriptive proportion of turnout for respectively the 2016 and 2018 elections
by residential stability. The placebo tests excluding the 2016 general election tests
generally seem to pass.
Disentangling Distance Moved
Although the distance moved is adjusted for in the result above, it should be still
clarified—is it distance that is actually driving the dip and recovery of turnout for
voters with high information costs?
I test whether there is still a dynamic relationship when there is little to no distance
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Figure 1.3: Turnout of Movers, 2016 and 2018 General Elections
Same Address Same Precinct Same Dist. Same Cong. Diff. Cong.




















Figure 1.4: Fitted Smooth Functions for Residential Stability by Information Cost,
Movers within Half-Mile
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A. Smooth terms (effective degrees of freedom / residual degrees of freedom)
Res. Stability × Same Address 3.310 1.708∗ 2.771 2.732 1.148 1.002 1.000
4.102 1.004 3.448 3.400 1.281 1.003 1.001
Res. Stability × Same Precinct 2.559 1.004 3.169 1.930 3.181 1.541 3.155
3.189 1.008 3.937 2.416 3.954 1.904 3.924
Res. Stability × Same Subdist. 3.613∗ 1.113∗ 2.019 4.075 1.001∗∗∗ 1.001 3.368∗∗
4.472 1.218 2.522 6.027 1.001 1.002 4.177
Res. Stability × Same Cong. 3.003∗ 1.001 1.438 1.001 1.001 1.504 1.001
3.730 1.003 1.756 1.002 1.002 1.853 1.001
Res. Stability × Diff. Cong. 1.564∗∗ 1.003 1.002 1.002 1.808 1.003 1.084
1.939 1.006 1.005 1.004 2.274 1.005 1.163
Age 6.009∗∗∗ 4.398∗∗∗ 4.492∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 4.788∗∗∗ 6.285∗∗∗ 3.961∗∗∗
7.102 5.392 5.510 1.166 5.856 7.297 4.907
Distance to Poll 1.016 1.003 1.004 1.003 1.001 1.000 1.001
1.031 1.005 1.008 1.005 1.003 1.001 1.002
Old Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
5.223∗ 6.960∗∗ 3.146 3.645 1.002 1.000∗ 1.957
6.297 7.998 3.944 4.534 1.003 1.001 2.484
B. Parametric coefficients (estimate / standard error)
Same Precinct 0.057 0.053 −0.026 0.262∗∗∗ 0.120 0.118 0.031
(0.058) (0.068) (0.061) (0.073) (0.098) (0.080) (0.094)
Same Subdist. 0.053 0.184∗ 0.109 0.253∗∗ −0.093 0.238∗ −0.089
(0.077) (0.089) (0.079) (0.093) (0.130) (0.104) (0.122)
Same Cong. 0.009 0.305∗∗ −0.006 0.266∗∗ −0.024 0.312∗∗ −0.041
(0.080) (0.093) (0.083) (0.097) (0.134) (0.109) (0.127)
Diff. Cong. 0.001 −0.217 −0.172 −0.254 −1.032 0.086 0.333
(0.232) (0.241) (0.239) (0.296) (0.569) (0.286) (0.326)
Distance Moved −0.020 −0.106 0.185 0.407∗ 0.591∗ −0.139 0.505
(0.171) (0.200) (0.175) (0.201) (0.277) (0.230) (0.264)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 13,150 12,470 10,680 8,877 8,529 8,008 7,307
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.051 0.090 0.137 0.173 0.068 0.186
Log Likelihood −7,578.712 −5,909.561 −6,823.539 −5,199.565 −3,164.015 −4,214.901 −3,331.615
UBRE 7,619.864 5,942.088 6,855.060 5,224.926 3,178.778 4,238.004 3,348.890
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 1.4: Generalized Additive Model Results, Subsample of Movers within Half
Mile
same generalized additive model with movers who have moved to a nearby house.
Specifically, I use a walkable neighborhood of 0.5-mile distance, which is the mean
walking value for those who have reported at least one walking trip daily (Yang and
Diez-Roux, 2012). Assuming that a street block equals one-ninth of a mile, this
equates to walking about four blocks. While other thresholds are possible, I use
walking distance because (1) car ownership is not observed, and (2) larger travel
distance by vehicles can be vary in their costs by time of the day and the available
infrastructure surrounding a household.
The sample of movers who have moved less than half a mile is about 13.1% (13,150
voters). Given that now the distance is smaller, the sample is smaller, and that the
distance moved has effective degrees of freedom18 that does not exceed 2 in Table
18This is also called equivalent degrees of freedom (Beck and Jackman, 1998).
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1.3, the distance moved is now treated as parametric (linear). I also exclude the
neighborhood’s median household income for the new household. This is because
while in the full sample, the Pearson correlation coefficient was about 0.53, now in
the small move sample the correlation coefficient is 0.98.
Figure 1.4 shows the fitted smooth functions by each information cost category.
Again, while the smooth functions do not seem to have strong relationship formovers
within the same apartment (? = 0.089) or within the same precinct (? = 0.568),
those with higher information costs have clearer dynamic trends (? < 0.05). That is,
if the voter crosses precinct lines or more, even within the same county, a recovery
of turnout is documented. This shows that independent of distance moved, the
detrimental effects of turnout apply heterogeneously by informational environments.
Changing the cutoff from half-mile to values such as one mile or three miles produce
the same results.
Therefore, the conclusion holds that sufficient changes in information seem to be
a necessary condition to observe a dip and recovery pattern, regardless of distance
moved. One plausible explanation is how voters subjectively perceive voting costs
to be. For a small enough move, such as within the apartment or within the precinct,
costs of moving may not matter so much, causing the voter to pay little attention to
acclimating to the change.
For instance, for a within-apartment mover, a voter may be able to pick up her vote-
by-mail ballot from a common mail room without necessarily having to re-register
to have it forwarded. Or perhaps she could go to the same polling place, state her
address up to the street-level and not the unit, and still be able to vote. Similarly
within the precinct, the voter may simply be able to visit her polling place and state
that she moved but is still within the precinct boundaries, or retrieve her ballot easily
from her old home.19
Also note that in Figure 1.2 the nonlinear pattern in movers who cross precincts,
local and state-level districts, and Congressional districts all show a very similar
pattern. It seems to be that once the voter faces an environment in which some
search cost must occur, how fast the voter adapts does not seem to be dependent
much on varying degrees of information cost. All in all, the results show how it
might not be entirely accurate to impose a global and additive functional form to
different types of costs of moving.
19Ballots are not forwarded even with the change-of-address requests at the USPS.
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1.5 Mitigating Re-registration Costs: Policy Evaluation
In Section 1.4 I have shown that turnout is significantly low for voters who move
close to the election, especially if themovers are facing a big enoughmove in terms of
changed informational environment. Unfortunately, in terms of policy interventions,
it is not usually possible to manipulate the voters’ change in environment, as election
administrators have no voice in where the voters move to, what friends of neighbors
they make, and so on. If movers stay six months or more at their new home, their
turnout levels seem to recover almost to the turnout level of stayers. But of course,
election administrators cannot manipulate how long a voter has lived at the new
residence on Election Day.
Is there anyway to reliably helpmovers turn out, other than simplywaiting? Very few
papers have investigated how to boost turnout of movers. McDonald (2008) shows
that portable statewide registration, which permits in-state movers to be registered
and to be able to vote on Election Day, increases turnout by 2.4 percentage points.
How about movers within-state, or even within the county? Here I evaluate an
election administration policy first suggested in Squire et al. (1987) and subsequently
implemented through the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, when evaluated,
was found to greatly improve movers’ turnout.
Background
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 decrees that states can use the USPS’s
NCOA records to determinewhether the voter still lives in the address or havemoved.
California actively uses this data to maintain its voter rolls up-to-date (California
Secretary of State, 2019). In particular, when a residential move is detected via
NCOA processing, election administrators have to send a physical mail to the voter
to notify that their new address will be used for voting purposes, by CA Elec Code
§ 2225 (2017). This notification must be, substantially, in the following form (see
Appendix A.1 for full statutes):
“We have received notification that you have moved to a new residence
address in California. You will be registered to vote at your new address
unless you notify our office within 15 days that the address to which this
card was mailed is not a change of your permanent residence. You must
notify our office by either returning the attached postage-paid postcard,
or by calling toll free. If this is not a permanent residence, and if you
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do not notify us within 15 days, you may be required to provide proof
of your residence address in order to vote at future elections.”
Dear Voter:
According to information we have received, the address where you live 
OR where you receive mail has changed to the address printed on the 
attached card.
If your new address is in Orange County, we will update your 
registration and future election materials will be sent to your address. 
If you no longer reside in Orange County, your voter registration has 
been placed in the inactive file. You must reregister in the county in 
which you now reside. To receive an affidavit call 1(800)345-VOTE.
Within 15 days, return the Business Reply portion of this card notifying 
us that your change of address is correct or is not a change of 
permanent residence.
If the information on this card is incorrect and you fail to notify our 
office, you may not receive your voting materials for future elections 
and your registration may be permanently canceled.
*If you need assistance in Chinese, Korean, Spanish or Vietnamese, please call (714) 567-7600.
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS
PO BOX 11298
SANTA ANA, CA 92711-1298
Phone No. (714) 567-7600
Voter Name: 3 OU 147029
Street Address:
Mailing ili  Address:r :
The information above is incorrect. 
Dear Voter:
WE HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED THAT YOU HAVE MOVED.
Check and sign the correct box below.
Send back the completed card within 15 days.
My mail is 
delivered to:I live at:
Signature: Date:
I live in Orange County and the address(es) above are correct.
Signature: Date:







 Permit No. 77
NCOA 
FORWARDING SERVICE REQUESTED
Figure 1.5: NCOA Mailing of Orange County, California, Front and Back
This policy, henceforth NCOA automatic voter registration or NCOA treatment
for simplicity,20 serves two purposes. First, it rids the movers of their convenience
costs of re-registering to vote. Second, it reminds them about the upcoming election,
acting as a ‘nudge.’ Figure 1.5 shows the mailing sent out to the movers in Orange
County, in its original form. Most importantly, if the voter actively does not deny
moving to a new residence or notify the Registrar of a new mailing address, the
voter file will reflect the new address. This is true even if the voter does not return
the mailing checked with “I live in Orange County and the address(es) are correct,”
acknowledging the movement. Therefore, if there is no counteraction, the USPS
information is treated as a true move. If the voter is a permanent absentee voter,
the mail ballots will be sent to the new address. If the voter has crossed precinct
20Again, I would like to emphasize that this is a policy that needs both NCOA processing and
automatic voter registration (AVR).
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boundaries, the new polling place’s roster will have her name printed, and not the
old one.
This is an extraordinarily proactive measure by the Registrar and can potentially
boost turnout. However, the efficacy of the policy has never been measured so far.
How effective is this policy in stimulating movers to turn out? And how can we
estimate it?
Natural Experiment
A natural experiment is available as follows. As explained in Subsection 1.3, no list
maintenance is performed 90 days before the Election Day. In Orange County, the
last NCOA automatic voter registration was performed on July 26th, 2018, up to the
movers who moved before June 15, 2018, as the Secretary of State’s office obtains
and disseminates NCOA data in the middle of the month. This discontinuity creates
an interesting quasi-experimental opportunity for policy evaluation, as those who
have moved in the latter half of June and beyond did not get the NCOA mailings, as
opposed to those who moved in the early half of June. This is a quasi- regression
discontinuity design with NCOA mailing as an intervention. Although I cannot
determine the exact date of the residential move, I can parse NCOA treatment from
the voter file changes, which reveals whether the voter moved later than the cutoff.
The full sample for policy evaluation here is the set of June movers who filed a
change of address. Note that the treatment group is the set of movers from June 1 to
June 14 who have not voluntarily updated their registration records until late July.
If the voter has already reported having changed residences to the Registrar so that
the voter roll is already up-to-date, the mailing is not sent out. Therefore all others,
including those who moved in early June and possibly disclosed it to the Registrar
before July, are put to a control group.21 If anything, this will estimate a lower bound
of the effect of the policy, as those who voluntarily inform the Registrar are more
likely to vote.
Results
The estimation of the policy effect is straightforward. The independent variable of
interest is the NCOA treatment, which is binary, and I use the same set of covariates
used in Section 1.4. Because the logistics regression result and the entailing average
marginal effect is almost identical to the effect estimated by a linear probability
21Note that if the disclosure is voluntary, I cannot extract whether the voter has moved in early or
late June.
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model, I present the output from a linear probability model in Table 1.5 for a more
direct interpretation.
The first column is the main regression with 2018 general turnout as the dependent
variable. Using eligible voters in previous three general and primary elections, I
also perform placebo tests, which all pass for the treatment. On average, the treated
group is more likely to have voted in the 2018 general by 5.9 percentage points.
Figure 1.6 shows the 95% confidence interval ([0.0345, 0.0839]) along with the
intervals for placebo tests.















NCOA Treatment 0.059∗∗∗ −0.006 0.001 −0.004 −0.011 0.001 −0.010
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Same Address −0.008 −0.051 −0.038 −0.046 0.026 −0.117∗∗ −0.041
(0.040) (0.036) (0.049) (0.050) (0.039) (0.049) (0.047)
Same Precinct 0.014 −0.063∗ −0.032 −0.070 0.008 −0.079∗ −0.052
(0.036) (0.033) (0.042) (0.044) (0.034) (0.043) (0.041)
Same Cong. −0.040∗ −0.018 −0.015 −0.019 0.004 −0.039 −0.055∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028)
Diff. Cong. −0.051∗ −0.043∗ −0.022 −0.016 −0.013 −0.047 −0.076∗∗
(0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.026) (0.032) (0.031)
Distance Moved −0.002∗ 0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.0001 0.001 −0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 5,539 5,035 4,341 3,680 3,553 3,366 3,082
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.043 0.081 0.135 0.136 0.057 0.136
Res. Std. Error 0.455 (df=5510) 0.392 (df=5007) 0.474 (df=4313) 0.448 (df=3652) 0.342 (df=3525) 0.419 (df=3338) 0.391 (df=3054)
F statistic 29.427
∗∗∗ 9.334∗∗∗ 15.164∗∗∗ 22.291∗∗∗ 21.695∗∗∗ 8.587∗∗∗ 18.902∗∗∗
(df=28; 5510) (df=27; 5007) (df=27; 4313) (df=27; 3652) (df=27; 3525) (df=27; 3338) (df=27; 3054)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 1.5: Effect of NCOA Automatic Voter Registration, Linear Probability Model
Effect Size. The estimated treatment effect is very large. In fact, if we could
boost turnout of movers uniformly at 5.9%, much of turnout depression by moving
would disappear. To put this in context, take the results of the landmark study in
persuasive get-out-the-vote (GOTV) mailings in Gerber et al. (2008). The effect
of showing households their own voting records and urging them to vote resulted
in a 4.9 percentage point increase of turnout, and showing them both their own
and the neighborhood voting records resulted in an 8.1 percentage point increase.
Oftentimes, many GOTV devices are insignificant or have effect size lower than 5
percentage points (Schelker and Schneiter, 2017).
So why is the effect so large, comparative to the previous findings of the GOTV
literature? There can be a few caveats. First, the width of the “window” of
observations used for the regression discontinuity is two weeks. Two extra weeks















































Figure 1.6: Effect of NCOA Automatic Voter Registration Treatment and Placebo
Tests
Second, this was an official, pre-paid postage mailing from the election administra-
tors, and not a GOTV mailing from third-party civic organizations. This may have
made the difference. For example, Mann and Bryant (2019) show that even a simple
postcard from official election administrators can encourage voter registration and
turnout (2 percentage points increase), without any legal or administrative process
changes—a ‘nudge.’ Malhotra et al. (2012) also show that while third-party organi-
zation’s emails made no difference in turnout, emails from official sources increased
turnout.
Third, Orange County in 2018 was a highly contentious area in which the entire
county turned ‘blue,’ whereas it has been deemed a conservative bastion for very
long. Some districts, which had a Republican representative for thirty-five years,
now elected a Democratic House representative. Hence the voters may have been
simply more responsive to any type of stimulus related to the general election.
However, also note that Congressional districts of new residences are controlled for.
Lastly, this is not an average treatment effect (ATE) for all movers but the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Specifically, the treatment is on relatively
peripheral voters who happened to move in the early weeks of June. The treated
voters did not inform the Registrar in about two months of moving, which indicates
that they are less interested in voting compared to those who do inform the Registrar.
Also, treated group who moved within the first five days of June are likely not to
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have voted in the primary of 2018, which took place on June 5, 2018. If they voted
with their new address, the database would have been updated, so that no treatment
would have been necessary in July. In fact, if placebo tested with the dependent
variable of 2018 primary, the treatment gives statistical negative effects on turnout.
And peripheral voters are understood to be more responsive to stimulus than those
who are already well-motivated to vote (Highton and Wolfinger, 1998).
However, there seems no denying that the NCOA automatic voter registration is
effective, whatever the size may be. As can be seen with the placebo tests for
2016, 2014, and 2012 elections, the treated group is not so extremely peripheral
to the degree that they have also voted less in previous cycles. In addition, as
aforementioned, the effect is underestimated by including voluntary disclosers in
the control group. Hence, it may well be the case that the estimated size is valid.
Overcoming Costs of Moving. In Section 1.4, I have concluded that dynamic
effects of costs exist only when the voter’s environment has sufficiently changed.
Does the NCOA automatic voter registration still boost turnout of those with little
to no change in environment?
Consistent with the results in Section 1.4, I find that theNCOAmailings do not have a
turnout boosting effect on voters with ‘small’ moves. Table 1.6 shows that formovers
within the same precinct or for movers within a half-mile of their original residence,
the NCOA mailing has no effect. Again, this may indicate that while theoretically
convenience/distraction costs should apply to all movers homogeneously, it only
begins to be effective when the mover has moved sufficiently far away or crossed
precinct lines while moving.
Policy Implications
In terms of election administration, the efficiency of an already existing NVRA
policy is promising. It is designed for both higher turnout and for better voter list
maintenance, it is relatively simple, and it is non-partisan—both in nature and in
effect, as when estimated, no further mobilization of movers would have swayed any
major election results, not even a state Senator or general Assembly.22 Therefore,
from a policy perspective, it is encouraging confirmation that the Registrar has
“safety nets” that help movers adjust and participate in the political process.
22For Orange County 2018 general election results, see https://www.ocvote.com/
fileadmin/live/gen2018/results.htm#c-1913.
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Dependent Variable: General 2018 Turnout
Low Info Cost Distance MovedLess Than 0.5-mile
Distance Moved
Less Than 1 Mile
Distance Moved
Less Than 3 Miles
NCOA Treatment 0.044 0.050 0.060∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.034) (0.027) (0.018)
Same Address 0.035 0.015 −0.001
(0.054) (0.046) (0.043)
Same Precinct 0.053 0.083 0.064 0.031
(0.051) (0.054) (0.044) (0.038)
Distance Moved 0.050 −0.009
(0.111) (0.012)
Same Cong. 0.012 0.015 −0.020
(0.056) (0.039) (0.027)
Diff. Cong. −0.149 0.103 −0.052
(0.206) (0.093) (0.041)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 464 724 1,143 2,548
R2 0.176 0.179 0.145 0.137
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.149 0.124 0.128
Residual
Std. Error
0.441 0.441 0.446 0.450
(df = 439) (df = 697) (df = 1115) (df = 2519)
F Statistic 3.898
∗∗∗ 5.851∗∗∗ 6.989∗∗∗ 14.323∗∗∗
(df = 24; 439) (df = 26; 697) (df = 27; 1115) (df = 28; 2519)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 1.6: Effect of NCOA Automatic Voter Registration in Small Moves
However, the actual implementation of the policy can be difficult. List maintenance
cannot take place less than 90 days before a federal election. Given a primary and a
general election, this already equates to six months in the election year where NCOA
mailings cannot be performed. If there is a special election or two, the moratorium
period extends further. This means that the Registrar has to rely on a small window
of time between those moratoriums to perform full NCOA processing and mailings.
When the usage of vote-by-mail is prevalent, or the election is conducted by all-
mailing, this may pose a problem. This indicates that voters who move close to
the election are relatively disenfranchised, policy-wide. The 90-days restriction is
understandable in that it will lessen the load of election administrators too close to the
election. If, however the election administrators have sufficient resources, loosening
the 90-days restriction can improve turnout of movers. (Highton and Wolfinger,
1998) in particular expressed concern about the 90-days policy as follows:
(A 90-day closing date) would be the first week in August for the general
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election ... Twelve percent of all adult citizens moved in the six months
before November 1992, nearly three-quarters of everyone who moved
during the entire year. Moving in the summer fits best with the school
year, a rhythm that guides not only parents of school-age children but
also significant groups such as teachers and university students. Purging
and reregistration through the NCOA option misses all these people.
If the summer movers equate to younger and more transient electorate, easing the
90-days policy will benefit them in particular, who are already a low-turnout group.
Outside California, if NCOA treatment is mandated, this could greatly help voters.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NASS), at least thirty-
six states authorize the usage of NCOA data to check whether voters’ address
changed (National Association of Secretaries of State, 2017). What happens after
the voter data and NCOA data is matched is slightly unclear. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973gg-6(c), if moves detected are within-jurisdiction moves, the election official
is required to update the voter’s registration and then send the notice.
How this is exercised is a little less straightforward—in-county movers’ addresses
are automatically updated only in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, California, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.23 In fact, according to NASS, in Califor-
nia, Florida, and Illinois, this applies to all in-state and not just in-county movers,
which is an extraordinary feat. For some states such asDelaware, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, NewMexico, Ohio, Ok-
lahoma, South Dakota, or Texas, there is no mention of automatic updates prior to
contact—some are contingent upon the voter actually returning the mailing notice,
and some are silent on details. Although a follow-up study that includes all these
states would be desirable, this would be extremely expensive to run, since it will
require both a national voter file and NCOA processing of the entire national roster.
What a simple contact without re-registration would do is not entirely clear. Does
NCOA automatic registration work mainly because it solves re-registration burden,
or mainly because it is a reminder about the election from official sources? The
answer is out of the scope of this paper. However, it is nonetheless clear that other
23In Connecticut andWisconsin, only movers within the municipality are contacted. In Michigan
similarly, only voters within the city or township.
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states should follow up on the usage of NCOA data, if they wish to best clean the
voter data as well as maintain movers’ turnout.
Subgroup Analyses
Dependent Variable: General 2018 Turnout
Main Subgroup Analyses
PAV Race Party
All PAV Not PAV White Hispanic Asian Dem Rep NPP/Third-Party
NCOA Treated 0.059∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.065 0.137∗∗∗ 0.021 0.085∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.034) (0.040) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 5,539 3,632 1,907 3,255 850 573 1,793 1,815 1,931
R2 0.130 0.099 0.196 0.119 0.175 0.181 0.127 0.124 0.129
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.093 0.184 0.113 0.151 0.145 0.114 0.111 0.117
Residual
Std. Error
0.455 0.457 0.447 0.446 0.460 0.461 0.438 0.454 0.469
(df = 5510) (df = 3604) (df = 1879) (df = 3230) (df = 825) (df = 548) (df = 1766) (df = 1788) (df = 1904)
F Statistic
29.427∗∗∗ 14.747∗∗∗ 16.921∗∗∗ 18.239∗∗∗ 7.287∗∗∗ 5.055∗∗∗ 9.869∗∗∗ 9.742∗∗∗ 10.843∗∗∗
(df = 28 (df = 27 (df = 27 (df = 24 (df = 24 (df = 24 (df = 2 (df = 26 (df = 26
5510) 3604) 1879) 3230) 825) 548) 1766) 1788) 1904)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001


























































































(b) Not Permanent Absentee Voter




















































































































































































































































































(c) No Party Preferences/Third
Party
Figure 1.9: Effect of NCOA Automatic Voter Registration Treatment by Party
Here I discuss some important subgroup analyses policy effects, by (1) permanent
absentee voter status (Figure 1.7), (2) race (Figure 1.8), and (3) party affiliation
(Figure 1.9).24 Table 1.7 shows these analyses in numbers. Note that as did for the
full sample, all regressions pass the placebo tests. However, the results should still
be taken with a grain of salt, as the subgroup estimates are not blocked or part of
the randomization process.25
The subgroup analyses show that the policy has very different effect for subgroups.
Per absentee voter status in Figure 1.7, the treatment effect is much stronger for
those who are not permanent absentee voters, that is, those who are more likely
to turn out physically to vote at a polling place. This is an important intuition
in light of the recent COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, in which many of the states
are hurriedly converting towards all-mail voting in the primaries and are actively
discussing going all-mail in the general election as well. As election administrators
are forced to operate with less polling places, this shows that NCOA automatic voter
registration may aid voters who are not used to vote-by-mail.
Per racial category in Figure 1.8, the effect on Hispanic movers are somewhat
muted, while the treatment has a strong effect on white movers. What is interesting
is that the Asian movers are extremely responsive, with almost twice the coefficient
of whites. What this signals for the Asian electorate as opposed to the Hispanic
electorate is not immediately clear to me. One possibility is that the mailing was
entirely in English, resulting in a language barrier.
As convenience voting mechanisms are often quoted as benefiting the Democrats,
24I exclude ‘black’ because there are too few voters who are black in Orange County, and ‘others’
due to their ambiguity.
25In the entire dataset, 59.4% are treated. The following is a simple descriptive of proportion
treated per subgroup: PAV (55.8%), not PAV (66.3%), white (59.2%), Hispanic (63.6%), Asian
(55.0%), Republican (59.1%), no party preference/third party (61.0%), and Democrat (58.2%).
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it is very important to perform a subgroup analyses by party. This yields a very
interesting result, shown in Figure 1.9. For Democrats, the NCOA automatic voter
registration had almost no effect at all. For the rest of the movers, especially
for Republicans, the effect was extremely strong. Although it remains to be seen
whether wewill see similar effects in other counties than this traditional conservative
bastion, this is one evidence that convenience voting mechanisms are not uniformly
beneficial to the Democratic party.
1.6 Discussion
In this paper, I first asked how the impact of moving on turnout changes over time.
I show how voters who move close to the election are significantly less likely to
vote, the difference being at most 16.2 percentage points. It took movers at least six
months to recover to a level of turnout similar to stayers, and turnout was relatively
steady for those who lived longer than six months at their new residence. This
dip and recovery trend is not seen for small moves in which there were no or very
little information costs, such as within-apartment movers. The time trend was only
apparent for voters who at least cross precinct boundaries while moving, even when
limited to movers within half-mile. Sufficient changes in information costs seem to
be a necessary condition in activating dynamic costs of moving.
While election administrators cannot dictate when or where the voter moves to, I
show that a simple, pre-existing, and non-partisan policy is effective in retaining
movers and boosting their turnout. With this policy, election administrators can use
the change-of-address data from theUSPS to proactively trackmovers, automatically
update the voter registration database’s address for them, and notify them of this
action. This resolves the convenience cost of voters or the re-registration burden
from movers, and also reminds them about the upcoming election. Using a natural
experiment that stems from legal requirements and how the policy was practiced, I
evaluate the effect of the policy. I found that the propensity to votewas 5.9 percentage
points larger for those who received the ‘NCOA mailings.’ I also discussed some
related policy suggestions.
The importance of analyzing movers’ turnout is even more important due to the
changes in election administration practices and COVID-19 which has upended
all elections since March. Many states were moving towards all-mail elections
even before the pandemic, as vote-by-mail has been argued to increase turnout,
especially for the peripheral voters in low-stimulus elections (Karp and Banducci,
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2000; Southwell and Burchett, 2000; Gerber et al., 2013). As of 2018, twenty-
two states had provisions allowing all-mail elections under some circumstances.
Among them, three (Oregon, Washington, and Colorado) conduct all elections by
all-mail, and California and Hawaii are also gradually making a transition. With
the pandemic, many states have been forced to look for all-mail options, and it is
uncertain whether in-person voting options can be as robust as before for the general
election. To cap it all, voters themselves will choose to vote by mail more than ever,
afraid of health hazards from voting. When a larger electorate receives ballots by
physical mail, it is more vital than ever to analyze and remove barriers that movers
may face when voting.
The detailed and large administrative data and the use of semiparametric regressions
made this analysis possible. I would like to again emphasize that this study would
not have been possible nor convincing with just survey data, as they lack both
valid information about details of moving, and the power to perform such flexible
analysis. In addition, the use of such large-N data ensures that we can explore
beyond the linearity to reliably fit generalized additive models with splines (or any
other smoothing functions). This paper shows that generalized additive models can
open up exciting new analyses when combined with administrative datasets.
While I only use in-county movers, the costs of moving will only increase for out-
county and out-state movers. Portable registration does not apply across county
borders. In these cases, the lowered turnout is likely to be stretched across a longer
period of time. These voters with geographic, community mobility will take much
longer to adjust than six months—indeed, two years, the observation period of this
study, may be insufficient for a full recovery. It may take more than three years,
five years, or even close to a decade, a time frame as analyzed in Highton (2000).
However, as a majority of movers are within-county, it is still important to recognize
how in-county movers may face difficulties in voting, especially if they have moved
close to the Election Day. In addition, multistate partnerships such as Electronic
Registration Information Center (ERIC)’s data sharing may benefit from taking a
leaf out of in-county NCOA automatic registration’s book.
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2.1 Introduction
The United States has established one of the world’s most comprehensive federal
campaign disclosure processes. The Federal Election Commission (FEC), the fed-
eral entity which collects and disseminates these disclosures, produces data that are
transparent, accessible, and up-to-date. Consequently, there has been an enormous
amount of academic research on campaign finance, in particular on campaign expen-
ditures, in the U.S. for the last few decades—see, for example, the recent review by
Dawood (2015). Yet as we argue below, the FEC’s data on campaign contributions
is incomplete, and accordingly, our understanding of campaign contributions in the
United States is incomplete as well.
One key feature of disclosure regulations in the U.S. is that currently, each federal
campaign committee only has to report to the FEC contributions from individuals
who have already given $200 in aggregate to that campaign committee, either
within a year or a two-year election cycle according to the committee type. The
$200 threshold has been in place for decades, and many donors’ first few—in some
cases all—contribution records are censored.1 We call this the censoring problem in
1Prior to 1989, however, the data entry threshold of the FEC was set at $500. See the FEC’s
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campaign finance data, and the campaign contributors whose contribution amounts
are below this threshold we call hidden donors.
Although a crucial part of the data generating process, the censoring problem and
hidden donors have not been adequately addressed in the campaign finance literature
(Key, 1964; Francia et al., 2003; Barber, 2016a; Magleby et al., 2018). There is,
after all, little that could be done about this censoring, short of changing the law.
However, in aggregate, hidden donors are an important force that politicians must
cater towhen deciding ideological positions and campaign strategies. Hidden donors
are likely to become more important for researchers to study in the near future, as
more candidates are wooing individual donors, and positioning themselves as not
“buyable” by corporate PAC money.2
Fortunately, we can get an estimate of the censoring problem due to the unique
fundraising approach taken by the 2016 presidential campaign of Bernard “Bernie”
Sanders. For the first time, we can observe all of a major presidential candidate’s in-
dividual contribution records, without any of them being censored. This is because
the Sanders campaign chose to receive money only through an intermediary com-
mittee, and so these contributions are known as “earmarked contributions.” These
transactions are governed by a different, stricter set of regulations, resulting in full
disclosure. Through the Sanders presidential campaign, we can compare datasets
in which the censoring problem is and is not present. While the “law of available
data” has driven us to investigate visible donors almost exclusively, this paper, us-
ing the valuable opportunity presented by the 2016 Sanders campaign, studies the
seldom-explored world of “hidden” donors.
We show that hidden donors differ substantially from the visible donors. We do
this using only the administrative data from the FEC, where we statistically impute
contributor race/ethnicity and gender using only the contributor’s name and address,
which augments the thin selection of covariates available just from campaign reports.
We find that hidden donors are more likely to be female, non-white, and younger.
They may also have different political goals or interests, as they are more likely
to donate later in the election cycle than visible donors, as their contributions
are concentrated at points in the election cycle when the race is contested. Most
importantly, there were seven times more hidden donors than visible donors for
Sanders—suggesting that past research focusing only on visible donors may have
Thirty Year Report published in 2005. Also, because the $200 restriction is with nominal dollars,
the data have to be filtered using inflation adjustments.
2See Appendix B.4 for additional information on the 2020 campaign and small donors.
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only observed the tip of the iceberg in terms of individual donor behavior. We
suggest that as presidential campaign fundraising methods are now shifting towards
an individual and small-donor paradigm, more analysis of small donor behavior is
necessary.
2.2 Past Research
Given the limitations of the FEC’s campaign contributions data, most papers that
study individual campaign contributors use survey data (Brown et al., 1995; Fran-
cia et al., 2003; Barber et al., 2017; Rhodes et al., 2018). However, such studies
inevitably rely on the FEC records to sample respondents, meaning that they are
restricted to visible donors. The comparisons that studies often make are between
visible contributors and average citizens, or between different types of visible con-
tributors. These studies have not examined howhidden contributors differ from those
who are visible, nor do they compare hidden contributors and non-contributors.
It is not that scholars are altogether unaware of this censoring problem. Key
(1964) noted that scholars do not know much about “little givers.” Francia et al.
(2003) recognized the threshold by labeling donations after the $200 threshold as
“significant” donations, while Heerwig (2016) called these donors “elite” donors.
Barber (2016a), while discussing how his survey does not include donors who gave
less than $200 in a footnote, said that his picture of individual donors’ motivations
may be incomplete, if unitemized (hidden) donors have different motivations from
those who are itemized (visible).
Although this censoring problem is well-known, there is no remedy short of chang-
ing federal campaign finance law, or asking campaigns to voluntarily report every
small donation. Unfortunately, as contributing money to electoral campaigns is not
a widespread form of political participation, the relative rarity of campaign donors
in the population of adult Americans means that it is difficult to draw a represen-
tative sample of donors overall, and small or hidden donors specifically. There
have been a few studies using the American National Election Studies (ANES)
surveys (Panagopoulos and Bergan, 2006; Johnson, 2013), but the sample size that
report contributing is very small—for instance, in the 2008 election, only 9.9% of
respondents reported to have contributed money to a specific candidate.3
Despite these limitations, the literature has worked to generate stylized facts about
32008 Time Series Study, ANES, May 19, 2015 version, sub-sample of post-election survey
respondents: question V085033.
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the small, hidden donors. Most obviously, past research has argued that the hidden
donors have less income than visible donors, because giving is related to disposable
income. For example, Verba et al. (1995) show that the percentage of family income
contributed to political campaigns increases with household income, sharply rising
at $50,000 or more (See also Wilcox (2008) and Malbin (2013)). A series of papers
such as Graf et al. (2006), Panagopoulos and Bergan (2007), and Malbin (2009)
exploit surveys based on donor lists from the public matching funds program, in
which presidential candidates can apply for government funding up to the first
$250 of each contribution, but only after full disclosure. Johnson (2010) and
Culberson et al. (2018) tackle the problem by using aggregate amounts reported at
the campaign level, concluding that small donors are linked to more ideologically
extreme candidates, although there is some mixed evidence with this argument
(Malbin, 2013).
Themost recent work that has systematically compared visible and hidden campaign
contributors is Magleby et al. (2018). They were able to cooperate with major
presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012 to receive a random sample of contributors
who gave donations of all sizes. They generally do not find important ideological
differences between visible and hidden donors.4 In terms of their demographic
profiles, they found that visible donors are older and wealthier than hidden donors.
Hidden donors, meanwhile, were more likely to have been solicited to contribute
online. Magleby et al. (2018) makes it clear that campaigns prioritize large donors
over the small, especially due to changes introduced by the Bipartisan Campaign
ReformAct of 2002. However, appeals to small donors are becomingmore prevalent
in American campaigns, especially in recent elections as the Internet is becoming
central to campaign fundraising (Malbin, 2013; Karpf, 2013). In that case, it is
crucial to study who these small donors are, and what their donation strategies may
be, so that we can understand how they influence campaign strategy.
This paper contributes to the literature on small donors by analyzing an entire donor
population for a presidential candidate using complete individual-level data. While
our data do not have the more in-depth questions and breadth that are available
in surveys like that of Magleby et al. (2018) or Graf et al. (2006), we are not
limited to survey respondents—we can bring the entire population of visible and
hidden Sanders contributors to study, which can complement the mostly survey-
based existing literature. This allows us to provide a set of analyses regarding the
4They refer to this comparison as itemized vs. small donors.
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hidden donors in 2016, to document their contribution behavior, and to establish a
baseline for future research on small and hidden donors.
2.3 The Censoring Problem in Campaign Finance Data
In this Section, we discuss the censoring problem that is the consequence of federal
regulations on individual campaign contributions—how the censoring problemmay
manifest itself, and how we can use the data from the 2016 Sanders campaign to
estimate the extent of campaign contribution censoring.
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 11
The FEC administers federal campaign finance law, under Title 11 of the Code of
Federal Regulations. A federal campaign committee that meets the conditions will
be registered with the FEC and will regularly file reports that disclose funds that
are raised and spent. 11 CFR 104.3 Contents of Reports dictates this, and how the
information on receipts is censored is stated in 11 CFR 104.3(4)(i):5
(4)(i) Each person, other than any political committee, who makes a
contribution to the reporting political committee during the reporting
period, whose contribution or contributions aggregate in excess of $200
per calendar year (or per election cycle in the case of an authorized
committee), together with the date of receipt and amount of any such
contributions, except that the reporting political committee may elect
to report such information for contributors of lesser amount(s) on a
separate schedule;
When a contribution pushes the sum of aggregated contributions over this threshold,
this contribution is “itemized.” Unitemized contributions are aggregated into a
lump-sum and reported as a single number, and hence no other details are reported
for unitemized contributions. Also, donors who do not meet the threshold are
entirely absent from receipt reports that campaigns file with the FEC.
As aforementioned, we utilize intermediary committees to investigate the censoring
effect on the data. 11 CFR 110.6Earmarked Contributions provide details as to what
5We immediately see that aside from the arbitrary $200, there are two additional problems:
One is that the $200 is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for inflation, and the other is that whether
a campaign committee is authorized or not—which is, in the campaign finance jargon, another
name for candidate-affiliated committee, especially the principal campaign committees. For an exact
definition, see 11 CFR 9032.1. We largely avoid the first problem as we only use a single cycle’s
observation, and we will for the moment ignore the second problem.
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intermediary committees are, and what they should disclose. While earmarked con-
tributions are money designated to a clearly identified candidate/committee, inter-
mediary committees (also called conduits) are “anyonewho receives and forwards an
earmarked contribution to a candidate or candidate’s authorized committee.”6 The
following excerpt from the FEC summarizes the special disclosure requirements:
A political committee that serves as a conduit of an earmarked contri-
bution must disclose the earmarked contribution, regardless of amount,
on two separate reports: the committee’s next regularly scheduled FEC
report, and a special transmittal report sent to the recipient authorized
committee. 110.6(c)(1).
As we can see, intermediary committees have stricter disclosure requirements than
other campaign committees. They must report all transactions, not just those that
cross the $200 threshold—see Appendix B.1 for details. The issue, which we
explain with detailed hypothetical examples in Appendix B.2, is that for campaigns
that undergo the typical process, we will not observe campaign contributors who
donate less than $200.
The 2016 Sanders Campaign
The 2016 Sanders campaign was unique in many ways, including their approach
to campaign finance. In 2016, one of the important issues for Sanders was his
campaign’s stance against the influence of “big” money and special interests. He
claimed early on that his campaign would not be allied with any super PACs (Lee,
2016; Qiu, 2015). In addition, the Sanders campaign was reported by the media
in late 2015 to have organized only seven traditional fundraisers, while the Clinton
campaign had by then organized more than 110 (Associated Press, 2015). In
March 2016 it was further reported that the campaign had only two more traditional
fundraisers (Gaudiano, 2016).
This distaste for conventional fundraising meant that most of Sanders’ donations
were digitally processed. His website noted on April 30, 2016 that 94% of its
6While conduit or intermediary committees are interchangeably used and the FEC seems to
prefer the former, we use the terminology ‘intermediary committees.’
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contributions were made online.7,8 His fundraising appeals were mostly digital,
using emails, texts, and social media (Corasaniti, 2016), and his website pointed to
the ActBlue contributing page. The campaign used no other online platforms and
had no offline fundraising staff. Hence, almost all individual donors who desired to
contribute to Sanders would have had to donate through ActBlue, regardless of their
wealth, connections, or intentions.
Because ActBlue is an intermediary committee, we can track all Sanders donors,
regardless of the size of their donations to his campaign, which as far as we know is
a first for federal campaigns. Regardless of whether they gave fifty cents or maxed
out individual contribution limits, they would be captured in ActBlue reports. This
means that the censoring problem disappears with respect to Sanders’ contributors,
giving us an unprecedented opportunity to study both visible and hidden donors to
a major presidential campaign. See Appendix B.3 for details.
It is true that the data are restricted to a subset of presidential donors, and that
Sanders is an unusual candidate, as he is a very progressive Independent and the
first presidential candidate to rely exclusively on individual contributions, mostly
raised online.9 However, there are unmistakable advantages in utilizing the Sanders
data. We may never have another major candidate whose contributions are so
transparently presented to the public, and whose donors are exposed, both small
and large.10 This is also the first step into understanding the unique data generating
7The website address is https://berniesanders.com/revolution/. Our final esti-
mate of how much Sanders campaign received online is 98.1% of his total individual contributions,
which is greater than the 94% reported in the website. The discrepancy seems to arise because
the campaign’s estimate was calculated before mid-May 2016—and we believe that many of the
donations made after that point in the campaign were made online. That the 94% is calculated before
mid-May can be inferred from the Wayback Machine’s snapshot of the website, the first snapshot of
which is at May 21, 2016, and shows the 94% claim.
85.1% of donors’ year-to-date contribution records do not match the actual sum of records, (1)
potentially because they have not been sufficiently record linked due to the conservative linking of
contribution records that constitute the same individual, (2) the committee inaccurately calculated
the contributor year-to-date by mixing up different contributors, or (3) because these donors have
given in the few traditional fundraisers we discussed earlier. The third possibility seems viable, since
we find that 68.7% of those with record irregularities are visible. The second explanation may also
have merit, because we often find that intermediate records of contribution year-to-date sums are
grossly inaccurate. This speaks to the difficulty of working with campaign finance data.
9As discussed earlier, there is some debate and mixed evidence in the literature about whether
small donors are polarizing—that is, whether ideologically extreme candidates attract more small
donors (Wilcox, 2008; Bonica, 2011; Malbin, 2013; Johnson, 2010; Culberson et al., 2018; Magleby
et al., 2018). Unfortunately, although this is a very important and interesting question, due to the
nature of our data, we cannot test this claim in this paper.
10While the 2020 Democratic primary contenders are also shunning corporate PACs, their
fundraising also incorporates the traditional individual fundraising, such as private, invited events.
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process presented by intermediary committees.
Table 2.1: Proportion of Unitemized Contributions in Individual Contributions,
Dollar Amounts, the 2016 Election
Unitemized Individual $/





Hillary Clinton (Dem.) 25.8
Bernie Sanders (Dem.) 58.1
Donald Trump (Rep.) 64.9
Ted Cruz (Rep.) 38.5
Table 2.1 shows the proportion of unitemized contribution amounts relative to all
individual contributions for the four major presidential candidates of 2016, as well
as House and Senate Democrats and Republicans in 2016. We see in Table 2.1 that
58.1% of Sanders’ contribution amounts were unitemized, and a large proportion
of contribution amounts going to Trump, Clinton, and Cruz were also unitemized.
The same is the case for House and Senate campaigns in 2016. Note that the total
number of unitemized contributions is not the same as the sum of funds contributed
by hidden donors, since the first $200 of visible donors are still labeled as unitemized,
and not corrected in retrospect. Again, this demonstrates that there are many hidden
donors, and that they play a substantial role in elections, especially in presidential
races.
2.4 Data
The data we use were obtained from the FEC. One can use the FEC “Download Bulk
Data” page (https://www.fec.gov/data/browse-data/?tab=bulk-
data) to download the individual contributions data or build a database using the
OpenFEC API (https://api.open.fec.gov/developers/). While the
bulk data are easy to download and do not need deduplication, they contain only
visible donors meeting the $200 threshold, and they also lack the donor’s address.
Hence we built our database using raw FEC data using the OpenFEC API, and
downloaded all of the 2016 cycle’s raw individual contribution data.11
11The R scripts used to build the database will be publicly available upon publication. This script
downloads the data as text files in batches of 100 records, resulting in more than 1,133,000 files and
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We then augmented the records with geographic identifiers such as Congressional
district information after geocoding each record.12 We also used record linkage to
connect the donations that came from the same individual contributor. We use exact
matching on first name, last name, and street address, and allow matches if there is
variation in these variables but the employer and occupation is exactly the same for
consecutive contribution records. We use exact matching to take advantage of the
sequential nature of repeating contributions—if donor  has been a teacher for the
first part of 2016, and has a different address starting mid-2016, we would still link
her records together given that the names and occupation/employer stay consistent.
To prevent false matches, we only match within the state.
Next, we focused specifically on contributions to Bernie 2016, the Sanders pres-
idential committee, and to ActBlue, creating a union of contribution records to
Sanders while filtering out duplicate contributions. This is a very important and
time-consuming step, because there is always a separate receipt for donor giving to
the intermediary committee, the intermediary committee giving to the final destina-
tion campaign, and the acknowledgement of a donor giving to the final destination
campaign. The OpenFEC API recognizes this and offers guidance as to how to
exclude some entries as duplicates in its Receipts description. Every intermediary
contribution must be checked against the destination committee’s reports to elim-
inate duplicate entries, which will have the same contribution amount, date, and
personal details. This way, we can uncover donations ranging from a dollar to the
$2,700 individual limit. The campaign reports do not contain gender or racial/ethnic
information per se, and only carry name, address, the money’s destination, date, oc-
cupation, and employer, the minimal requirements by the federal regulations.
Finally, we supplemented the contributions data, using names and geo-locations to
infer gender and race/ethnicity. To infer gender for each individual contributor, we
use the R package gender (Mullen, 2018; Blevins and Mullen, 2015) of rOpenSci
project, which uses first names and the Social Security Administration’s yearly
dataset of first names to infer the gender of the donor. If the donor has voluntarily
entered a prefix such as a Mr., we override the gender inference with the gender
inferred from the self-reported prefix. For race/ethnicity, we use the R package
wru (Khanna et al., 2017; Imai and Khanna, 2016). That is, we utilize the Census
Bureau’s surname list and Bayes’ rule to infer the race. In particular, we use a Census
over 100 million records of individual transactions.
12Given that each record had a limited number of fields, this database has a single table, and can
be linked to other tables in future research (by contributor name and address, for example).
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block level inference, after geocoding each address using the Census Geocoder and
obtaining the latitude and longitude of the address. The Census block being the
smallest unit in which detailed surname distributions are provided by the 2010
Census, this enables the most accurate approximation of race. For the empirical
validation of the method, see Imai and Khanna (2016).
2.5 Who Are the Hidden Donors?
We define a Sanders contributor as anyone who donated to Sanders’ presidential
campaign committee during the 2016 presidential election cycle. The committee
launched on April 30, 2015 and the cycle ended on December 31, 2016.13 The total
estimated number of Sanders contributors is over 2 million, including both visible
and hidden donors, a large base of donors. However, among them, only 12.4%
(250,352 out of 2,017,638) would have been visible if the Sanders campaign did
not receive individual contributions only through intermediary committees. In other
words, there were seven times more contributors when hidden donors were included.
This simple fact shows the potential magnitude of the censoring problem, and is
similar to the numbers reported in Magleby et al. (2018), where they estimated that
82% of Romney donors and 88% of Obama donors in 2012 were small donors.14
Figure 2.1 shows the donor base compared to the population estimated by the 2016
American Community Survey, geographically. Not surprisingly, we can see that the
Sanders’ donor population is large in Vermont, with the town of Newfane with the
largest proportion of Sanders donors (32% of residents). 74% of the top 100 Zip
Codes in Sanders-donor population relative to their total population are in Vermont,
with California and Massachusetts trailing respectively at 12% and 5%.
Table 2.2 describes the demographic difference between visible and hidden Sanders
contributors. A hidden donor is more likely to be female and a racial or ethnic
minority, whether black, Hispanic, or Asian. Note that the differences in gender are
consistent with previous literature (Graf et al., 2006; Magleby et al., 2018).
While the percentages of black or Asian contributors do not differ greatly between
visible and hidden Sanders donors, a hidden contributor is much more likely to be
Hispanic than a visible one.15 This is an interesting observation and could reflect the
13Statement of Organization, Bernie 2016. Available at http://docquery.fec.gov/
pdf/537/15031422537/15031422537.pdf, last accessed November 19, 2018.
14One thing that should be noted is that both Obama and Romney were candidates that won the
primaries, while Sanders did not make it to the general election. Had he won the primaries, these
descriptives may have changed. See Appendix B.6 for a brief illustration.



















































































Table 2.2: Demographics and Occupations of Visible and Hidden Contributors,
2016 Sanders Campaign
Visible Hidden
% of Men 57.2% 53.2%
% of Whites 90.5% 86.7%
% of Blacks 2.8% 3.0%
% of Hispanics 4.2% 7.4%
% of Asians 2.5% 2.9%
% of Unemployed 26.7% 25.7%
% of Engineers 4.8% 3.1%
% of Teachers 4.1% 4.9%
% of Retired 3.9% 1.3%
% of Attorneys 2.3% 1.1%
% of Professors 2.1% 1.2%
% of Physicians 2.1% 0.8%
% of Consultants 1.9% 1.3%
% of Students 1.2% 4.0%
% of Homemakers 0.4% 0.3%
(Occupations are sorted by the visible donor percentage for a better contrast.)
fact that the Hispanic electorate is generally younger than other racial/ethnic groups
(Patten, 2016), and perhaps unable to afford donating more than $200.
Table 2.2 also shows the top 10 types of employment of all 2016 contributors and
their percentage for the subset of Sanders supporters. Noticeable is the presence
of students in the hidden donor population, while the likelihood of being retired is
much higher for visible donors. This signals a difference in age groups: that the
hidden donors are likely to be younger in age. In addition, while visible donors
are more likely to report being attorneys and physicians, hidden donors are slightly
more likely to be teachers. Considering that the average annual salary of teachers in
public schools was $56,383 in 201216while a physician’s lowest pay was $189,00017,
this hints that income and wealth might explain why some donors are hidden while
others are not, which is as expected. However, it is also interesting to note that the
proportion of visible donors reporting unemployment is slightly higher.
of our descriptive statistics—because the sample size is so large, every difference that we present in
this paper is statistically significant (? < 0.001).
16National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: 2013
17Forbes, The Best- And Worst-Paying Jobs For Doctors, July 20, 2012.
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2.6 Differences in Contribution Patterns
Given the demographics differences that we have documented earlier, here we
investigate whether hidden and visible donors vary in the amount, frequency, and
timing of their donations.
Amount and Number
Table 2.3 displays the basic descriptive statistics for Sanders contributions in the
2016 cycle. Here we see the important differences between visible and hidden
contributors. Figure 2.2 shows the density plot of the sum of Sanders contributions,
capped at $500 to clearly highlight the difference. We see that the distribution of
the contribution sum is extreme valued, much more pronounced with the hidden
donors’ data. Also, the distribution of hidden donors’ contributions exhibits peaks
at various salient contribution amounts such as $10 (12.0% of hidden donors), $15
(8.5%), $50 (7.6%), and $27 (6.1%). There are no such extreme peaks for visible
donors’ sum of contributions. The mode for visible donors is $250 (4.8%), followed
by $300 (3.1%).
Table 2.3: Sanders Contributions, Visible and Hidden Contributors, 2016 Sanders
Campaign
Visible (12.4%) Hidden (87.6%)
Sum of contributions:
—— Mean $632.0 $45.7
—— Q1 $270.0 $15.0
—— Q2 $400.0 $27.0
—— Q3 $700.0 $60.0
Number of contributions:
—— Mean 13.2 2.5
—— Q1 5 1
—— Q2 10 1
—— Q3 17 3
Median first contribution date 10/04/2015 01/29/2016
Median last contribution date 05/18/2016 03/09/2016
% of donors who gave to Sanders, after
—— Super Tuesday 83.5% 44.9%
—— Acela primaries (Super Tuesday III) 63.3% 16.9%
—— Clinton became presumptive nominee 29.5% 4.6%
—— Sanders endorsed Clinton 5.5% 0.8%
—— End of Democratic convention 0.1% 0.0%
The $27 contribution amount is particularly interesting. This is an amount that
the Sanders campaign deliberately made salient mid-election, emphasizing that the
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Contribution Sum to Sanders, Visible and Hidden Con-
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average donation size to the campaignwas $27, and thus the campaign relied on small
donors and not on the fat-cats of Wall Street.18 This emphasis has been frequently
covered by the media (Bump, 2016; Foran, 2016; Mehta et al., 2016), and was
further echoed in Sanders’s later campaign strategies, as they added a $27 donation
option in their suggested contribution amounts. And indeed, the campaign had
successfully mobilized small donors enough that its median donor was a one-time
giver of $27. However, $27-giving is more indicative of a visible donor compared
to the benchmark distribution. While 20% of Sanders donors have given $27 at least
once, conditional on a $27 giving record, a donor is 26.5% likely to be visible. This
may suggest that such compliance with the campaign message—enough to choose
such a non-salient amount—is indicative of donor loyalty. That is, who ends up
contributing enough to earn the visibility.
Aside from the obvious differences in contribution amounts, Table 2.3 also shows
important differences by the number of contributions. Note that visible donors have
18Note that the individual contribution limit of 2016 was $2,700, which could have resulted in
this value.
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given multiple times—indeed, while the median hidden donor has given only once,
the median visible donor has given ten times to Sanders. This shows that not all
visible donors are one-time donors of hundreds of dollars.
Timing
The timing of campaign contributions has not been widely analyzed, though there
are a few recent papers on the subject (Christenson and Smidt, 2011; Smidt and
Christenson, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2015; Magleby et al., 2018). These studies
aggregate the number of donations on a daily level to study donation dynamics.
Magleby et al. (2018) aggregated the data separately for small and large donors, and
concluded that the same events motivate large and small donors alike, and thus they
seem to be driven by the same dynamics.
However, the timing of giving disaggregated by first and last date of contributions
may provide additional insight into donor motivations. If we view contributing to
campaigns as a rational act in which a donor weighs her marginal benefits and costs,
whether her gift is expressively or instrumentally motivated, the first contribution
date reveals when the marginal benefits first exceed marginal costs of the person. If
donations are driven by solicitation, timing may show how an equilibrium is struck
between demand and supply.
Table 2.3 also shows various summaries of when the donors choose to give. Notice
that visible contributors on average enter earlier in the race with their first contribu-
tion. While visible donors give long before the primaries, hidden donors enter right
before the primaries start. Visible donors also leave later than hidden contributors,
again by a difference of two to three months, a substantial amount of time. Note
how half of the hidden donors started to leave after March 9th, although that was
the day after the Sanders’ surprise win in Michigan. In fact, by April 26 (the time of
the so-called Acela primaries), less than one in six Sanders hidden donors remained
(16.9%). For visible donors, a majority of them stopped only after May 18.
Table 2.3 shows the percentage of donors who gave to Sanders or other committees
after some key dates inwhich Sanders’ prospect declined. We include Super Tuesday
(March 15), the Acela primaries (April 26), when Clinton became a presumptive
nominee (June 6), when Sanders officially endorsed Clinton (July 12th), and when
the Democratic Convention officially closed (July 28). Note that the percentage
of hidden donors who give to Sanders rapidly declines as the election progresses.
This contrasts with visible donors. By the time that Clinton is the presumptive
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nominee, almost 30%of visible donors still opened their wallets for further campaign
contributions to Sanders, while only 5% of hidden donors did.19 This suggests
that “hidden” status was achieved because they were not attracted to give until
the race was contested, and they were also quicker to lose interest. That hidden
donors are late entrants to the market signals that they may not have been strong
supporters to begin with, and that they may have been persuaded to give only after
Sanders gained sufficient momentum.20 Indeed, it is surprising to see that so many
visible donors contributed to Sanders after he had effectively lost his quest for
the Democratic nomination. Even if we account for the possibility of campaigns
mislabeling donationswith different dates then they actually received, the percentage
seems substantial.
The difference in enthusiasm could be attributed to many factors, such as ideological
differences (Ensley, 2009), candidate valence, information costs, or contributor’s
budgets. For example, given that donors are instrumental, the ones who are further
away from Sanders ideologically may have been attracted to give by his rising
prospects, but as his viability fell, they withdrew as their marginal benefit of giving
fell below the costs. It could be that these are donors who are generally not
sufficiently interested in politics to consider giving, and only when Sanders became
a serious figure, were attracted just enough to give once or twice. There could be a
donor class with limited budget for political donations, for instance due to a lower
family income, who thus cannot afford to give expressive donations such as those
made after Sanders loses the primary race. With only administrative data we cannot
immediately conclude whether either of these two explanations hold true, but this is
worthy of further investigation.
Differentiating Visible Donors
Given the results above, there is a strong possibility that visible donors become vis-
ible simply because they have patiently given many times, and eventually gave more
than the $200 threshold. These donors, who we call eventually visible donors, may
be different from the ones who have given over $200 in their first contribution, who
19Overall, 22.2% of donors started to give before the Iowa Caucuses but also stopped before the
Iowa Caucuses, while 35.2% of donors gave before and after the Iowa Caucuses. Similarly, 35.9%
started to give before Super Tuesday but not after, while 39.1% of donors gave before and after Super
Tuesday.
20Note that this difference in timing is best highlighted also because Sanders had a lengthy
campaign, as he did not leave the race until the Democratic convention. If a less-viable candidate
had dropped out earlier or his/her prospects dwindled much more quickly, while the difference will
still hold, it would be more subtle.
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we will call immediately visible donors. If for instance a donor gives $50 monthly
starting January 2016 and opts out during or before April, she will be hidden, while
if she remains to give once more until May, she becomes visible. Distinguishing the
different types of visible donors may be important in understanding differences in
their political behavior from hidden donors.
Table 2.4 replicates Table 2.3 with these classifications. The immediately visible
donors constitute only 2.7% of the donor population, while the eventually visible
donors are 9.7% of the donor population. Note that the number and sum of contribu-
tions are correlated, as there is a $2,700 cap on the maximum amount of individual
contributions—a donor who gives $500 regularly cannot give more than 5 times.
Altogether, the immediately visible donors (2.7% of donors) give 20% of the indi-
vidual contributions amount, the eventually visible donors (9.7%) give 46.2%, and
the hidden donors (87.6%) give 33.8%. Again, this now excludes the first $200
from visible donors, and hence the proportion is reduced from what is presented
in Table 2.1. Each class is a formidable force in the financial electorate, but it
is the eventually visible donors who filled the campaign chest of the presidential
candidate. Table 2.2’s equivalent with these classifications is available in Appendix
B.5.
Table 2.4: Sanders Contributions, Immediately Visible, Eventually Visible, and








——Mean $876.0 $564.0 $45.7
—— Q1 $277.0 $269.0 $15.0
—— Q2 $500.0 $389.0 $27.0
—— Q3 $1,000.0 $638.0 $60.0
Number of contributions:
——Mean 6.2 15.1 2.5
—— Q1 1 7 1
—— Q2 3 11 1
—— Q3 7 19 3
Median first contribution date 01/25/2016 09/23/2015 01/29/2016
Median date when voter became visible 01/25/2016 03/04/2016 —
Median last contribution date 04/03/2015 05/25/2016 03/09/2016
% of donors who gave to Sanders, after
—— Super Tuesday 61.5% 89.6% 44.9%
—— Acela primaries (Super Tuesday III) 38.7% 70.1% 16.9%
—— Clinton became presumptive nominee 15.7% 33.3% 4.6%
—— Sanders endorsed Clinton 3.0% 6.2% 0.8%
—— End of Democratic convention 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
54
On average, the eventually visible donors start early, but give frequently and are late
to leave the donation game. For other campaigns than the Sanders campaign, we
would not have been able to observe their first few donations, and hence would not
know exactly when they entered. Instead, we would have observed only the date
that they crossed the $200 threshold and became visible, the median of which is
March 3, 2016, and would have only known that they would have entered before that.
Because the best predictor of giving is their past giving history, it makes sense for
campaigns to target early givers and attempt to solicit more money from them, given
that they have not maxed out. It appears that donors who become eventually visible
are the most loyal—or persuadable—set of donors. Indeed, conditional on having
first given before June 1, 2015 (within two months of launching the campaign),
27.6% will become eventually visible.
One interesting point is that the median date of first donation for hidden donors
and for immediately visible donors is similar—only four days apart, a week to go
before the Iowa caucuses. The first and third quartiles are also similar: respectively
September 12, 2015 vs. October 1, 2015, and March 6, 2016 vs. March 9, 2016.
If first donation dates are indication of interest/persuasion, this suggests that the
hidden and immediately visible donors may be quite similar in their motivations for
contributing, and perhaps that income or wealth is the primary difference between
hidden and immediately visible donors. It is the repeat donors—who are also
mostly early donors—who stand out, and they might be the donors who most affect
the campaign’s policy positions.
Again, we are looking at the data from a single campaign. Depending on the
nature of different campaigns, contextual factors, and primary election dynamics,
the profile of the hidden donor population might vary across election cycles and
candidates. If the hidden donors—who provided one-third of contribution dollars to
Sanders in 2016—can be further mobilized with certain issue positions, a campaign
may choose to do just that. Hidden donors have, after all, the potential to give
more and perhaps become visible. If they are more economically representative, the
campaign may find it more beneficial to focus on small donors and retaining policy
positions closer to the median voter. However, if the campaign’s donor base cannot
be mobilized this way, the campaign may choose to diverge from the median voter
to attract more rich donors.
Are the three classes of donors actually any different in policy preferences? We
cannot conclude that they are with only administrative data, and much less with
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just Sanders’ 2016 campaign. However, we believe it is worth further investigation.
Uncovering hidden donors clearly shows that we need to better understand who
the presidential campaign perceives to be major financial electorate, and whether
catering improves a campaign’s chances of primary and general election success.
2.7 Conclusion
How is our understanding of campaign finance restricted by the FEC’s data reporting
process? Because only transactions that exceed cycle-to-date aggregate of $200 are
disclosed, many donors’ contribution records are censored, either entirely or in
part. We have shown that small donors, who are usually “hidden” due to censoring
(hence the term hidden donors), are distinct from large donors. Unfortunately, it
has been only large donors who were usually visible to campaign outsiders and
researchers (visible donors). Hence, we argue that our knowledge of individual
campaign contributors has been incomplete.
Hidden donors to Sanders 2016 campaign far outnumbered visible donors, and for
every visible donor to his campaign, there were seven who were hidden. Also, these
hidden donors, relative to visible ones, were more likely to be students, females,
and racial/ethnic minorities. This hints, consistent with the existing literature, that
we usually only see a limited picture of much wealthier, privileged donors’ political
behavior when using censored campaign contributions data.
Hidden donors on average contribute later in the election than visible donors, and
their giving generally occurred when the race was competitive. The median hidden
donor started giving to Sanders a week before the primaries started, and did not give
more than once or twice—whether it be a lack of enthusiasm, Sanders’ diminished
viability, or the donor’s constricted campaign budget, is difficult to identify with our
data. Whichever is the case, the hidden donors largely cleared out around March
2016, while a substantial portion of visible donors continued to give even with their
candidate’s dwindled prospects. This observation cannot be made with survey-
based methods, with daily aggregation over all donations, or with campaign-level
data aggregation.
The hidden donors, in aggregate, provided up one-third of the contributions to
Sanders from individuals. While this proportion may be overestimated due to the
uniquely popular, small-donor powered nature of the Sanders campaign, the hidden
donors are still a significant subset of the financial constituents that a politician
must be responsive to. If hidden donors are providing significant financial support
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to a campaign, it is likely that they have a more important influence on campaign
platforms than previously acknowledged.
We also demonstrated the importance of donors who were hidden in the beginning
but eventually became visible, who provided about half of Sanders’ funds from
individuals. These eventually visible donors were more likely to be early givers than
the hidden donors—something that was not observed with traditional FEC data. For
this class of donors, campaigns are likely to target solicit money from them until
they have maxed out their contribution limits. Overall, looking into hidden donors’
contributions and eventually visible donors’ first contributions demonstrate the need
to better understand how campaigns perceive and tailor their messages to all their
contributors.
Fortunately for campaign finance scholars, the reliance on intermediary committees
is ever increasing. Not only is the usage of ActBlue to solicit online donations now
widely prevalent in Democratic campaigns, but the GOP is also trying to attract
small donors by building a similar intermediary committee called WinRed, which
will also be subject to the same strict set of disclosure regulations as ActBlue.
While we may never be as lucky have such rich contributions data from a major
presidential candidate, this ever-increasing reliance on intermediaries/conduits, and
that the $200 requirement stands unadjusted by inflation, will help us study small
donors in the future.
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C h a p t e r 3
DONATION DYNAMICS: DO CRITICAL CAMPAIGN EVENTS
INFLUENCE CONTRIBUTIONS?
3.1 Introduction
Individual donors play a key role in presidential elections. Their importance is ever
growing (Goff, 2005; Magleby, 2008) such that other sources of money—such as
PACs, party committees, candidate self-financing, public funds, and transfers from
affiliated committees—pale against direct donations from individuals. Indeed, from
2012 on, no major presidential candidate has accepted public matching funds, due
to the spending limitations that follow the money. The vacancy of public funds has
been quickly filled by individuals tapped by campaign operations.
Yet we know surprisingly little about why these individuals give. What motivates
individual campaign contributions? The classical literature of donor motivations are
built on surveys (Brown et al., 1995; Francia et al., 2003; Barber, 2016b), and while
surveys are useful, they do not quite take into account the rich information available
in the campaign finance disclosure data. This paper complements the surprising
lack of literature using this large administrative dataset and contributes as proof that
there is much to explore in administrative data alone—especially about the timing
of giving.
Each transaction in a campaign disclosure report is tagged with the date that the
money was received by the campaign. Given a single transaction, I must the ask
the following: why did this individual give on this particular date, and not on
some other dates? The timing of individual contributions is a critical component
to the why-question, as it may help better establish the empirical model of the
“purposeful, instrumentally motivated citizen”—or its alternative. Yet, the timing
and the dynamics of giving have been much under-explored in the literature.
Hence in this paper, I approach this why question by looking into when these
individual contributions to the presidential race take place, using both nonparametric
and semiparametric methods. I use the Federal Election Commission (FEC)’s 2016
election data, cast as a daily time-series of individual contributions in (1) sums and
(2) counts. With this data, I test the hypothesis that if presidential donors are either
instrumental or momentum-driven, they will be responsive to events that reveal new
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information about candidate viability, such as early victories or unexpected upsets in
caucuses and primaries. That is, I look for critical events that significantly motivate
or demotivate individual giving, while mapping out a smooth and succinct trend
elsewhere to see how the overall giving takes place over time. For this purpose, I
employ the sequential segmentation splines in Ratkovic and Eng (2010) to harness
the power of smoothing splines while searching for critical breaks.
I find that on the national level, daily aggregates for any candidate are a slow-moving,
smooth process, without any particular critical events. The overall smooth estimates
show that there is certainly a dynamic element to the underlying political interest
during an election cycle. However, there are no sudden changes—everything is
more or less gradual. This is true even when the algorithm is explicitly modeled
with known events, such as key primary races, dates that presumptive nominees
emerge from each party, surprise, upset wins by candidates, or scandals.
Even when I disaggregate the data by state, events that I expect to create shocks
hardly ever do. These include events such as the Iowa caucus or the New Hampshire
primary, and the few breaks that I do detect run contrary to existing theory. I
conclude that overall, donors seem neither uniformly strategic nor momentum-
driven, and provide some preliminary interpretations of the exceptions and also of
the structural breaks at other unexpected, seemingly uneventful dates.
3.2 Literature
Instrumental and Expressive Giving
Money is extremely important in presidential races, or any other election in the
United States—one legislator called it “the mother’s milk of politics,”1 and election
campaigns stop when they run out of funds. Thus political giving is another form
of democratic political participation, just as is voting, volunteering in campaigns,
contacting public officials, political discussions, grassroots local activities, and
so on (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). Therefore, campaign
contribution literature has relied on similar theoretical frameworks used to model
and analyze turnout.
Naturally, contributing has been subject to the same scrutiny posed in the voting
literature—that is, of the “failure of rational choice theory” or the “puzzle of par-




single campaign contributor’s money to a candidate, given the existing legal caps,2
are not likely to be enough to influence the outcome of the election. This is true of
all federal races, including both Congressional and presidential races, and obviously
more pronounced in the latter. Yet 23.4%3 of respondents to the Cooperative Con-
gressional Election Study claimed to have contributed in the 2016 election, among
80.2% of which have given to a presidential candidate. And among these American
presidential givers, about 55.9% of them have given only to the presidential race. If
one’s money cannot influence the election outcome, why would anyone give?
Ever since Riker and Ordeshook (1968) attempted to rescue the instrumental calcu-
lus of voting in Downs (1957), voting has been regarded as a decision based on both
instrumental and expressive components (Fiorina, 1976). By instrumental motiva-
tion, I refer to the Downsian utility in which a donor’s money has value only when
her dollar is pivotal in helping the more ideologically proximate candidate win. By
expressive motivation, I refer to the utility that results from the act of contributing
itself, such as psychological satisfactions in fulfilling the civic duty or expressing
solidarity with the supporting candidate or cause. Which of these two prevail in
individual campaign contributors?
One literature4 has argued more for the instrumental and strategic motivations of
campaign contributions, such as (Bartels, 1988), Mutz (1995), Ovtchinnikov and
Pantaleoni (2012), and Hill and Huber (2017). This is especially because contrib-
utors are thought to be more politically involved, knowledgeable, and sophisticated
(Mutz, 1995). Others have argued that political giving is expressive, especially
2Currently, an individual’s contribution to a federal candidate is capped at $2,700 USD per
election, counting the primary and the general elections separately.
3CCES 2016 cross tabulations without adjusting with survey weights. While the proportion of
presidential givers among all campaign contributors are stably around four-fifth, the proportion of
campaign contributors in presidential election years have been declining from 2008 (36.5%) and
2012 (31.5%).
4I do not mention some other prominent campaign finance literature, because they are not
relevant. Within the thin individual contributor literature,5 most of the past literature has focused
on Congressional contributors. This is simply because their data is more useful in comparing
donor types, with all the variability in candidates and states that can be exploited. Unfortunately,
presidential donors and Congressional donors often do not overlap: for instance, Francia et al. (2003)
have classified Congressional contributors into three types: investors, ideologues, and intimates, who
are respectively donors who give expecting some quid pro quo benefit from the legislator, donors who
give because of ideological similarity, and donors who give simply out the pleasure of associating
with the high social circle created by the legislator. However, this frame is not informative when
observing presidential contributors, who overlap little with presidential donors. For instance, in
the CCES 2016, while 75% of Congressional donors are also presidential donors, only 26.4% of
presidential donors are also Congressional donors. In addition, it is much more difficult to imagine
that many investor-type or intimate-type contributors to the presidential candidates.
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considering the limits of one individual’s money being able to sway the election.
Ansolabehere et al. (2003) describe political giving as akin to donating to the Red
Cross.
The most prominent of the research explicitly dealing with presidential donor moti-
vation, Brown et al. (1995), classify motivations into three: purposive, solidary, and
material. The first is instrumental, and the latter two are expressive, as ‘material’
contributors in their book indicate those who answered that they give because it is
something “expected of someone in my position,” if I set aside donors with “busi-
ness and employment reasons.”6 That is, they recognize that there are both types of
donors. Or both motivations behind an individual, with perhaps different weights
given between them.
Suppose a donor is strategic and cares about the outcome of the election. Howwould
her contributing behavior change? First, if she is sufficiently forward looking, she
is better off giving early in the campaign. Within the election cycle, if she receives
new, important information on candidates, she will rationally update her priors on
the viability of the candidate, which will increase or decrease the utility from giving.
Suppose there is a positive shock to a candidate that is observable to most donors.
Then on the aggregate level, it is likely that I will see a financial “bump”, a reflection
of donors revising their decision to invest in the candidate in question.
Now suppose that a donor is expressive. The Riker and Ordeshook approach, which
sets the expressive utility as a constant, gives no information on when this person
is likely to give. Given that there are dynamics in the campaign, it is difficult to
imagine that the expressive utility from giving is constant. In Section 3.2 I present
one branch of theory as to how expressive utility may look like.
Momentum in Elections
Another thread of the campaign finance literature deals with momentum (Mayer,
1996; Mutz, 1997; Steger et al., 2004; Norrander, 2006; Donovan and Hunsaker,
2009; Butler, 2009), which is something distinct from Bayesian updating and “in-
vesting” to increase the return. Butler (2009) summarizes this as follows:
Victory creates enthusiasm among supporters, who increase their cam-
6Brown et al. (1995)’s donors were documented only after they have given $200 or more. This is
equivalent to more than $400 in 2016 dollars. I expect that within the donors observable from FEC
transactions, the proportion of donors with material motivations is much lower in recent elections
than in past elections. For the discussion of hidden donors by reporting threshold, see Chapter 2.
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paign contributions. ... The reverse effect happens for losing candidates.
Momentum in primary victories is an important factor well-recognized in political
science, especially due to the sequential nature of theUnited States primaries (Knight
and Schiff, 2010; Redlawsk et al., 2011; Collingwood et al., 2012). Candidates spend
a disproportionate amount of money and time in the first few primary sites such as
Iowa, which is one of prominent reasons why candidates now shun public matching
funds—federal funds require that candidates spend proportionately to the state’s
population, a high disadvantage in the early primaries. It is also well-known that
the media coverage is biased by the sequence in the primaries. Norrander (2015)
states that Iowa and New Hampshire each receive five to ten times more coverage
than the average state’s presidential contest.
Why would there be any momentum, an overestimation or an underestimation of
the underlying candidate viability? One reason could be that people like backing a
winning horse, and they look to each other to catch signals on candidate viability—
donating to those with a positive signal will then result in a herding behavior.
Another idea is that there is a certain utility from “suspenses” or higher variance in
beliefs, and surprises in themselves (Ely et al., 2015).
What is interesting is that whether a donor is instrumental or expressive-momentum
driven, both of them will be responsive to the same critical events in the campaign.
These include initial primary victories or upset, surprise wins in which the candidate
exceeds expectations. Assuming that information on candidate viability is not quite
accurate, and donors are generally instrumental or momentum-driven, I can then
hypothesize that I will see sharp boosts, apart from a smooth, slow trend, at these
particular event dates. In this paper I do not aim to disentangle the two but to test it
jointly.
3.3 Data and Methodology
Data
I use the data from the FEC, which makes all contribution records from individuals
to presidential committees available, including donors’ names, addresses, and oc-
cupations. Using this, I can use entity resolution techniques to build a panel data,
if there are multiple donations from the same individual. The data is open source
but extremely large, complex, and growing exponentially. This has resulted in a low
utilization of this data despite the magnitude of information that it provides to many
important questions in political giving.
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In this paper I limit the analysis to the 2016 election, and its six most prominent
presidential candidates—Hillary Clinton (D) and Donald Trump (R), the general
election candidates, and Bernie Sanders (D), Ted Cruz (R), Marco Rubio (R), and
John Kasich (R), who were unsuccessful in their respective party’s presidential
primaries.7 I choose to use only 2016, because it is the first election in which
(1) there is no incumbent president running for reelection, and (2) there are no
major party candidates that participated in the matching fund system, in either
primaries or the general election.8 This puts the candidates’ solicitation strategies
on a relatively equal footing. Moreover, 2016 was a highly interesting election.
Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans were able to determine a general election
candidate during the invisible primary period. By the first week of January 2016,
FiveThirtyEight reported that Sanders had narrowed the margins between himself
and Clinton to its lowest up-to-date, and Cruz and Trump were neck-and-neck.9
Individual contributions to election committees are, by the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, only made public when the individual in question gives more than 200 USD to
the committee in question, and only from that moment on.10 This makes small and
early donations invisible to the researcher, and the remaining contribution records
sparse. In Table 3.1, I provide key campaign finance statistics, especially sources
of their money, by candidate. Note that high reliance on small contributors relative
to large means that the pattern of giving may seem more volatile to the eye of the
researcher, which is something to watch out for with Sanders and Trump data.
Due to this and the fact that most contributors give only once or twice in the
campaign, individual campaign contribution records are not very informative as a
panel data, if the researcher wishes to observe the dynamics of a single election
campaign. Not surprisingly, most research has to do with tracking donors over
different years of elections. In this paper, I collapse the panel into a time-series
7For the Republican party, I have chosen candidates who have lasted longest. I could have
included Ben Carson, whose popularity peaked and then dwindled from late 2015, or Jeb Bush, who
was most prominent at the beginning of the election cycle but lost popularity—here I chose not to,
because their observed numbers of individual donations were too small.
8https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/09/public-campaign-funding-
is-so-broken-that-candidates-turned-down-292-million-in-free-money/?utm_term=.2cd0a21dc7cd.
In 2000, Bush rejected public matching funds for primaries. In 2008, Obama rejected the public
matching funds for the general election, a first for a major party candidate. In 2016, every major
candidate rejected the public money for both races, not counting O’Malley.
9FiveThirtyEight, 2016 Primary Forecasts, Iowa Democratic and Republican Caucuses, polls-
only forecast. I do not use the poll-plus forecast because this takes the fundraising state into account
as well.
1011 CFR 104.8 - Uniform reporting of receipts.
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Contribution Type Clinton Sanders Trump Cruz Rubio Kasich
Individual, Large 52.67% 41.62% 14.01% 60.99% 66.37% 75.98%
Individual, Small 18.53% 57.70% 25.93% 38.16% 24.34% 22.04%
PACs 0.31% 0% 0.04% 0.10% 2.08% 1.2%
Public Funds 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Self-finance 0.25% 0% 19.77% 0% 0% 0%
Other Transfers 28.23% 0.68% 40.24% 0.75% 7.21% 0.78%
Number of Donors Observed 519,714 250,352 205,847 99,554 35,136 13,795
Number of Donations Observed 3,007,977 2,089,355 402,917 509,474 93,381 24,845
Table 3.1: Key Campaign Finance Statistics by Candidate
observed daily, with two quantities of interest—daily contribution sum, and daily
contribution counts. Although I am primarily interested in the former, the latter is
a more robust measure to individual-level heterogeneity in wealth, and I intend to
look for structural breaks in both quantities.
Using campaign finance data as a time-series is a relatively unexplored approach in
the campaign finance literature. The only such paper to our knowledge is Christenson
and Smidt (2011), which explored the daily fundraising for the 2008 primaries
for both major parties using Kalman filtering to account for the noise created by
days of the week and FEC report deadlines. The paper provides an excellent
argument as to why the daily observations of fundraising measures may not equal
the underlying contribution dynamics. However, their interpretation of candidates’
latent fundraising strengths relies heavily on visually interpreting the figures. In this
paper, I offer more concrete, objective measures that determine whether an event
is “critical” enough to create a structural break, and yet is simultaneously able to
smooth the estimates, as will be explained in Section 3.3.
Sequential Segmentation Smooth Splines
In this paper I have two purposes: to test existing hypotheses of giving by looking
for structural breaks at certain dates, as well as estimating a stable, smooth estimate
of campaign finance dynamics. For this purpose, I employ the sequential smooth
spline method of Ratkovic and Eng (2010), a modification of the smooth spline
method designed to look for location and number of unknown jumps.
This nonparametric method is a modification to partial splines (Wahba, 1990; Gu
and Wahba, 1993; Kim and Gu, 2004; Gu, 2013) designed to account for sudden
breaks in the data. Inspired by how the smooth splines systematically overesti-
mates and underestimates George W. Bush’s popularity, right before and after the
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9/11 Attacks in 2001 respectively, the method looks for the existence, the number
of, and the locations of unknown jumps in the data. After potential breaks are
identified, several models are fitted, sequentially adding breaks. Then the modified
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is calculated for eachmodel and the algorithm
automatically determines if jumps should be added, and if so, how many.
More specifically, recursive procedure is as follows: firstly, the algorithm fits a cubic
smoothing spline to the data. That is, it assumes the target H8 is linear in a smooth
function of G8, so that H8 = 5 (G8) + n8 with  (n8) = 0, var (n8) = f2n . This smooth





(H8 − 5 (G8))2 + _
∫
{ 5 ′′}2 3C (3.1)
I then remove the linear trend from the residuals, 4̂1, · · · , 4̂=, and search the residuals
for a breakpoint, by running a modified binary segmentation method.11 Next, I add





(H8 − 5 (G8) − V{G > breakpoint})2 + _
∫
{ 5 ′′}2 3C (3.2)
This is repeated a number of times, sequentially finding the next most likely break
and augmenting it to the existing breaks. After a series of models are generated—
model with no jumps, model with only the first break, model with the first and the
second breaks, and so on—I calculate the modified BIC for each of these models.
The model with the lowest statistic is chosen as the final model.
The original paper is focused on comparing the sequential segmentation splines
with existing smoothing functions, including the canonical smooth splines, Kalman
filters, and LOESS, and shows the strength of the method in several different ways,
such as the behavior of the residuals. In addition, the method warrants comparisons
with existing literature on detecting breakpoints, such as Bai (1994, 1997); Bai and
Perron (2003), and Bai and Perron (1998). The classical structural break tests are
essentially “tests against changes in the coefficients of a linear regression.” (Zeileis
et al., 2003). Here I am not fitting linear regressions but taking a nonparametric
11For details, see Ratkovic and Eng (2010) and Sen and Srivastava (1975).
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approach to accommodate both (1) a flexible underlying dynamics in individual
campaign contributions, and (2) automatic selection of breaks with principledmodel
selection. Hence Ratkovic and Eng (2010) is better than classical tests in this regard.
I briefly go over how each method performs with observational data in Appendix
C.1.
Practical Extensions
In this paper, I make some extensions to (Ratkovic and Eng, 2010). To test for
known events, I not only run the spline method as is—that is, assuming that all
breaks are unknown—but also run the method a second time, in which the jump is
directly modeled into the unpenalized space of the partial splines. This is a form
of semiparametrics, and a measure to recognize that I do indeed know the potential
location of jumps, although these may not be the first and foremost choices in
structural breaks. If I intentionally fit known jumps into the first of the sequence of
breaks, the algorithm will compare the BIC statistics between the different models
and decide whether adding this known jump—and a series of other jumps—will
benefit than having only smooth splines. However, as the original paper warns, this
is essentially “assuming the answer to the question we are asking.”
I apply the following two principles to guard against false positives. First, after the
initial estimation, I bootstrap the residuals and re-estimate the splines—and jumps,
if any—from the generated fake data. This is to generate a confidence interval for
our estimates, and especially the standard errors for the jump sizes, as suggested by
the original paper.12 However, one caveat is that when the signals are not strong
enough in the data, the jump may disappear when the spline method is rerun on
the newly generated fake data. The more this takes place, the more it is likely that
the initial estimate with the jump is likely to be a false positive, especially when I
forcibly model known jumps into the splines. I declare a jump as a true positive
only when the jump is rediscovered 90% or more times in its bootstrapped estimates.
Second, when the jump size is very small, the rediscovered jumps sometimes display
different signs. Inconsistency in the sign of jumps estimates is also an indication
that the jump is a false positive. For jumps that are not 90% times or more positive
or negative, I assess them as false positives.
12After performing an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, I find that the residuals are not quite
stationary. This indicates that it would be better to block bootstrap the residuals, by either non-
overlapping block bootstraps (Carlstein et al., 1986) or moving block bootstraps (Kunsch, 1989; Liu
et al., 1992).
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The set thresholds for both principles are arbitrary, and I leave a formal assessment
such as simulations for future work. However, these are very stringent criteria.13
Figure 3.1 is a case in which no jumps are found without a model, but when a known
jump is specified in the spline, there is a jump which is rediscovered 70% or more
times when bootstrapped. Figure 3.3 is a case in which a jump is found even without
a model. When bootstrapped, the jump is found 99.6% of the time.
Figure 3.1: Comparison of Estimates with and Without a Model, Jump Rediscovery
Rate of 70.1%
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Estimates with and Without a Model, Jump Rediscovery
Rate of 88.8%
Note that I use logged measures of our original quantities of interest. This is due
to the fact that as the election intensifies, the variance of the data increases. I show
an example of the raw and logged measures in Figure 3.4. The residuals, as can be
seen in Figure 3.5, is not well-distributed around zero, and cannot be bootstrapped
13For instance, even the Bush poll data used in Ratkovic and Eng (2010) will fail the first criteria—
the large and immediate jump, which is apparent to the eye, will only be estimated 70% of the time
when bootstrapped. The jump at the Iraq invasion will be rediscovered even less.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of Estimates with and Without a Model, Jump Rediscovery
Rate of 99.6%
without violating the underlying distributional assumptions. The logged measure
does much better in terms of residual distributions. Note that this changes the
interpretation to responsiveness in elasticities.
(a) Raw USD (b) Logged USD
Figure 3.4: Example of Raw and Logged Contribution Sum, Clinton, National
Aggregate
Lastly, I further validate the jumpby running the splinemethod not only on the logged
quantity of interest, but also on the residuals of the said quantity after netting out the
effects of weekends, FEC deadlines, and end-of-month dates. This is the minimal
de-seasonalization of campaign finance, some mentioned already in Christenson
and Smidt (2011). These variables indeed have a strong linear correlation with
campaign contributions, and I accept only the jumps that are also found when the
algorithm is run on the residuals. That is, jumps that persist when I have excluded
the effects of the three covariates.14
14I can also directly model those covariates into the unpenalized space of the splines, but this is
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(a) Raw USD (b) Logged USD
Figure 3.5: Example of Residuals, Raw and Logged Contribution Sum, Clinton,
National Aggregate
3.4 National Jumps
I first ask the following question: do any known critical events create a national jump
in campaign finance? If so, which ones are more important than others? Figure 3.6
shows national trends estimated by the sequential smoothing spline method for all
six candidates.
I see that the underlying process estimated is surprisingly smooth on the national
level—there are no jumps anywhere, for any candidate, and for any of the two
quantities of interest. Table 3.2 presents the BIC statistics for these estimates. It
is clear that the minimum BIC statistics from sequentially augmented models are
nowhere close to the BIC without breaks, in all twelve cases.
Although no events were detected, I can still extract useful information from the
smooth estimates. First of all, note how the candidate strength measured by cam-
paign finance does not correspond to forecasts from national primary polling, shown
in Figure 3.7.15 For instance, in the Democratic party, although the campaign fi-
nance began falling during the month of April 2016, polls for Sanders was still
rising. In the Republican party, note how Kasich garnered popularity as Rubio fal-
tered and withdrew, but elasticity16 of giving did not follow the popularity increases.
The comparison remains similar when compared to log of popularity to make the
quantities comparable in interpretation.
Save for Trump, all candidates start off their campaign with large contributions
outside the scope of this paper.
15For all major and minor candidates, see Appendix C.2.




Figure 3.6: National Estimate by Candidate
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Figure 3.7: National Primary Polls by Party, FiveThirtyEight, 2016 (Selected Can-
didates)
arriving on the first few days. The excitement cools over the first half of year 2015,
then starts climbing again at various points by the candidate. The exception, Trump’s
war chest, shows large fluctuations—I believe this is mainly because Trump relied
much less on individual contributors than any other candidate. Plus, I can clearly
see that Clinton’s war chest overwhelms any other candidates’ at any given point
in time during the election cycle. Sanders donors give many more times though,
suggesting that each transaction from a Clinton supporter is much larger than one
from a Sanders supporter, which is not very surprising.
The local maxima of these smoothed estimates are worth noting. Sanders’ global
maximum is at Super Tuesday (March 1, 2016), and Trump’s local maxima in
2016 are each at March 3, July 30, and October 23, which are respectively quite
close to Super Tuesday, Republican convention, and the last general election debate.
Naturally, I must ask whether critical events will be detected if I aid the algorithm
by specifying where the known events occurred. That is, I can try modeling a set
of breaks that I have reasonable prior expectations to be influential on campaign
finance, directly into the unpenalized component of the partial splines.
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2015-07-02 17.83 2015-12-07 23.87
2015-07-06 19.98 2015-05-25 28.69
2015-05-08 18.16 2015-06-27 33.67
2015-07-18 20.48 2015-06-25 35.32





2015-07-01 26.81 2015-05-25 25.73
2015-07-18 29.21 2015-06-25 25.56
2015-05-12 33.15 2015-12-12 29.53
2016-06-10 37.86 2016-06-27 35.59







2016-07-01 24.75 2015-10-26 9.107
2015-12-23 27.76 2016-01-25 11.77
2016-09-26 30.51 2015-06-15 17.42
2015-07-30 33.77 2015-09-14 21.13





2016-07-01 36.82 2016-01-18 9.451
2015-07-30 39.10 2015-04-11 13.08
2015-10-15 41.60 2015-10-26 17.31
2016-06-20 43.62 2016-06-15 19.62







2015-07-01 13.88 2016-02-16 7.501
2015-12-24 17.62 2016-01-05 11.25
2015-04-17 15.33 2015-12-18 15.00
2015-05-01 19.16 2015-11-16 18.75





2015-07-01 16.09 2016-02-08 7.501
2016-01-25 16.45 2016-01-11 11.25
2015-04-17 18.27 2015-12-18 15.00
2015-12-17 20.26 2015-11-16 18.75
2015-05-01 23.57 2016-03-07 22.67
Table 3.2: First Five Events Selected, Per Candidate and Quantity of Interest,
National Level
I divide the election cycle into three periods in which the dynamics differ: the
pre-primary period, the primary period, and the post-primary period. For each
of the periods, I use the following events while searching for possible breaks: (1)
Republican and Democratic primary debate dates for the pre-primary period,17 (2)
17Norrander (2015) points out that debates are high-stake events during the invisible primary
and the earlier primary season, and that voters are influenced by the candidates’ performance during
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Iowa caucus, New Hampshire primary, Super Tuesday, Super Tuesday II,18 and the
Acela Primaries19, dates in which presumptive nominees emerged20, and end-of-
convention dates for the primary period, and (3) general election debate dates and
October 7, 2016, for the post-primary period, in which Access Hollywood video
tape with Trump appeared in the Washington Post and WikiLeaks released Podesta
emails, a rare date in which big scandals for both party presidential candidates took
place. While the choice of these events is not based on any existing measures, it
spans key events in which the media’s horse-race coverage were focused on.
Again, I find no breaks—modified BIC statistics are lower when there are no jumps
but just splines. I conclude that the national level campaign finance is too smooth
to have any jumps in the elasticity of giving. Henceforth, I now look for jumps by
disaggregating the data into money from each state, in an attempt to prevent the data
from canceling out meaningful variations.
3.5 Initial Primary Victories and Surprise Victories
I now ask our main question: do donors respond to either (1) “surprises” in via-
bility or (2) initial primary wins and losses? In order to ask this question, I must
first calculate at which races—if any—candidates exceeded expectations. I utilize
FiveThirtyEight, a website that analyzes opinion polls since 2008, and which uses a
model to weight pollsters by date and their accuracy, and provide a daily forecast of
by-candidate vote share.21
The races in question for the two separate questions overlap, especially for the
Republican party. Rubio did very well in the Iowa caucus, 6.7% more (23.1%)
than was predicted (16.4%) right before the caucus. Cruz also did better (27.6%)
than predicted (23.9%), while Trump fared worse (24.3%) than predicted (28.6%).
In the New Hampshire primary, while Trump did much better (35.2%) than pro-
these dates. More than fifteen million watched the first Democratic debate on October 13, 2015,
broadcast on CNN. The Republican counterpart, first on August 6, 2015 and then on September 16,
2015, boasted more than twenty-three million viewers separately for each event.
18This is March 15, 2016, in which there were races in five states, Florida, Illinois, Missouri,
North Carolina, and Ohio
19This isApril 26, 2016, inwhich therewere races in five states, Connecticut, Delaware,Maryland,
Pennsylvania and Rhodes Island, also referred to as Super Tuesday III.
20These are respectively June 6, 2016, and May 4, 2016, for Democratic and Republican party.
Super Tuesday IV, in which there were races in California, Montana, New Jersey, NewMexico, South
Dakota, was not a consideration for this reason.
21Unfortunately, there are states in which no or very few polls are conducted due to low interest
in its outcome, resulting in only around half of the fifty states to have reasonable forecasts before the
race. However, this also means that the race is not of much import, so I can safely set aside these
states for my purposes.
73
jected (29.8%), it was Kasich who surprised, coming in second rather than third
behind Rubio as was predicted. After that, there were no notable upset victories or
surprises,22
For the Democratic party, Iowa and New Hampshire races did not deliver much
surprises compared with the polls. However, Sanders delivered upset victories in
Michigan and Indiana, also confirmed by news reports at that time. In Michigan
race, March 8, 2016, Sanders was projected to get a vote share of 36.9% against
Clinton who would win 58.2%, but the results came in 49.8% against 48.3%,
Sanders winning the state. Similarly, in Indiana race, May 3, 2016, Sanders scored
52.5% of vote share against 47.5%, beating his expectations at 42.2% against 49.3%.
Given this knowledge about the two major parties, are there any jumps from each
candidate-state time-series on the dates in question?
Estimating Events as Unknown Jumps. Again, when the sequential smoothing
spline method is run without any specified jumps, there are no particular breaks
detected on the day of the primaries, the day before, or the day after. One exception
is Kasich’s donors in five states: Connecticut, Florida, New York, Texas, and
Virginia, in all of which there is a positive jump on February 8th.23 Again, this
means that there was a surge starting from the day of the New Hampshire primary
itself.
Although the trend is not strong enough for the jumps to persist when bootstrapped
(see Figures C.7 and C.8), this is an interesting phenomenon documented: Rubio
and Kasich donors had some states with breaks on dates close to the Iowa caucus and
New Hampshire primary, respectively. Note that for both candidates, these races
are the ones in which they have exceeded expectations. I find that in contribution
counts, from January 21 to January 31, 2016, twenty-one states had positive jumps
for Rubio.24 I also find that there was a jump from Kasich supporters in Kansas on
22This can be also seen from Google New searches with relevant keywords during the primary
period.
23There is also a case in which sum of contributions from Trump’s supporters in Illinois showed
a slight jump on April 19, 2016, the date of the New York primary in which Trump had a large win
in his home state. However, given that the first three dates selected and recognized as breaks in this
particular time-series is November 5, 2015, April 19, 2016, December 23, 2015, these jumps may
have been purely accidental due to Trump having so few individual over-$200 donors. Corresponding
BIC statistics are 23.17, 26.89, and 16.10, and the splines-only BIC is 16.49. Surely enough, when
bootstrapped, the jump disappears.
24These are, in the order of the date of the jump, Rhodes Island (January 21), Alaska and Oregon
(January 24), Iowa and NewMexico (January 25), Colorado, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and Utah (January 26), Arkansas, Louisiana, Wisconsin, and Wyoming (January 27),
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February 7. Note that these are all before the races and not after, contrary to our
expectations—this is shown graphically in Section 3.7. Again, although only one—
Rubio’s Arkansas, in contribution counts—survives our stringent bootstrapping
criterion (See Figures C.9 and C.10), this is an interesting pattern in the data, even
with such few sample size comparative to other candidates.
What the pattern documents is not very clear-cut at this point. If candidates that
are—by January 2016—not the top two primary candidates experience jumps before
key races in which they have done well, why would that be? I could speculate on
several possibilities. First is that the donors are rationally investing in the upcoming
battle, in the hopes that they can increase the marginal probability of winning for
their favorite candidate. That is, it is forward-looking agent’s—either on the demand
or supply side, or both—attempt to back up the campaign’s war chest to influence the
key races. Second is that the campaign finance is simply a real-time reflection of the
surging popularity of these candidates—that is, there is an endogeneity, but somehow
happened to create a break. Third is a possible winner-take-all type of forecasting
utility, a satisfaction from backing the winning horse, which makes agents overstate
their private signal in the Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) sense, which may be why
these jumps are observed only in second-tier candidates. Distinguishing between
these behaviors will require much more data, and an analysis of other election years
as well.
Estimating Events as Known Jumps. When the four races of interest—Iowa,
NewHampshire, Michigan, and Indiana—are directly modeled and tested for jumps,
and the same bootstrapping principles applied, only a handful of Clinton’s and
Trump’s data survives, and only the jumps at either the Iowa caucus or the New
Hampshire primary. These are presented in Figure 3.8, and Figure C.11 plots how
the splines would have been estimated without direct modeling of the events.
The final results defy expectations somewhat. Clinton’s Iowa race, although Clinton
won, was such a narrow win, that some caucuses resorted to such extreme measures
as coin tosses to decide a winner.25 In addition, the vote share was below her
original expectations. Hence it is not the case that an unexpected victory brought
her a positive boost in campaign money. However, there was a boost. The case of
Connecticut and Indiana (January 28), Mississippi and Nebraska (January 30), and Kentucky and










































































































































































































































































































































































Clinton’s contributions in Oregon is also rather peculiar. Clinton was always leading
in the few opinion polls led in Oregon26 but Sanders declared victory in Oregon
by twelve percentage-points. Why Oregon of all places should be responsive to the
Iowa caucus, albeit its jump size smaller than in Iowa, it not clear.
The various results for Trump are also difficult to interpret—these states are not
easily clusterable by covariates such as size of the delegates, the timing of the
primary, popularity of Trump, and so on. However, I am wary of reading too much
into jumps from Trump’s data, as he had much less donation counts than Clinton,
and jumps may be products of a small sample size. Note also that Pennsylvania and
Delaware will display the Iowa caucus as a jump or the NewHampshire primary as a
jump, depending onwhat known jump it ismodel with. Amodel that includes both is
rejected by the BIC statistics. This indicates that I must further havemeans to choose
one of the known jumps if two jumps are close to each other and incompatible.
3.6 Local Events: In-state Wins or Losses
I ask one more question: do donors respond to local events? Here I limit local
events to in-state primaries.27 This is not a question directly related to the theory
that we presented in Section 3.2. However, in light of finding a significant jump
in contributions from Clinton-supporting Iowans on the Iowa caucus date, I wish
to make sure that I can rule out the effect of local races. Theoretically, a local
race’s influence may be justified per the social network literature, notably (Sinclair,
2012). Sinclair showed that in the 2008 election, people were influenced by how
their friends were giving.
For each state, I model a jump at their primary or caucus date and test if the
jump survives (1) the modified Bayesian Information Criteria, (2) de-seasonalizing
weekend effects, FEC deadline effects, and end-of-month effects, (3) bootstrapping
residuals and again detecting for jumps. If I only take jumps that survive 90%28 or
more times and have consistent jump sign during bootstrapping, I end up with only
two cases aside from the aforementioned Clinton-Iowa, one from Trump-supporters





27It would be interesting to track where the candidates rally, geocode the location, and see if these
boost local contributions, but I leave this for future research.
28If I restrict this to 95%, only the New Jersey case of Trump supporters survives.
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(a) Clinton, Iowa, Jump at the
Iowa Caucus (Feb 1, 2016),
Jump Size: Mean 1.6, Std. Err.
0.2
(b) Trump, New Jersey, Jump at
the New Jersey Primary (Jun 7,
2016), Jump Size: Mean 1.5,
Std. Err. 0.2
(c) Trump, North Dakota, Jump
at the North Dakota Caucus
(Apr 1, 2016), Jump Size: Mean
1.2, Std. Err. 0.3
Figure 3.9: Cases with Structural Breaks at In-state Primaries
On top of finding very few jumps with this local event specification, the few results
have nothing in common. They are neither similar in primary form, dates, whether
candidate exceeded expectations, and so on.29 Indeed, the only thing common about
these three outcomes is that they are for candidates who became the general election
candidates, the same conclusion I have drawn in Section 3.5. In addition, if I do
not specify these events, the sequential smoothing spline method will conclude that
these are not jumps, except for the first case. For now, I leave set aside these findings
as exceptions and conclude that local events per se have no effects on campaign
finance.
3.7 Events Unknown A Priori
Finally, I ask the following: are there any critical events in campaign finance that
are unknown a priori? This is an important question, and the methodology itself
was designed to find location and number of unknown breakpoints.
I run the algorithm by each candidate and state, without specifying any known events
in the partial splines. In Figures 3.10 and 3.11 I plot these break dates against the
break sizes. The point sizes in the Figure are each state’s population size, which is a
measure to see if these breakpoints are results of small potential donor population.
I see that there are certain clusters of jumps by state per candidate. Setting aside the
aforementioned jumps ofRubio andKasich donations near Iowa andNewHampshire
races, first of all, note that there is a big jump in Trump’s war chest around mid-June
in both contribution sum and counts. In Figure 3.10 it starts with Wisconsin on May
30. Twenty-one states experience jumps starting from May 30 to June 21, dispersed
29New Jersey race was long after Trump became the presumptive nominee, and North Dakota has
no meaningful enough set of in-state primary polls to have a forecast.
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Figure 3.10: All Detected Breaks by Candidate and State, Contribution Sum
Figure 3.11: All Detected Breaks by Candidate and State, Contribution Counts
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over the three weeks but most concentrated on June 20. In Figure 3.11 there are
fifteen states that had a jump on June 20.
What happened on this daywith theTrumpcampaign? TrumpfiredCoreyLewandowski,
his campaign manager, on this date, but it is hard to believe that this had such a
big, positive impact on donor behavior. I interpret this to be not an external shock
but an internal change within the campaign operations. June 20 is a major FEC
deadline mid-year in which the campaign must put its full effort into raising money,
to display its viability to the public and convince voters. The Trump campaign had
done quite poorly on raising money before the month of June, at which they only
had 1.3 million cash on hand. The Trump campaign launched extensive solicitations
during June to compensate, and was able to gather 20.2 million cash on hand by
the end of June.30 However, why only some states were responsive, and others not,
is not immediately clear—if the intensity of solicitations notably differed by state,
they do not align with more sensible swing state choices, or anything reported from
the media.
Secondly, for the Trump campaign’s contribution counts, I also observe three clusters
of dips, each respectively on July 1 (six states, ± 1 day), August 25 (eleven states, ±
1 day), and November 4 (six states). Again, there seem to be no particular external
events that could have hurt the Trump campaign, and this time it is neither the case
that these dates are linked to FEC deadlines. The latest of the dips, November 4,
may be understandable if donors calculate that further giving on a date so close to
the campaign will not be very effective, but it is then questionable why I do not see
the same pattern for Clinton supporters, or for Trump supporters from other states.
Overall, there are these inexplicable breaks if approached from information update
point of view, as they are relatively uneventful dates.
Finally, as shown in Figure 3.10, there are the dips in the contribution sum from
Sanders donors fromMay 4 toMay 15, in nineteen different states. Considering that
the campaign was announced on April 30 and Sanders’ major rally only began on
May 26 in Burlington, Vermont,31 it is likely that this is a relic of bunched reporting
from the campaign, and nothing of substantial import.
30See FEC filing here. A Fortune article on July 21, 2016 summarizes this well.
31http://time.com/3895770/bernie-sanders-hillary-clinton-vermont/
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3.8 An Early Look into the 2020 Data
So far, I have explored the 2016 election, where there were only a handful of
presidential candidates in each party. One may argue that the smooth processes
seen in Figure 3.6 is because there was not much uncertainty in winnowing of the
candidate pools, perhaps except for Trump’s surprise strength in the early primaries.
In this 2020 election cycle, the situation was dramatically different. With an incum-
bent president, therewere only four candidateswho threw their hats in theRepublican
party, but in the Democratic party, there were twenty-eight named Democrats vying
for the president (Burns et al., 2020), maximum twenty-four at any given point in
time (Lee, 2020). With Sanders ending his presidential bid on April 15, 2020, the
Democratic field has finally narrowed down to Biden. But Biden was not a strong
primary candidate in the pre-primary period according to the polls, with many
strong candidates such as Sanders, Buttigieg, Warren, Klobuchar threatening his
candidacy. What is more, his numbers fell rapidly with the beginning of the Iowa
Caucus as he experienced devastating losses in the early states, before drastically
shooting up starting from Super Tuesday. This can be seen in Figure 3.12, which is
Figure 3.7’s equivalent. For a figure with all candidates, see Appendix C.2.
With such sharp turn of events and much uncertainty about candidate viability much
more even than the 2016 Republican primary, the 2020 Democratic primary is a
race best suited for testing whether donors are actually instrumental or momentum-
driven.
Moreover, on September 24, 2019, the House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, formally
announced that the committees of the House would begin an impeachment inquiry,
with the actual impeachment starting mid-December and concluding early February.
While there is hardly any literature on what effects impeachment of an existing
president has on political participation, either turnout or campaign contributions,
the effect will be seen for the data gathered—if any.
Figure 3.13 shows Figure 3.6’s equivalent for the 2020 cycle, with data collected up
to March 1, 2020. Figure 3.14 shows the same jump estimates with the underlying
data points, as well as smooth estimates for each candidate for more information.
As can be seen, in either contribution sum or in counts, there are no structural
breaks—save for one for Biden in counts, when there is a large jump in the very
beginning of his campaign at April 24, 2019. This is hardly any surprise, as he
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Figure 3.12: National Primary Polls by Party, FiveThirtyEight, 2020 (Selected
Candidates)
observations prior to April 25, 2019 are likely from very political sophisticated
donors with inside contact or enthusiasm enough to start donating even before the
official announcement. Hence the jump, although robust, is hardly of much interest.
Note in Figure 3.14 that Trump did have several days around the day that impeach-
ment was announced and around the day that impeachment began with very high
contribution sum. In fact, the day his campaign hauled in the most in both sum
and counts was December 18, 2019, when impeachment formally began (more than
900,000 USD). But overall, his cash influx from individuals was quite consistent
over the observed election cycle, resulting in almost a flat line when smoothed.
Now, since this dataset does not include observations after Super Tuesday and after
the Democratic field has winnowed down to a single candidate, we may observe
jumps on the national level later in the election cycle. In addition, the COVID-
19 pandemic that is raging across the United States and the world will surely
have significant impact on individual contributions, as citizens suffer economically




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.14: National Estimate by Candidate, the 2020 Election Cycle (Up to March
1, 2020), with Underlying Data Points and Smoothing Spline Estimates
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effect).
While I have not performed state-by-state analysis for the 2020 cycle, nor modelling
for known jumps, the preliminary analysis of the 2020 cycle on the national level
seems to be consistent with what I have shown earlier—that campaign contributions
is a slow-moving but a smooth process, and there are no significant structural breaks
that would be observed if donors are largely instrumental or momentum-driven.
3.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to answer “why do campaign contributors give” with
“when do campaign contributors give”, using presidential donors to the 2016 race. I
hypothesized that if either donors are instrumentally motivated, or are expressively
motivated but primarily momentum-driven, I will observe structural breaks at key
campaign events, such as initial primary victories or surprise, upset wins. I also
purported to pin down the slow-moving process underlying campaign finance data.
Instrumental donors will Bayesian update with new information about the true state
of candidate viability unless most donors have already accurately inferred the true
state of the world. With momentum-driven expressive donors I hypothesized as
such because by definition momentum indicates how early candidate performances
boosts or hurts the candidates, whatever the reason behind it is, such as the desire
to back a winning horse. I tested this hypothesis using the sequential segmentation
spline method taken from Ratkovic and Eng (2010), which detects the number and
location of unknown and known jumps while providing smooth estimates to the
underlying dynamics elsewhere.
I found that when contributions are aggregated nationally, there were no events
detected whatsoever, either with a blank slate or when key events were modeled
into the unpenalized space of the partial splines. Only when I have disaggregated
the data by contributor’s state, I find jumps—but not where I have expected them
to be. If anything, there is a surge in contributions before the candidates exceed
expectations, not after, for some second-tier candidates. In addition, there were a
few sporadic responses to the first two primaries—Iowa and New Hampshire—from
the general election candidate’s money, but without a readily discernible pattern.
All in all, known events do not seem to be creating immediate and lingering shocks
for the algorithm to detect as a structural break. Although they ran contrary to our
hypothesis, these provide interesting new pictures that contribute to the campaign
finance literature.
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I asked two additional questions. Do donors respond to local events—here more
specifically, in-state caucuses and primaries? Are there any other critical events in
campaign finance that are not considered important a priori? I find that generally, in-
state primaries do not cause structural breaks. I also find some dates that emerge as
important in many states for each candidate, but these are dates with no particularly
interesting event, such as August 25th for the Trump campaign in which donations
sharply dipped from twelve states. I interpret these to be demand effects from the
campaigns themselves, and not the supply effect—that is, the campaign may fire up
or cease operations at times that are not particularly linked to any external event, but
makes sense internally, such as an FEC deadline.
Lastly, I performed the same check on the national-level daily aggregated data of the
2020 presidential election cycle, using data collected up to March 1, 2020. I again
see virtually no events detected either on contribution sum or counts. It remains
to be seen whether there will be any structural breaks later in the cycle post Super
Tuesday, or in the mayhem of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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A p p e n d i x A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Legislation Related to Voter Registration
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), also known as the “motor
voter law,” is about increasing the opportunities of voter registration through various
means. Its various Sections decree that the States1 offer citizens the chance to
register to vote through motor vehicle agencies, by mail-in applications, and by
public assistance and disability offices.
Section 8, Administration of Voter Registration, requires States to maintain accurate
and up-to-date data. Specifically, the it mandates that the States conduct “a general
voter registration list maintenance program that makes a reasonable effort to remove
ineligible persons from the voter rolls by reason of the person’s death, or a change
in the residence of the registrant outside of the jurisdiction, in accordance with
procedures set forth in the NVRA” (The United States Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, 2017).
The National Change of Address Program (NCOA)
For the second requirement, the NVRA offers one example. The States can use the
permanent change-of-address records submitted to the USPS by voters. A United
States resident can fill out a change of address form on the Official USPS Change of
Address website or physically at a local post office, to have her mail forwarded to the
new residence or a PO Box. While from a voter’s point of view this serves primarily
not to lose any mail while moving for a price of 1.05 USD,2 the accumulated
data contains movers’ old and new addresses, including the date they requested the
service to start.
This data can be used by the States to check their voter data and to discern voters who
have moved. By distinguishing those who have moved away from the jurisdiction,
the election officials can remove the names of some voters. This is an important
1The States here indicate 44 States and the District of Columbia, with Idaho, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as exceptions.
2This is for ID verification.
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step in list maintenance, because it can reduce the cost of direct mail operations by
creating a cleaner list with fewer undeliverables and mistakes in delivery.
The only legal requirement is that this removal is performed 90 days prior to the
date of the federal election. To see the actual screenshots of change-of-address
applications and how it prompts voter registration data update, see Appendix A.1.
Note that the usage of the NCOA data is not mandatory.3 The NCOA processing is
just one example of a potential list maintenance activity that can be performed by
the States. A majority of the states do implement the NCOA processing (National
Association of Secretaries of State, 2017), California being one prominent state that
mandates NCOA processing by its own election laws.
California Elections Code
In California, counties can opt in to integrate NCOA processing into their list
maintenance, as an alternative to a residency confirmation postcard (CA Elec Code
§ 2222 (2017); 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(1)(A)). This is classified as third party address
changes, as opposed to first party address changes. Because there is a statewide
voter registration system in California, it is the Secretary of State that is in charge of
obtaining and disseminating the NCOA data (California Secretary of State, 2019).
Pursuant to California Code of Regulations § 20108.50 National Change of Address
Processing, the Secretary of State must NCOA process the statewide voter list, and
send any records of registrants that seem to have changed their address to the relevant
county officials.
The Justice Department’s Summary
The following is the 36th question posted in the Justice Department’s questions and
answers over the NVRA (The United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division, 2017). It details the role that NCOA processing plays in voter list mainte-
3Highton and Wolfinger (1998) wrote as follows (page 92):
The NVRA provides one alternative to this daunting list-cleaning procedure: States
may identify movers with the Postal Service’s computer file of address-change infor-
mation, known as theNational Change ofAddress (NCOA) program. About 40million
permanent change-of-address notices are filed each year with the Postal Service. The
NCOA file is updated daily and each change is kept for three years. This information
can be bought from two dozen licensed vendors who distribute customized NCOA
data sets. The NVRA requires that people purged by NCOA who move inside the




36. Do States have to use the NCOA process to initiate the notice
process?
No. States do not have to use the NCOA process. Under the NVRA,
States must have a general program that makes a reasonable effort to
identify and remove the names of voters who have become ineligible to
vote by means of a change of address. The program has to be uniform,
non-discriminatory, in compliance with the Voting Rights Act and must
be completed 90 days before a federal election. States otherwise have
discretion under the NVRA and HAVA in how they design their general
program, and States
For example, some general programs involve a State undertaking a uni-
formmailing of a voter registration card, sample ballot, or other election
mailing to all voters in a jurisdiction, and then using information ob-
tained from returned non-deliverable mail as the basis for correcting
voter registration records (for apparent moves within a jurisdiction) or
for initiating the notice process (for apparent moves outside a jurisdic-
tion or non-deliverable mail with no forwarding address noted).
Another example involves general programs where States initiate the
notice process based on information showing that a voter has not voted
in elections nor made contact with a registrar over some period of time.
This is not prohibited by the NVRA and its bar on removing voters
from the list solely for failure to vote, since it relies on the NVRA
notice process, and thus utilizes both a notice and a waiting period of
two federal general elections.
The following is the 38th question from the same source, detailing how the within-
county movers can vote.
38. Are there any protections in the NVRA for those eligible registered
voters who have changed address to another location within a registrar’s
jurisdiction, or are otherwise on an inactive voter list, but have not
notified the registrar prior to the date of a federal election?
Yes. The NVRA contains fail-safe provisions to enable such persons
who show up to vote on a federal election day to update their registration
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and to vote in that election even though they have not notified the
registrar of the address change:
1. An eligible registered voter who hasmoved to an address in an area
covered by the same polling place as his or her previous address
is permitted to vote at that same polling place upon oral or written
affirmation by the registrant of the change of address at the polling
place;
2. An eligible registered voter who has moved to an address in an
area covered by a different polling place from the polling place
for his or her previous address, but within the same registrar’s
jurisdiction and the same congressional district, at the option of
the registrant:
a) shall be permitted to correct the voting records and vote at
the old polling place upon oral or written affirmation by the
registrant of the new address before an election official at that
polling place; or
b) shall be permitted to correct the voting records and vote at a
designated central location within the same registrar’s juris-
diction, upon written affirmation by the registrant of the new
address on a standard form provided by the registrar; or
c) shall be permitted to correct the voting records for purposes
of future elections at the new polling place, and shall be
permitted vote in the current election at that polling place if
allowed under State law, upon confirmation by the registrant
of the new address by such means as are required by law.
A central voting location need not be made available by the registrar if
State law allows the person to vote at either the old or new polling place
in the current election upon oral or written affirmation of the address
change.
The failsafe provisions of Section 8 draw a distinction between the
registrant’s need for “affirmation” or “confirmation” of a new address,
depending upon the circumstances in which the failsafe voting occurs.
100
California Elections Code Section 2225
The following is the full text of CA Elec Code § 2225 (2017).
(a) Based on change-of-address data received from the United States
Postal Service or its licensees, the county elections official shall send
a forwardable notice, including a postage-paid and preaddressed return
form, to enable the voter to verify or correct address information.
Notification received through NCOA or Operation Mail that a voter has
moved and has given no forwarding address shall not require themailing
of a forwardable notice to that voter.
(b) If postal service change-of-address data indicates that the voter has
moved to a new residence address in California, the forwardable notice
shall be in substantially the following form:
“We have received notification that you have moved to a new residence
address in California. You will be registered to vote at your new address
unless you notify our office within 15 days that the address to which this
card was mailed is not a change of your permanent residence. You must
notify our office by either returning the attached postage-paid postcard,
or by calling toll free. If this is not a permanent residence, and if you
do not notify us within 15 days, you may be required to provide proof
of your residence address in order to vote at future elections.”
(c) If postal service change-of-address data received from a nonforward-
able mailing indicates that a voter has moved and left no forwarding
address, a forwardable notice shall be sent in substantially the following
form:
“We are attempting to verify postal notification that the voter to whom
this card is addressed has moved and left no forwarding address. If the
person receiving this card is the addressed voter, please confirm your
continued residence or provide current residence information on the
attached postage-paid postcard within 15 days. If you do not return this
card and continue to reside in California, youmay be required to provide
proof of your residence address in order to vote at future elections and,
if you do not offer to vote at any election in the period between the
date of this notice and the second federal general election following this
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notice, your voter registration will be cancelled and you will have to
reregister in order to vote.”
(d) The use of a toll-free number to confirm the old residence address is
optional. Any change to the voter address must be received in writing.
(Amended by Stats. 2015, Ch. 728, Sec. 68. (AB 1020) Effective
January 1, 2016. Operative September 26, 2016, when the Secretary of
State issued the certification prescribed by Stats. 2015, Ch. 728, Sec.
88.)
California Code of Regulations, Title 2: Administration
The following is § 20108.50. National Change of Address Processing in Division
7. Secretary of State, Chapter 2. Statewide Voter Registration Database.
Except during the 90 days prior to a Federal election, the Secretary of
State shall conduct monthly voter registration list maintenance using
a change of address service or services based on the United States
Postal ServiceNational Change ofAddress (NCOA) database to identify
address changes for registered voters. For records showing a change of
address, the Secretary of State shall automatically transmit a change of
address notice to the elections official in the county fromorwithinwhich
a voter has moved. Within five (5) business days of receipt of a change
of address notice from the Secretary of State the elections official shall
process the change of address notice pursuant to California Elections
Code Section 2225 and Section 2226 and submit any changes in the
registration record to Calvoter in accordance with Section 20108.15
and Section 20108.40.
United States Postal Services NCOALink
Privacy Act Statement. The following is the privacy act statement that accompa-
nies the web-based USPS change of address as of June 30, 2018. The emphasis is
added by the author.
Your information will be used to provide you with mail forwarding
and change of address services. Collection is authorized by 39 U.S.C.
401, 403, and 404. Providing the information is voluntary, but if not
provided we will not be able to process your request. We do not
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disclose your information to third parties without your consent,
except to facilitate the transaction, to act on your behalf or re-
quest, or as legally required. This includes the following limited
circumstances: to a congressional office on your behalf; to financial
entities regarding financial transaction issues; to a U.S. Postal Service
(USPS) auditor; to entities, including law enforcement, as required by
law or in legal proceedings; to contractors and other entities aiding
us to fulfill the service (service providers); to federal, state, local or
foreign government agencies regarding personnel matters or for the
performance of its duties; for the service of legal process; for voter
registration purposes; for jury service duties; to a disaster relief or-
ganization if the address has been impacted by a disaster or manmade
hazard; to individuals or companies already in possession of your name
and old mailing address, as an address correction service. Informa-
tion will also be provided to licensed service providers of the USPS to
perform mailing list correction service of lists containing your name
and old address. A list of these licensed service providers can be ob-
tained at the following URL: https://postalpro.usps.com/
mailing-and-shipping-services/NCOALink. Formore in-
formation regarding our privacy policies visitwww.usps.com/privacypolicy.
A.2 Data Wrangling
Re-processing the Database with NCOA
While the classification of movers can be performed by just monitoring the changes
to the voter data, I have re-processed the database with NCOA with the help of
Orange County election officials.4 This is to detect the moving dates of the first
class of voters, who disclosed their new address prior to having detected via NCOA.
This final step augments the USPS data to the voter file and determine movers’ their
residential stability—that is, the months spent at the new residence.
Data Filtering
A couple caveats should be noted. I have excluded voters whose age was observed
to be more than a 100. This decision accounts for the fact that for some voters, the
date of birth is either entered wrongly (e.g. January 1, 1900), or the dead voters
4The NCOA processing is formally named the NCOALink Product. According to the Postal
Service, the NCOALink Product is only provided to a selection of companies licensed by the Service.
The OCROV processed the data through a vendor of their choice at my request.
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have not been fully accounted for.
A.3 Descriptive Statistics
Here I present some descriptive statistics of data, as well as the values used in the
main text’s conditional plots.
Movers vs. Stayers
Table A.1 shows some comparisons between movers between the 2016-2018 elec-
tions and stayers in the final sample.
Variables Movers Stayers
% of General 2018 Turnout 63.6 70.1
% of Female, If Classified 51.8 50.6
Median Age 42 50
% of Republicans 33.2 31.4
% of Democrats 33.4 33.4
% of Voters Born Abroad 24.1 28.0
% of General 2016 Turnout, if Eligible 80.3 81.9
Table A.1: Movers vs. Stayers, Sample Data
Who Requests Change of Address?
Table A.2 shows comparisons between those who request change of address and
thosewho do not, given the initial classification ofmovers. Note that this comparison
is not a universal comparison.
Variables Change-of-AddressRequesters Non-Requesters
% of General 2018 Turnout 63.6 70.1
% of Female, If Classified 51.8 50.6
Median Age 42 50
% of Republicans 33.2 31.4
% of Democrats 33.4 33.4
% of Voters Born Abroad 24.1 28.0
% of General 2016 Turnout, if Eligible 80.3 81.9
Table A.2: Movers with Change-of-Address Requests and Those Without, Sample
Data
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A.4 Regression Results in Main Text, Full Table
This Section shows the summary of the generalized additive models and the linear
probability models in their full form, including all the coefficients from control
variables.
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A. Smooth terms (effective degrees of freedom / residual degrees of freedom)
Res. Stability × Same Address 3.353 1.148∗ 2.698 2.655 1.030 1.003 1.002
4.153 1.145 3.358 3.305 1.059 1.006 1.004
Res. Stability × Same Precinct 2.684 1.145 3.391 1.931 1.004 1.003 1.933
3.341 1.276 4.206 2.418 1.007 1.007 2.421
Res. Stability × Same Subdist. 7.205∗∗∗ 1.034 2.305 1.015 2.007 3.971 3.473∗∗
8.232 1.067 2.878 1.030 1.792 4.899 4.305
Res. Stability × Same Cong. 8.446∗∗∗ 3.810∗∗∗ 3.910∗ 1.013 1.792∗ 2.296 1.002
8.913 4.709 4.830 1.027 2.241 2.868 1.004
Res. Stability × Diff. Cong. 8.428∗∗∗ 3.177∗∗∗ 1.235 2.552 1.015 1.003∗ 1.002
8.908 3.945 1.433 3.183 1.029 1.007 1.003
Distance Moved 1.139∗ 1.009∗ 2.828 2.270 1.006 1.005 1.002
1.139 1.017 3.580 2.887 1.011 1.011 1.006
Age 7.991∗∗∗ 7.378∗∗∗ 7.314∗∗∗ 7.035∗∗∗ 7.603∗∗∗ 7.655∗∗∗ 8.115∗∗∗
8.655 8.227 8.200 7.998 8.473 8.365 8.752
Distance to Poll 4.947∗ 1.037 2.287 1.021 2.102∗ 1.011 1.814
6.035 1.074 2.910 1.041 2.676 1.021 2.303
Old Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
8.623∗∗∗ 8.140∗∗∗ 5.252∗∗ 8.377∗∗∗ 8.060∗∗∗ 3.017∗∗∗ 7.732∗∗∗
8.955 8.786 6.318 8.882 8.754 3.808 8.573
New Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
8.357∗∗∗ 7.866∗∗∗ 1.009∗ 6.994∗∗ 3.103∗∗ 2.371∗ 1.003
8.881 8.655 1.019 8.037 3.891 3.029 1.006
B. Parametric coefficients (estimate / standard error)
Same Precinct 0.053 0.043 0.003 0.303∗∗∗ 0.163 0.134 0.094
(0.050) (0.058) (0.053) (0.064) (0.084) (0.069) (0.080)
Same Subdist. 0.113∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.063 0.395∗∗∗ 0.170∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.064
(0.048) (0.054) (0.050) (0.060) (0.079) (0.064) (0.075)
Same Cong. −0.004 0.133∗∗ 0.019 0.312∗∗∗ 0.152∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.042) (0.047) (0.046) (0.056) (0.071) (0.056) (0.068)
Diff. Cong. −0.026 0.104∗ −0.018 0.325∗∗∗ 0.158∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.031
(0.045) (0.050) (0.050) (0.059) (0.074) (0.060) (0.071)
2016 Turnout 1.467∗∗∗
(0.017)
Times Moved −0.229∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.282∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.045) (0.032) (0.042)
PAV 0.291∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.024)
Female 0.172∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.105∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.042 0.136∗∗ 0.166∗
(0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.049) (0.066) (0.052) (0.067)
Male 0.215∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.049) (0.066) (0.052) (0.067)
Black 0.187∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.142∗ −0.096 −0.271∗ 0.316∗∗ −0.354∗∗
(0.073) (0.083) (0.079) (0.093) (0.133) (0.102) (0.132)
Hispanic −0.106∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ −0.315∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗ 0.093∗ −0.462∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.036) (0.051) (0.037) (0.049)
Others (Race) 0.125∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.050) (0.040) (0.049)
White 0.176∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.059∗ −0.130∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.041
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.040) (0.033) (0.040)
Independent/Third-Party −0.135∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗∗ −0.523∗∗∗ −0.616∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.030) (0.024) (0.028)
Democrat 0.316∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)
Born Abroad −0.263∗∗∗ −0.251∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.033) (0.027) (0.032)
39th Cong. District 0.115 0.200 0.279 −0.019 0.202 0.134 0.236
(0.155) (0.170) (0.171) (0.186) (0.268) (0.196) (0.247)
45th Cong. District 0.231 0.278∗ 0.325∗ 0.012 0.248 0.169 0.151
(0.155) (0.169) (0.170) (0.186) (0.267) (0.195) (0.246)
46th Cong. District −0.022 0.178 0.334∗ −0.025 0.169 0.079 0.169
(0.156) (0.170) (0.171) (0.187) (0.269) (0.197) (0.248)
47th Cong. District 0.015 0.147 0.243 −0.105 0.208 0.071 0.128
(0.156) (0.171) (0.172) (0.188) (0.270) (0.198) (0.249)
48th Cong. District 0.230 0.267 0.257 −0.021 0.182 0.154 0.055
(0.154) (0.169) (0.170) (0.185) (0.267) (0.195) (0.246)
49th Cong. District 0.289∗ 0.390∗∗ 0.254 −0.006 0.220 0.262 0.081
(0.157) (0.172) (0.171) (0.188) (0.269) (0.198) (0.248)
Constant −0.907∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ −0.901∗∗∗ −0.777∗∗∗ −2.195∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ −1.597∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.183) (0.184) (0.204) (0.289) (0.214) (0.269)
Observations 100,389 96,195 83,977 71,411 69,104 65,388 59,914
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.052 0.090 0.134 0.165 0.067 0.164
Log Likelihood −57,722.160 −45,323.170 −53,401.650 −41,960.780 −26,208.670 −34,083.580 −27,761.590
UBRE 57,859.880 45,412.880 53,480.550 42,045.840 26,277.130 34,150.990 27,832.550
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table A.3: Generalized Additive Model Results, Full Sample
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A. Smooth terms (effective degrees of freedom / residual degrees of freedom)
Res. Stability × Same Address 3.310 1.708∗ 2.771 2.732 1.148 1.002 1.000
4.102 1.004 3.448 3.400 1.281 1.003 1.001
Res. Stability × Same Precinct 2.559 1.004 3.169 1.930 3.181 1.541 3.155
3.189 1.008 3.937 2.416 3.954 1.904 3.924
Res. Stability × Same Subdist. 3.613∗ 1.113∗ 2.019 4.075 1.001∗∗∗ 1.001 3.368∗∗
4.472 1.218 2.522 6.027 1.001 1.002 4.177
Res. Stability × Same Cong. 3.003∗ 1.001 1.438 1.001 1.001 1.504 1.001
3.730 1.003 1.756 1.002 1.002 1.853 1.001
Res. Stability × Diff. Cong. 1.564∗∗ 1.003 1.002 1.002 1.808 1.003 1.084
1.939 1.006 1.005 1.004 2.274 1.005 1.163
Age 6.009∗∗∗ 4.398∗∗∗ 4.492∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 4.788∗∗∗ 6.285∗∗∗ 3.961∗∗∗
7.102 5.392 5.510 1.166 5.856 7.297 4.907
Distance to Poll 1.016 1.003 1.004 1.003 1.001 1.000 1.001
1.031 1.005 1.008 1.005 1.003 1.001 1.002
Old Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
5.223∗ 6.960∗∗ 3.146 3.645 1.002 1.000∗ 1.957
6.297 7.998 3.944 4.534 1.003 1.001 2.484
B. Parametric coefficients (estimate / standard error)
Same Precinct 0.057 0.053 −0.026 0.262∗∗∗ 0.120 0.118 0.031
(0.058) (0.068) (0.061) (0.073) (0.098) (0.080) (0.094)
Same Subdist. 0.053 0.184∗ 0.109 0.253∗∗ −0.093 0.238∗ −0.089
(0.077) (0.089) (0.079) (0.093) (0.130) (0.104) (0.122)
Same Cong. 0.009 0.305∗∗ −0.006 0.266∗∗ −0.024 0.312∗∗ −0.041
(0.080) (0.093) (0.083) (0.097) (0.134) (0.109) (0.127)
Diff. Cong. 0.001 −0.217 −0.172 −0.254 −1.032 0.086 0.333
(0.232) (0.241) (0.239) (0.296) (0.569) (0.286) (0.326)
Distance Moved −0.020 −0.106 0.185 0.407∗ 0.591∗ −0.139 0.505
(0.171) (0.200) (0.175) (0.201) (0.277) (0.230) (0.264)
Turnout 2016 1.484∗∗∗
(0.046)
Moved Times −0.222∗∗∗ −0.612∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.287∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗ −0.166 −0.226∗
(0.066) (0.072) (0.070) (0.085) (0.119) (0.088) (0.111)
PAV 0.163∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.087 0.806∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.048) (0.044) (0.051) (0.078) (0.056) (0.070)
Female 0.189 0.090 0.264∗ 0.294∗ −0.195 0.317∗ 0.331
(0.102) (0.116) (0.115) (0.141) (0.179) (0.140) (0.198)
Male 0.238∗ 0.031 0.251∗ 0.463∗∗ 0.062 0.251 0.510∗
(0.102) (0.116) (0.116) (0.141) (0.179) (0.140) (0.198)
Black 0.206 0.083 0.075 −0.095 0.008 0.742∗ −0.828
(0.209) (0.237) (0.233) (0.284) (0.373) (0.321) (0.465)
Hispanic 0.083 0.112 0.122 −0.203 −0.623∗∗∗ −0.053 −0.597∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.087) (0.087) (0.105) (0.148) (0.109) (0.146)
Others (Race) 0.305∗∗∗ 0.194∗ 0.159 −0.101 −0.336∗ 0.166 −0.134
(0.084) (0.094) (0.093) (0.110) (0.145) (0.119) (0.143)
White 0.332∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.043 −0.163 0.260∗ 0.020
(0.072) (0.082) (0.080) (0.094) (0.122) (0.102) (0.122)
Independent/Third-Party −0.226∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.398∗∗∗ −0.471∗∗∗ −0.392∗∗∗ −0.472∗∗∗ −0.472∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.059) (0.054) (0.061) (0.085) (0.069) (0.080)
Democrat 0.270∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗ −0.217∗∗ −0.122 −0.260∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.062) (0.051) (0.058) (0.078) (0.070) (0.074)
foreign_born −0.223∗∗∗ −0.309∗∗∗ −0.251∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗ −0.207∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.057) (0.056) (0.068) (0.093) (0.076) (0.091)
39th Cong. District 0.364 0.730 0.636 −0.791 −0.559 −0.777 −1.640∗∗
(0.395) (0.403) (0.475) (0.508) (0.612) (0.777) (0.569)
45th Cong. District 0.644 0.807∗ 0.542 −0.733 −0.581 −0.691 −1.877∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.401) (0.473) (0.505) (0.608) (0.775) (0.566)
46th Cong. District 0.157 0.698 0.634 −0.746 −0.581 −0.876 −1.704∗∗
(0.397) (0.405) (0.477) (0.510) (0.614) (0.778) (0.572)
47th Cong. District 0.210 0.614 0.735 −0.839 −0.717 −0.828 −1.944∗∗∗
(0.400) (0.408) (0.480) (0.513) (0.620) (0.781) (0.578)
48th Cong. District 0.654 0.900∗ 0.568 −0.708 −0.704 −0.744 −1.926∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.400) (0.473) (0.505) (0.608) (0.775) (0.565)
49th Cong. District 0.610 1.062∗∗ 0.461 −0.793 −0.776 −0.502 −2.182∗∗∗
(0.400) (0.412) (0.478) (0.511) (0.617) (0.781) (0.575)
Constant −1.313∗∗ 0.877∗ −1.250∗ −0.141 −1.092 1.730∗ 0.085
(0.419) (0.430) (0.498) (0.538) (0.655) (0.797) (0.619)
Observations 13,150 12,470 10,680 8,877 8,529 8,008 7,307
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.051 0.090 0.137 0.173 0.068 0.186
Log Likelihood −7,578.712 −5,909.561 −6,823.539 −5,199.565 −3,164.015 −4,214.901 −3,331.615
UBRE 7,619.864 5,942.088 6,855.060 5,224.926 3,178.778 4,238.004 3,348.890
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table A.4: Generalized Additive Model Results, Subsample of Movers within Half
Mile
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NCOA Treatment 0.059∗∗∗ −0.006 0.001 −0.004 −0.011 0.001 −0.010
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Same Address −0.008 −0.051 −0.038 −0.046 0.026 −0.117∗∗ −0.041
(0.040) (0.036) (0.049) (0.050) (0.039) (0.049) (0.047)
Same Precinct 0.014 −0.063∗ −0.032 −0.070 0.008 −0.079∗ −0.052
(0.036) (0.033) (0.042) (0.044) (0.034) (0.043) (0.041)
Same Cong. −0.040∗ −0.018 −0.015 −0.019 0.004 −0.039 −0.055∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028)
Diff. Cong. −0.051∗ −0.043∗ −0.022 −0.016 −0.013 −0.047 −0.076∗∗
(0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.026) (0.032) (0.031)
Distance Moved −0.002∗ 0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.0001 0.001 −0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
2016 Turnout 0.275∗∗∗
(0.014)
Times Moved −0.057∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.042∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Distance to Poll 0.013 −0.012 −0.030 0.007 −0.004 −0.006 −0.005
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
PAV† 0.054∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Age 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Female‡ 0.017 −0.006 −0.020 0.028 −0.020 0.038 0.015
(0.034) (0.032) (0.042) (0.043) (0.034) (0.044) (0.044)
Male‡ 0.062∗ −0.026 0.0001 0.093∗∗ 0.028 0.050 0.055
(0.034) (0.032) (0.042) (0.043) (0.034) (0.044) (0.044)
White 0.040∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.010 0.007 0.051∗ −0.009
(0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027)
Black 0.245∗∗∗ 0.113∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.111 0.015 0.141 0.163∗
(0.064) (0.060) (0.084) (0.086) (0.068) (0.088) (0.086)
Hispanic −0.030 0.063∗∗∗ 0.041 −0.066∗∗ −0.035 0.037 −0.061∗
(0.026) (0.023) (0.031) (0.032) (0.025) (0.032) (0.032)
Others (Race)‡‡ −0.005 0.073∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.034 0.020 0.020 −0.019
(0.026) (0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.025) (0.032) (0.032)
Independent/Third-Party −0.016 −0.055∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
Democrat 0.104∗∗∗ 0.021 0.142∗∗∗ −0.036∗ −0.0004 −0.021 −0.042∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018)
Old Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.0001 0.0003 −0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
New Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
0.001∗ 0.0005∗ 0.0003 0.00003 −0.0002 0.001 −0.00003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Born Abroad −0.044∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.055∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
39th Cong. District 0.113 0.229∗ 0.116 −0.145 −0.005 0.292∗∗ −0.173
(0.139) (0.120) (0.153) (0.145) (0.117) (0.143) (0.142)
45th Cong. District 0.156 0.252∗∗ 0.141 −0.148 −0.012 0.305∗∗ −0.156
(0.138) (0.120) (0.152) (0.144) (0.116) (0.142) (0.141)
46th Cong. District 0.108 0.234∗ 0.132 −0.152 −0.008 0.253∗ −0.155
(0.139) (0.120) (0.153) (0.145) (0.117) (0.143) (0.142)
47th Cong. District 0.125 0.208∗ 0.164 −0.153 −0.006 0.325∗∗ −0.111
(0.141) (0.122) (0.155) (0.147) (0.118) (0.145) (0.144)
48th Cong. District 0.157 0.239∗∗ 0.142 −0.156 −0.007 0.273∗ −0.176
(0.139) (0.120) (0.152) (0.144) (0.116) (0.142) (0.141)
49th Cong. District 0.150 0.246∗∗ 0.056 −0.147 −0.026 0.305∗∗ −0.213
(0.140) (0.121) (0.153) (0.146) (0.117) (0.144) (0.142)
Constant 0.011 0.410∗∗∗ 0.100 0.195 −0.146 0.142 0.099
(0.151) (0.132) (0.167) (0.161) (0.129) (0.159) (0.157)
Observations 5,539 5,035 4,341 3,680 3,553 3,366 3,082
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.043 0.081 0.135 0.136 0.057 0.136
Res. Std. Error 0.455 (df=5510) 0.392 (df=5007) 0.474 (df=4313) 0.448 (df=3652) 0.342 (df=3525) 0.419 (df=3338) 0.391 (df=3054)
F statistic 29.427
∗∗∗ 9.334∗∗∗ 15.164∗∗∗ 22.291∗∗∗ 21.695∗∗∗ 8.587∗∗∗ 18.902∗∗∗
(df=28; 5510) (df=27; 5007) (df=27; 4313) (df=27; 3652) (df=27; 3525) (df=27; 3338) (df=27; 3054)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
†: Permanent absentee voter.
‡: Voters with no clear gender classification are included as a baseline.
‡‡: Asian Americans are baseline race/ethnicity.
Table A.5: Effect of NCOAAutomatic Voter Registration, Linear ProbabilityModel
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Dependent Variable: General 2018 Turnout
Low Info Cost Distance MovedLess Than 0.5-mile
Distance Moved
Less Than 1 Mile
Distance Moved
Less Than 3 Miles
NCOA Treatment 0.044 0.050 0.060∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.034) (0.027) (0.018)
Same Address 0.035 0.015 −0.001
(0.054) (0.046) (0.043)
Same Precinct 0.053 0.083 0.064 0.031
(0.051) (0.054) (0.044) (0.038)
Distance Moved 0.050 −0.009
(0.111) (0.012)
Same Cong. 0.012 0.015 −0.020
(0.056) (0.039) (0.027)
Diff. Cong. −0.149 0.103 −0.052
(0.206) (0.093) (0.041)
2016 Turnout 0.299∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.038) (0.031) (0.021)
Times Moved 0.024 −0.027 −0.028 −0.041∗
(0.056) (0.038) (0.031) (0.022)
Distance to Poll −0.074 −0.002 −0.040 0.004
(0.063) (0.049) (0.040) (0.026)
PAV 0.045 0.006 0.021 0.068∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.035) (0.028) (0.019)
Age 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.024 −0.093 0.017 0.015
(0.113) (0.090) (0.077) (0.048)
Male 0.097 −0.037 0.051 0.057
(0.114) (0.091) (0.077) (0.048)
Black 0.488∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.158) (0.140) (0.101)
Hispanic 0.053 0.082 0.003 −0.050
(0.098) (0.077) (0.059) (0.037)
Others (Race) 0.065 0.130 0.084 −0.034
(0.101) (0.080) (0.060) (0.037)
White 0.048 0.142∗∗ 0.061 0.024
(0.093) (0.072) (0.054) (0.032)
Independent/Third-Party −0.022 −0.085∗∗ −0.044 −0.033
(0.056) (0.043) (0.034) (0.023)
Democrat 0.136∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.043) (0.035) (0.023)
Old Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
0.022 −0.002 0.0002 0.0001
(0.022) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
New Residence’s
Neighborhood Income
−0.019 0.003 0.002 0.001∗
(0.022) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Born Abroad −0.013 0.009 −0.013 −0.036
(0.052) (0.041) (0.033) (0.022)
39th Cong. District 0.042 0.224
(0.346) (0.148)
45th Cong. District −0.047 −0.011 0.037 0.238
(0.074) (0.059) (0.345) (0.147)
46th Cong. District −0.057 −0.006 −0.028 0.154
(0.086) (0.071) (0.346) (0.148)
47th Cong. District 0.111 0.115 0.067 0.210
(0.116) (0.090) (0.350) (0.151)
48th Cong. District 0.066 0.079 0.090 0.245∗
(0.074) (0.058) (0.345) (0.147)
49th Cong. District −0.111 −0.055 −0.062 0.187
(0.107) (0.086) (0.348) (0.150)
Constant −0.158 0.033 0.012 −0.060
(0.206) (0.167) (0.369) (0.169)
Observations 464 724 1,143 2,548
R2 0.176 0.179 0.145 0.137
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.149 0.124 0.128
Res. Std. Error 0.441 (df = 439) 0.441 (df = 697) 0.446 (df = 1115) 0.450 (df = 2519)
F Statistic 3.898
∗∗∗ 5.851∗∗∗ 6.989∗∗∗ 14.323∗∗∗
(df = 24; 439) (df = 26; 697) (df = 27; 1115) (df = 28; 2519)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
†: Permanent absentee voter.
‡: Voters with no clear gender classification are included as a baseline.
‡‡: Asian Americans are baseline race/ethnicity.
Table A.6: Effect of NCOA Automatic Voter Registration by Information/Social
Costs
109
A p p e n d i x B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 11 CFR 110.6 Earmarked Contributions
The following is the full excerpt of the United States Code, the material in italics
has been copied verbatim.
§ 110.6 Earmarked contributions 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(8)).
(a) General. All contributions by a person made on behalf of or
to a candidate, including contributions which are in any way
earmarked or otherwise directed to the candidate through an in-
termediary or conduit, are contributions from the person to the
candidate.
(b) Definitions.
(1) For purposes of this section, earmarked means a designa-
tion, instruction, or encumbrance, whether direct or indirect,
express or implied, oral or written, which results in all or
any part of a contribution or expenditure being made to, or
expended on behalf of, a clearly identified candidate or a
candidate’s authorized committee.
(2) For purposes of this section, conduit or intermediary means
any person who receives and forwards an earmarked contri-
bution to a candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee,
except as provided in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section.
(i) For purposes of this section, the following persons shall
not be considered to be conduits or intermediaries:
(A) An individual who is an employee or a full-time volun-
teer working for the candidate’s authorized committee,
provided that the individual is not acting in his or her
capacity as a representative of an entity prohibited
from making contributions;
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(B) A fundraising representative conducting joint fundrais-
ingwith the candidate’s authorized committee pursuant
to 11 CFR 102.17 or 9034.8;
(C) An affiliated committee, as defined in 11 CFR 100.5(g);
(D) A commercial fundraising firm retained by the candi-
date or the candidate’s authorized committee to assist
in fundraising; and
(E) An individual who is expressly authorized by the can-
didate or the candidate’s authorized committee to en-
gage in fundraising, and who occupies a significant
position within the candidate’s campaign organization,
provided that the individual is not acting in his or her
capacity as a representative of an entity prohibited
from making contributions.
(ii) Any person who is prohibited from making contributions
or expenditures in connection with an election for Fed-
eral office shall be prohibited from acting as a conduit
for contributions earmarked to candidates or their au-
thorized committees. The provisions of this section shall
not restrict the ability of an organization or committee to
serve as a collecting agent for a separate segregated fund
pursuant to 11 CFR 102.6.
(iii) Any person who receives an earmarked contribution shall
forward such earmarked contribution to the candidate or
authorized committee in accordance with 11 CFR 102.8,
except that -
(A) A fundraising representative shall follow the joint fundrais-
ing procedures set forth at 11 CFR 102.17.
(B) A person who is prohibited from acting as a conduit
pursuant to paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section shall
return the earmarked contribution to the contributor.
(c) Reporting of earmarked contributions -
(1) Reports by conduits and intermediaries.
(i) The intermediary or conduit of the earmarked contribu-
tion shall report the original source and the recipient
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candidate or authorized committee to the Commission or
the Secretary of the Senate, as appropriate (see 11 CFR
part 105), and to the recipient candidate or authorized
committee.
(ii) The report to the Commission or Secretary shall be in-
cluded in the conduit’s or intermediary’s report for the
reporting period in which the earmarked contribution
was received, or, if the conduit or intermediary is not
required to report under 11 CFR part 104, by letter to
the Commission within thirty days after forwarding the
earmarked contribution.
(iii) The report to the recipient candidate or authorized com-
mittee shall be made when the earmarked contribution is
forwarded to the recipient candidate or authorized com-
mittee pursuant to 11 CFR 102.8.
(iv) The report by the conduit or intermediary shall contain
the following information:
(A) The name andmailing address of each contributor and,
for each earmarked contribution in excess of $200, the
contributor’s occupation and the name of his or her
employer;
(B) The amount of each earmarked contribution, the date
received by the conduit, and the intended recipient as
designated by the contributor; and
(C) The date each earmarked contribution was forwarded
to the recipient candidate or authorized committee and
whether the earmarked contribution was forwarded in
cash or by the contributor’s check or by the conduit’s
check.
(v) For each earmarked contribution passed through the con-
duit’s or intermediary’s account, the information speci-
fied in paragraph (c)(1)(iv) (A) through (C) of this section
shall be itemized on the appropriate schedules of receipts
and disbursements attached to the conduit’s or intermedi-
ary’s report, or shall be disclosed by letter, as appropri-
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ate. For each earmarked contribution forwarded in the
form of the contributor’s check or other written instru-
ment, the information specified in paragraph (c)(1)(iv)
(A) through (C) of this section shall be disclosed as a
memo entry on the appropriate schedules of receipts and
disbursements attached to the conduit’s or intermediary’s
report, or shall be disclosed by letter, as appropriate.:
(2) Reports by recipient candidates and authorized committees.
(i) The recipient candidate or authorized committee shall
report each conduit or intermediary who forwards one
or more earmarked contributions which in the aggregate
exceed $200 in any election cycle.
(ii) The report by the recipient candidate or authorized com-
mittee shall contain the following information:
(A) The identification of the conduit or intermediary, as
defined in 11 CFR 100.12;
(B) The total amount of earmarked contributions received
from the conduit or intermediary and the date of re-
ceipt; and
(C) The information required under 11 CFR 104.3(a) (3)
and (4) for each earmarked contribution which in the
aggregate exceeds $200 in any election cycle.
(iii) The information specified in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) (A) through
(C) of this section shall be itemized on Schedule A at-
tached to the report for the reporting period in which the
earmarked contribution is received.
(d) Direction or control.
(1) A conduit’s or intermediary’s contribution limits are not af-
fected by the forwarding of an earmarked contribution except
where the conduit or intermediary exercises any direction or
control over the choice of the recipient candidate.
(2) If a conduit or intermediary exercises any direction or control
over the choice of the recipient candidate, the earmarked
contribution shall be considered a contribution by both the
original contributor and the conduit or intermediary. If the
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conduit or intermediary exercises any direction or control
over the choice of the recipient candidate, the report filed
by the conduit or intermediary and the report filed by the
recipient candidate or authorized committee shall indicate
that the earmarked contribution is made by both the original
contributor and the conduit or intermediary, and that the
entire amount of the contribution is attributed to each.
[ 54 FR 34113, Aug. 17, 1989 and 54 FR 48580, Nov. 24, 1989;
61 FR 3550, Feb. 1, 1996; 81 FR 94240, Dec. 23, 2016]
B.2 Hypothetical Examples of Campaign Contributions
An example best illustrates how some donors become hidden. We also show how
that affects summary statistics that might be computed using these data. Suppose
that the following four hypothetical individual contributors donate during the 2016
election cycle (January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2016). We assume that a committee
does not voluntarily report any contributions not required by the Federal Code of
Regulations.
1. Anne gives $500 as a one-time donation to the Democratic National Commit-
tee.
2. Diana gives to her junior Senator $60 every month.
3. Ruby gives $5 to her House Representative every month.
4. Gilbert gives $5 to the same Representative every month, but via an interme-
diary committee.
Because Anne’s single transaction well-exceeds the threshold, she is free of any kind
of censoring. The rest, however, may be subject to censoring.
1. For Diana, given the $200 threshold, only her fourth and later contributions
will be disclosed, since $180 < $200 < $240. Her first three months’ contri-
butions will not be recorded.
2. Ruby’s contributions altogether only add up to $120, well below the disclosure
threshold, and none of her contributionswill bemade public. Her $120will be,
however, added to a total sum of ‘unitemized contributions’ of the committee.
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3. Although Gilbert’s contribution pattern is identical to Ruby, because he gives
through an intermediary committee, every single one of his records will be
itemized.
Given these, what we really see in the FEC database are only the following itemized
contributions:
1. Anne has a single transaction of $500. Her year-to-date aggregate is recorded
as $500.
2. Diana has a twenty-one transactions of $60. The first transaction records her
year-to-date aggregate as $240, and later ones correspondingly $300, $360, ...
3. Gilbert has twenty-four transactions each of $5 with corresponding year-to-
date aggregates, clearly marked as earmarked contributions, in the intermedi-
ary committee’s report. Gilbert’s true intended recipient, his representative,
need not disclose any contributions from him on her own reports.
If the researcher utilizes only data from committees that are final recipients, both
Gilbert and Ruby are wiped from view. If she cares to investigate intermediary
committees’ reports as well, Gilbert’s actions are fully observable, while Ruby,
identical to Gilbert except for intermediaries, becomes completely hidden.
We can immediately spot several problems with descriptive statistics. With only
observed transactions, it is difficult to infer the true state of the world. For example,
the true mean of donor’s total contribution sum is $545. The mean estimated using
only itemized contribution would be little more than $626—an upwardly biased
estimate. The mean frequency estimate may also be biased. From a researcher’s
point of view, how many times Diana has actually given is a mystery. She may
have given just one more time. For instance, she may have given $180 in her
first contribution, then started giving in $60 increments. However, we also cannot
completely rule out the possibility that she has given ten, twenty, fifty, or even a
hundred different times.
Another concern is how Gilbert is visible while Ruby is not, and what researchers
may infer from seeing just the censored sample. For example, two major parties
have different utilization levels of intermediary committees, with the Democratic
party much more reliant on them than the Republican party. Suppose we pool
every transaction observable, regardless of which report it comes from. Then the
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data will be over-representative of small Democratic donors, and if not careful, one
may falsely conclude that Democratic committees are much more “grassroots” than
they truly. In truth, Republicans are giving just as similarly but just not through
intermediary committees, hence the small Republican donors hidden. To compare
committees on an equal footing, there must be substantial filtering that accounts for
the data generating process.
B.3 ActBlue
ActBlue is a non-profit that offers “fundraising technology for the left.”1 First
established in 2004, it contracts with Democratic campaigns to serve as a conduit,
with a flat rate of 3.95% fee for every contribution it processes. Having grown into
the central “online clearinghouse for Democratic action,”2 more than 400 federal
committees used ActBlue to raise money in 2014 (Willis, 2014). In 2016, more
than 1,400 federal campaign committees have used ActBlue as an intermediary
committee. In the 2018 election cycle, it raised 85 million as of May 20, 2017, and
more than 1 billion as of October 17, 2018—the top political action committee in
the amount raised, almost four times the Republican National Committee, which is
next in line in amounts raised from a political action committee.
Unlike Emily’s List, however, ActBlue’s website does not recommend candidates
or causes to donate to. It simply facilitates receipts for political operations and
forwards contributions to its final destination. In this sense, it is more like a credit
card company for political fundraising, but for mostly Democratic causes. This is a
different practice from bundling, notably used by Emily’s List.3
As of 2017, ActBlue reported to have processed $522,705,365 USD with $31.95
average contribution size, and had 7,892 groups raising money,4 ranging from the
Democratic Senate Congressional Committee to Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who
1ActBlue, About Us, https://secure.actblue.com/about, retrieved April 28, 2017.
2ActBlue Summary, Center for Responsive Politics, https://www.opensecrets.org/
orgs/summary.php?id=D000021806. Retrieved April 28, 2017.
3The following receipt of Emily’s List report shows this clearly. All three contributions here are
not earmarked, but they have an ‘X’ mark in their Memo Itemwhere it is written “TammyDuckworth
Contributions.” This means that all three individuals have directly contributed to Emily’s List, which
will bundle these receipts and contribute to Tammy Duckworth’s principal campaign committee as
an organizational contribution. If we only investigate individual contributions, it may make sense
to include these observations as well. However, I do not yet include such observations, as some of
them are inconsistent in how they are forwarded and there is room for miscounting one duplicate
contribution as two. See the following receipt of Emily’s List and another receipt of Hillary for
America, in which there was no mention of an earmark in the former but is marked as an earmark in
the destination committee’s report.
4ActBlue, 2017 in Review, https://report.actblue.com/. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
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continues Sanders’ legacy by offering students and activists the option to donate $27
on her ActBlue pages.
B.4 2020 Democratic Campaign Quotes
The following are some quotes from the Democratic primary candidates’ donation
websites, simultaneously captured on June 23, 2019, trying to sway individuals and
especially potentially smaller donors:
– Our campaign finance system is broken and I want to fix it. We need to
end Citizens United and get dark money out of politics. That’s why we’re
rejecting donations from corporate PACs and federal lobbyists. Let’s build
this campaign from the ground up. Are you in? (Cory Booker)
– “We’re powering our movement one donation at a time. No corporate PACs.
No federal lobbyists. No individual super PAC. Just us—together.” (Kirsten
Gillibrand)
– “We’re not taking a dime from corporate PACs, so your donation is critical to
our success.” (Kamala Harris)
– “Donate $5 today to show the strength of our people-powered campaign.”
(Amy Klobuchar)
– “Your contribution doesn’t just ensure that we have the resources we need
to run and to win the White House: it ensures that our democracy is once
again powered by people, and only people. Not PACs, not special interests,
not corporations.” (Beto O’Rourke)
– “We made it to the first debates! Keep the momentum going by donating $1
today!” (Eric Swalwell)
– Warren for President does not accept contributions from PACs of any kind or
federally registered lobbyists. (Elizabeth Warren)
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B.5 Demographics and Occupations of Donors
Table B.1: Demographics and Occupations of Immediately Visible, Eventually
Visible, and Hidden Donors, 2016 Sanders Campaign
Immediately Visible Eventually Visible Hidden
% of Men 60.7% 56.2% 53.2%
% of Whites 92.0% 90.0% 86.7%
% of Blacks 2.3% 2.9% 3.0%
% of Hispanics 2.9% 4.5% 7.4%
% of Asians 2.8% 2.4% 2.9%
% of Unemployed 23.7% 27.5% 25.7%
% of Engineers 4.9% 4.8% 3.1%
% of Teachers 2.8% 4.4% 4.9%
% of Retired 7.4% 2.9% 1.3%
% of Attorneys 3.6% 1.9% 1.1%
% of Professors 2.4% 2.0% 1.2%
% of Physicians 3.5% 1.7% 0.8%
% of Consultants 2.1% 1.8% 1.3%
% of Students 0.8% 1.3% 4.0%
% of Homemakers 0.5% 0.3% 0.3%
B.6 Comparisons with Primary Winners
One thing that should be noted is that Sanders is a candidate who did not make
it past the primaries in 2016. Therefore, the descriptive statistics that we see may
differ had he won the primaries. Although we do not have individual-level details
for other candidates, in this Section we present some aggregate trends to compare
the trends. Figure 1 shows the proportion of unitemized contributions against total
individual contributions reported in a given period—monthly for the even year and
quarterly for the odd year—for 2012 and 2016 candidates. Except for Sanders, all
others are general election candidates.
Notice that the trends are quite heterogeneous by candidate, and there is no fixed
trend for general election candidates. In case of Romney’s 2012 race and Clinton
in 2016, the proportion of unitemized money slowly seems to climb, while it drops
for Obama 2012 or Trump 2016. In addition, note that Figure 1 is not equal to
showing how small and large donors give, since the unitemized givers in January of
2012/2016 can turn into itemized/large donors at a later month.






































Figure B.1: Proportion of Unitemized Contributions in Total Individual Contribu-
tions, by FEC Regular Reporting Period
B.1
licitation strategies, since his campaign was uniquely leaning towards small donors.
In that hypothetical case, itemized donations would increase. However, it is also
possible that the trend from Obama 2012 continues, and even more unitemized con-
tributions emerge, since the campaign’s small donor strategy was a strongly pushed
rhetoric, especially against PACs, corruption, and lobbyists.
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A p p e n d i x C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
C.1 Classical Calculations of Breakpoints
In this section, we briefly compare the sequential segmentation smooth splines
with the classical approaches to detecting breakpoints. For this, we use the
strucchange package in R, written and maintained by Achim Zeileis et al.
The package description is as follows: “testing, monitoring, and dating structural
changes in (linear) regression models.” It introduces two approaches, one of which
is F tests (Chow tests) designed for testing known breaks, and generalized fluctuation
tests which minimizes the residual sum of squares of segmented linear regressions.
Again, these are a different approach with a different philosophy from the nonpara-
metric, sequential segmentation splines method.
One canonical data that the two classical approaches are applied to is the Nile data,
or the 102 years’ worth of the Nile’s annual flow at Aswan. There is a known break
for this data which is the completion of the Aswan dam in 1898, from which point
the flow level decreases. From both the OLS-based CUSUM tests and the F statistics
this single break is detected, and a two-segment model declared optimal. Figure
C.1 shows the final model fit.
When the spline method is applied to the Nile data, it gives the following estimate
as in Figure C.1. No breaks are detected. This is because when smooth splines are
default, it smooths over the Nile flow over a long interval as downwards.
The results do not change even when we model the 1898 as a known break, as the
BIC statistics are as follows for the sequential candidates of breaks: 6.443 for 1898,
10.024 for 1965 augmented, 14.482 for 1890 augmented, and so on. Splines only
BIC is 5.621, hence there are no breaks.
Is this a false negative? It depends on the prior belief of the researcher about the
data. If the researcher expects the data to be more or less stationary around a linear
trend, and wishes to detect for level changes, the classical approaches fit better. If
trends are expected to be nonlinear and we are still interested in sudden breaks, the
spline method is our friend. On a more positive note, note that the first of the breaks
chosen by the spline method is also 1898.
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Figure C.1: Optimal Fitted Model for the Nile Data, F Statistics Method
Figure C.2: Sequential Segmentation Spline Fit for the Nile Data
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Having tested the Nile data with the spline method, we will now test the Bush poll
data, the first example in Ratkovic and Eng (2010), with the classical methods, to
see if they can also detect the two breaks at the 9/11 attacks and the start of the Iraq
invasion, as does the spline method in Figure C.3.
Figure C.3: Sequential Segmentation Spline Fit for the Bush Poll Data
Surprisingly, in Figure C.4, we see that the F statistics method fails to catch the 9/11,
the more prominent of the jumps. While the method catches the Iraq invasion (more
precisely, as March 17, 2003), it catches the following four more breaks: March 7,
2002, March 26, 2004, March 21, 2005, and June 11, 2006. The segmentations,
however, do not seem to be an accurate summary of the bush poll’s behavior, and
misses the most obvious of the breaks.
We conclude that we cannot easily assess one method’s “superiority” over another,
as they are simply based on different assumptions about the underlying process of
the data and have different strengths. For our purposes, the spline method is better
than the classical structural break tests.
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Figure C.4: Optimal Fitted Model for the Bush Poll Data, F Statistics Method
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C.2 Primary Forecasts for All Candidates from FiveThirtyEight



























































































































Figure C.6: National Primary Polls by Party, FiveThirtyEight, 2020 (All Candidates)
C.3 Additional Figures by State
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